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This dissertation seeks to represent, as clearly as it is possible, South Africa's 
National Party perceptions on United States foreign policy in the 1980s. The primary 
area of focus is the policy switch from constructive engagement to punitive sanctions 
in the mid-1980s and the circumstances to which they have given rise. The following 
is a brief summary and the contents of the dissertatiop.. 
The dissertation will give a complete and formal statement in chapter two on 
U.S. foreign ·policy toward South Africa since approximately World War Two. The 
dissertation will provide a clear definition and understanding of economic sanctions in 
chapter three and touch on the curren_t on-going sanctions debate in South Africa. The 
core of the dissertation is displayed in chapter four which is a presentation the of field 
data collected from personal interviews with a third of the National Party caucus. This 
displays the National Party's perceptions on U.S. foreign policy. Following, chapter five 
presents alternative views to those held by the NP on the same issues discussed in 
chapter four. The final chapter makes an attempt at some conclusions based on the 
data presented in the dissertation. 
This study is important because it maintains that the data and questions 
presented in this dissertation offer interview material that has been little studied in the 





A complex variety of factors make up the ruling National Party's perceptions 
of the aims behind the United States foreign policy toward South Africa. During the 
1980s this area of U.S. foreign policy was of great importance to almost all South 
Africans as well as to many individuals and organizations in the United States. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to explore the perceptions which have underlain and 
influenced an aspect of white South Africa's responses to the foreign policy approaches 
of the U.S. in. the 1980s. By examining the National Party's responses both to the policy 
of constructive engagement and the 1986 switch to punitive sanctions this dissertation 
aims to deepen the understanding of NP Parliamentarians' perception of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
This study will assume that relations between the United States and South 
Africa have intensified since the Second World War and more particularly over the 
past twenty years. The intensification of relations has been brought about by a wide 
and complex array of inter-related forces. These, among others, include: 
I. The developing economic, political and social circumstances in South 
Africa and the needs to which they have given rise; 
II. The relations of South Africa with other states and territories m 
Southern Africa; 
III. The developing social concerns which have occurred in the United States 
and which have, by comparative association, spilled over into US/South African 
relations; 
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IV. The amount of influence carried by different policy approaches of 
previous and current U.S. presidential administrations; 
V. The shifting bilateral economic and political strategic interests of the 
United States and; 
VI. The changing patterns of economic and political values in the 
international sphere. 
These concerns have contributed to an alternating U.S. agenda towards South 
Africa. While an outline of developments in post-World War II relations between the 
U.S. and South Africa is provided, an intensive examination of relations between the 
two countries is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, the chapters of this work 
that focus on U.S. policy toward South Africa specifically deal with the period of 
constructive engagement during the first Reagan Administration until the enactment 
of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in the middle of Reagan's second 
term in 1986. 
As CAAA remained in place until July 1991 the year 1986 may not, at first 
glance, appear to be the logical cut-off point for this dissertation. However, the core 
of this work consists of material gathered from a representative sample of NP 
parliamentarians during May and June of 1990. At this time they were asked to cast 
their minds back over the era of constructive engagement and the break with that 
policy in 1986. 
By 1991 U.S.-imposed sanctions were in the process of being removed as South 
Africa appeared to be moving toward an acceptance of a democratic constitution. 
Nevertheless, in 1986 the initial imposition of sanctions marked an important turning-
point in US/South African relations, producing reactions in South Africa which have 
ranged from outright opposition to cooperation. 
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This dissertation endeavors to shed light on some of these responses. Thus, the 
central tasks of this work are firstly, the determination of National Party politicians' 
perceptions of the motives behind U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa during the 
1980s and secondly, an interpretation of such perceptions. 
The attempt to interpret perception inevitably leads one into a Pandora's Box 
of problems. To begin with, as we will discuss later, the term perception itself is an 
ambiguous one, difficult to define, nearly impossible to pinpoint. How do we know 
whether someone is sharing his/her honest perception of an event with us or is merely 
telling us what he/she wants us to believe? Moreover, how do we know whether a 
person's perception of an event represents reality or rather a distortion of it? In other 
words, how do we distinguish fact from fantasy? 
Nonetheless, despite these serious difficulties in dealing with perception, the fact 
remains that people's stated perceptions --- real or otherwise --- often reveal a great 
deal about the context in which they operate. As such, perceptions cannot be dismissed 
merely because they are difficult to grasp. Rather the student of politics must make a 
concerted effort at perception analysis through a careful delineation of the field of 
inquiry. 
Toward this end, this dissertation, while acknowledging the array of possible 
idiosyncratic explanations for NP perceptions, sets forth three general hypotheses 
concerning these perceptions. Hypothesis one operates from the assumption that the 
change in U.S. policy signalled by CAAA was perceived in an almost exclusively 
negative light by NP parliamentarians. It states that: 
National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy of sanctions to be 
motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the United 
States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and 
interests of South Africa as a whole, white population included. 
.. 
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Hypothesis two, on the other hand, assumes a more positive perception of U.S. intent 
on the part of NP politicians. It states that: 
National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a 
sincere desire to ensure not only fundamental change in the South African 
social formation but also a significant political and economic role for whites as 
well as non-whites. 
Finally, hypothesis three states that: 
U.S. imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, played a 
marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South African government 
to make fundamental changes. 
Through extensive interviews with Parliamentary members of the National Party 
this thesis sets forth to determine which of the first ~o hypotheses more accurately 
reflects NP perceptions. In other words it attempts to understand the relationship 
between the two hypothetical statements and reality. Moreover, the third hypothesis 
seeks to build on the first two hypotheses, thus making a significant contribution to the 
sanctions debate on the extent to which sanctions contributed to the process of 
fundamental change that South Africa is currently undergoing. 
The central methodological requirement of this dissertation clearly then is the 
determination of National Party perceptions of both the objectives and motivations of 
US foreign policy. The research procedure carried out toward this end are as follows: 
Research and analysis was made of the official reports, public speeches, and 
academic literature containing the stated responses of NP Parliamentarians to US 
foreign policy in order to provide an informed framework for an interview format. 
An interview questionnaire consisting of 20 questions was designed to elicit NP 
perception of US foreign policy both before and after CAAA. 
Standard and structured interviews were conducted with a random sample of 
1/3 of all National Party members of Parliament during a two-month period in 1990. 
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Likewise standard and structured interviews were also conducted with selected 
key policy-makers in order to obtain a sample of contrasting viewpoints. 
Interview responses were collated to reflect NP perceptions. 
Results were assessed in relation to the two working hypothesis posited at the 
outset of this study. 
At this point some of the unavoidable limitations of this dissertation should be 
noted. To begin with, since one is dealing with recent circumstances, primary archival 
sources have not always been available. Additionally, as the writer of this dissertation 
is a foreign student and does not speak Afrikaans a language barrier has in certain 
instances existed. Lastly, as the data collected in this dissertation are rich, it provides 
for numerous avenues of analysis which, unfortunately, cannot all be explored within 
the confines 0f a master's dissertation. 
This dissertation has assumed that NP Parliamentarians' responses to U.S. 
foreign policy are shaped by perceptions of their environment. Thus, it is necessary at 
the outset of this work to understand precisely what is and is not meant by the term 
perception as well as to determine the salient factors influencing NP perception. As 
such, the remainder of this introductory chapter will focus on clarification of the 
central terminology and approaches employed in this study. 
A review of the process of perception analysis as it applies to the South African 
political context will be provided before a closer look is taken at one of the most 
important factors motivating NP perceptions, namely Afrikaner nationalism. Lastly, this 
chapter will conclude by suggesting that it is this domestic factor which in many ways 
has shaped NP Party perceptions of US foreign policy during the 1980's. 
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1.1 PERCEPTION 
The study of relations between the United States and South Africa must, by 
definition, make reference to the behavior of these two states. Put another way, it must 
come to terms with the behavior of the individual decision makers who act on behalf 
of their respective governments. 
Embarking on an inquiry into the causes and consequences of human behavior 
might at first seem beyond the realm of the student of politics. Yet, as Paul Viotti and 
Mark Kauppi have noted in their recent study of international relations theory, 
disciplines are rarely self-contained in the social sciences. Indeed, the study of 
international relations between states now incorporates several subjects including 
economics, sociology and psychology, to name a few. 1 
Dealing as it does with the process of human thought-formation the study of 
perception is closely linked with the study of psychology in particular. Indeed, 
perception analysis is one of the many multi-disciplinary approaches to international 
relations which has emerged from the behavioralist movement of the 1960's. As 
Herbert C. Kelman notes: 
"Psychologists and social scientists in related fields have increasingly addressed 
themselves to matters of policy in the field of international relations: They 
have questioned some of the psychological assumptions underlying various 
approaches to foreign policy and have developed policy recommendations 
based, at least in part, on psychological considerations."2 
Before one can discuss the actual process of perception-formation, the term 
perception itself needs to be analyzed. One inevitably encounters many difficulties in 
attempting to come to terms with the concept perception. As the word perception is 
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is often incorrectly used as a synonym for a number of other terms including attitudes, 
values, and beliefs, we will first distinguish it from these terms before providing a 
precise definition. Thereafter, we will move on to a discussion of the 'level of analysis' 
problem with regard to perception. 
1.1.1 Perception: What it is Not 
Perhaps the best way to unravel what perception is, is to look at what it is not. 
As noted above, terms such as attitude, value and belief are often confused with the 
word perception. While these terms are, in fact, closely linked to the meaning of 
perception subtle, yet important, distinctions set them apart from it. 
Attitudes deal with our opinions or feelings about certain things. As K. J. Holsti 
tells us an attitude "can be conceived as a general evaluative proposition about some 
object, fact or condition .... "3 When we speak of a person's attitude toward something 
we are generally referring to how he or she feels about it --- positive or negative, good 
or bad. Thus the statement 'John has a good attitude toward his work' implies that 
John has positive feelings about the project he is doing. 
Established attitudes help form the perceptions a policy-maker may have of a 
particular situation. Indeed, as Kelman notes, attitude is a characteristic of perception -
-- the "general affective orientation toward an object is what the term attitude usually 
refers to."4 With regard to the international arena Holsti says that: 
" ... attitudes may have important effects on how policy-makers react to actions, 
signals, and demands of other states, perceive the intentions of other 
governments, and define their own objectives towards others."5 
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In other words, ones perceptions of an international event are likely to be affected by 
one's initial attitudes toward it. 
Like attitudes, values help determine one's perceptions. However, while 
attitudes towards things can be a function of either past or present circumstances, 
values are a usually derived from one's background. According to Holsti, values: "are 
the result of upbringing, political socialization in various group contexts, indoctrination, 
and personal experience." As such, values often "serve as standard against which our 
own actions and those of others are judged and are thus the bases of many of our 
attitudes .... " and by extension our perceptions.6 
Beliefs, on the other hand, are different from both attitudes and values. 
Whereas attitudes are ways of thinking which affect our values or principles, beliefs are 
things thought to be true. Thus, beliefs deal with explicit assumptions of truth rather 
than implicit thoughts or judgements. As Holsti states, "beliefs can be defined as 
propositions that policy-makers hold to be true, even if they cannot be verified.'17 
Our beliefs --- the things we assume to be true --- often precede and influence 
our perceptions. As with our attitudes and values our beliefs represent one of the 
many psychological components we bring to the perception-forming process. Having 
shown what perception is not, the next logical step for this chapter then becomes to 
demonstrate what it is. 
1.1.2 Defining Perception 
Perception can probably best be described in terms of the evaluation individuals 
regularly make of their environment. Indeed, perception refers to the process whereby 
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one interprets events on the basis of attitudes, values and beliefs. Holsti refers to 
perceptions as images which shape individuals' "actions and reactions" to their 
environment. As Holsti explains, images are: 
"individuals' perceptions of an object, fact or condition; their evaluation of that 
object, fact or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or 
hostility, or value; and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from that object, 
fact or condition".8 
It is from this definition that the term perception will be understood, and it will 
be used in this way throughout the dissertation. 
1.1.3 Perception: The Problems of Image, Reality and Levels of Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, perception analysis inevitably confronts the student of 
politics with a number of serious empirical problems. To begin_ with, a discrepancy 
often exists between what is real and what is perceived as being real. Images of 
situations can frequently be different from reality itself. 
As Harold and Margaret Sprout argue: 
"One can distinguish two kinds of psychological events ... On the one hand, 
individuals may perceive what does not exist or may fail to perceive what does 
exist. On the other hand, since what is perceived is interpreted in the light of 
past experience, individuals with different back~rounds may interpret quite 
differently the same perceived objects or events." 
Thus, according to Holsti, one's image of reality is frequently distorted· by the 
particular attitudes, values, beliefs or faulty expectations one brings to a situation. 
While individuals are constantly barraged by an assortment of input from their 
environment they actually only respond to or see a minute part of it. When presented 
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with new messages, most individuals engage in a complex screening process whereby 
they either only respond to the parts "relevant to a particular situation" or " 'see 'only 
information that conforms to their values, beliefs or expectations." Thus, as Holsti 
notes, "There are both physical and psychological factors that can distort the 
information upon which policy maker's images of reality are based."10 
Another problem frequently encountered when dealing with perception entails 
levels of analysis. In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert 
Jervis argues that in order to determine the relationship between perception and the 
decision-making process of a state one must first locate the appropriate level for 
analysis. Such identification helps one to decide why "all states of the same kind [i.e. 
with the same internal characteristics and politics] [don't] behave the same way in the 
same objective situation .... "11 
Jervis contends that there are four main levels of analysis to be considered when 
dealing with perception: the level of decision-making, of the bureaucracy, of the nature 
of the state and the working of domestic politics, and finally of international 
environment.12 
No one level of analysis is necessarily more important than the others. Rather, 
depending on the area of perception one is analyzing, they are all of potential 
significant value. The central task for the student of perception then is the 
determination of the level best suited to the issue one is dealing with and the answers 
one seeks.13 In order to determine which level of analysis is most appropriate for our 
study of National Party perceptions of US foreign policy a brief discussion of each level 
will now follow. 
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The decision-making level in perception analysis focuses on the nature of the 
individual. In essence it attempts to determine the relationship between the 
perceptions of the individual government official and his or her effect on the policies 
of a state. Thus, as the Sprouts have noted, the starting point for analysis at this level 
is the determination of" ... the policy-maker's mental image of the environment or 
situation."14 
The bureaucratic level, on the other hand, explores the way in which an 
individual's perceptions are influenced by his or her role in a bureaucracy. As Jervis 
explains, it assumes firstly that "bureaucrats' policy preferences are determined by their 
positions in government", and secondly that "states' policies are formed by bureaucratic 
bargains and routines."15 
Analysis at the bureaucratic level attempts to ascertain the way in which group 
or departmental membership in a government bureaucracy impinges upon the 
autonomy of individual perception. Unlike the decision-making level, the bureaucratic 
level tends to focus on "group think" rather than on individual idiosyncracies. 
Both the decision-making and bureaucratic levels of analysis look, at least in 
part, to the manner in which the perceptions of people --- acting in either an individual 
or bureaucratic capacity --- affect the policies of a state. At the level of state and 
domestic politics, however, the focus shifts to the way in which the internal 
characteristics of a state actually shape the perceptions of decision-makers. This level 
of analysis posits that "variations in decision-makers' policies may [either] be accounted 
for by variations in social and economic structure and domestic politics of the states 
they are serving," or in "a state's geographical position, its traditions, its national style, 
or the consequences, often unintended, of domestic conflicts."16 
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Meanwhile, the international level looks to the way that the international 
environment can and often does play a key role in perception-formation. As Hedley 
Bull has shown, we now live in a international states system, one in which the actions 
of any one member state have the potential to influence the actions of all others.17 
Thus, analysts of perceptions at the international level seek to determine the way in 
international conditions affect the perceptions of decision makers and influence policy 
outcomes.18 At this point we must now identify the levels of analysis most 
appropriate to our study of National Party perceptions of US foreign policy. This is 
necessary in order to determine the key variables influencing such perceptions. This 
chapter will argue that the key to identifying National Party perceptions of US foreign 
policy lies in understanding the interaction between the domestic and international 
levels of analysis. However, before demonstrating the centrality of these levels, it will 
first show why the decision-making and bureaucratic levels of analysis are of tangential 
importance to this study. 
Even the briefest look at the foreign policy-making process in South Africa 
reveals the inapplicability of the decision-making level of analysis to this study. As we 
know, the decision-making level essentially deals with the way in which differences in 
individual personalities and backgrounds affect the actual foreign policy of a state. 
If we look at the way in which foreign policy is both controlled and made in 
South Africa, however, we find that the focus of this study, the backbench members 
of the National Party caucus, play little or no effective role in the foreign . policy 
process. In his work The Diplomacy of Isolation, Deon Geldenhuys notes that it is the 
State President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior officials at the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs who are largely responsible for South African foreign policy rather than 
the House of Assembly in which the National Party has a majority.19 
Thus, as in most Western democracies, foreign policy is almost exclusively the 
prerogative of the executive branch of government rather than the legislative one.20 
In comparison with other comparable political bodies such as the British Parliament, 
however, the South African legislature or more specifically the House of Assembly is 
particularly weak. Whereas in Britain the government routinely submits to Parliament 
White Papers on foreign policy which often become the topic of lively debate, in South 
Africa, due to the State's inordinate preoccupation with secrecy, this is not often the 
case. 
It is also important to note that South Africa's foreign policy, especially in 
relation to its neighboring states, has often been intertwined with military and 
intelligence considerations, resulting in some degree of conflict among different 
bureaucratic actors. Again, however, noting the secrecy of such matters, it is difficult 
for one to obtain conclusive data. 
Moreover, as Geldenhuys explains, the "the National Party's numerical 
superiority in the House of Assembly constitutes a material constraint" on the 
parliament's role in the foreign policy-making process. To a greater degree than other 
parliamentary parties such as the British Conservative Party, the NP incorporates an 
unusually cohesive group of politicians with similar goals and ideals. Indeed, since the 
Conservative Party split with the NP in 1982 over P.W. Botha's apparent move away 
from apartheid, as a group, the National Party has shown little overt sign of internal 
conflict or opposition to the Party leadership. The consensus between the majority 
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party in the House of Assembly and those members of the executive responsible for 
policy effectively shifts debate on foreign policy issues. 
In agreement with this, in interviews conducted with Donald B. Sole and 
Herbert Beukes21 --- both former senior officials of the South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs, who have both served as Ambassador to the U.S. --- it was noted 
that there were times, in the late 1960s, after Mr. B.J. Vorster had become Prime 
Minister, when NP backbenchers (and at least one Cabinet-Minister) did show some 
restiveness at foreign policy initiatives. In seeking to open up more diplomatic ties with 
black Africa. Vorster found that he had to tread carefully, since the small but vocal 
'verkrampte' element in the caucus objected vehemently, among other things, to the 
possibility that black diplomats would have to be accorded equality of status with 
whites. 
While the caucus itself clearly plays no direct role in foreign policy-making it 
does, nevertheless, represent the State President's power-base, and he and his ministers 
have to be mindful of caucus sensitivities and carry them along with their decisions. As 
far as it is known, this presented no problems at any time or on any issue concerning 
foreign policy per se during the 1980s. Particularly after 1986, U.S. foreign policy had, 
if anything, a unifying effect on the NP as a whole, since it was totally opposed to 
sanctions. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that the backbenchers 
interviewed differed in no significant sense in their perception of U.S. policy from 
members of the Cabinet and their deputies. The latter, however, would certainly have 
possessed more information about the damage (especially concerning unemployment) 
done by sanctions, since this was kept secret. 
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Additionally, the National Party members of Parliament thus, are shut out of 
the foreign policy making process altogether. Within Parliament the National Party 
caucus is divided up into a range of study groups that correspond broadly with the 
ministerial portfolios, including Foreign Affairs. Members of the NP foreign affairs 
study group do enjoy regular briefings by officials, however, caucus members as such 
have virtually no effect on the making of foreign policy. Indeed as Geldenhuys has 
argued, "it is little more than a forum for the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to explain government policies and actions and to mobilize support, if 
necessary. "22 
Having established that the National Party caucus has virtually no role in the 
foreign policy-making process it should now be clearer why the level of bureaucracy, 
like the level- of decision-making, is of limited value to our study. To begin with NP 
Parliamentarians are members of a political party and not of a bureaucracy per se. 
Moreover, unlike the State President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, they have 
little or no contact with the foreign policy-making bureaucracy. Thus, their limited role 
in foreign policy-making effectively negates the usefulness of the bureaucratic level of 
analysis. 
At this point it should now be evident that National Party perceptions are not 
an independent variable affecting South African foreign policy. Rather, as we will see, 
they represent a dependent variable which is, arguably, affected by factors in the 
external environment, both domestic and international. As such, it behooves us _to turn 
to the domestic and international levels of analysis as they apply to this study. 
As stated earlier the domestic level of analysis looks to the effect which the 
internal characteristics of a state may have on the perceptions of actors within the 
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state. Due to the unique and internationally condemned policy of apartheid, it would 
seem of particular importance, in the case of South Africa, to understand the central 
force or forces shaping the domestic context in which NP politicians operate. 
1.2 THE NP IN ITS DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
Without doubt, the ideology of apartheid has, since 1948, played a large role in 
shaping the attitudes, values and beliefs of NP parliamentarians. These attitudes, values 
and beliefs at the domestic level have influenced NP perceptions of international 
relations between the US and South Africa during the 1980s. In attempting to come 
to terms with the South African domestic arena one can not ignore the relationship 
between Afrikaner nationalism, apartheid, and the National Party. 
By most accounts, it would seem that Afrikaner nationalism has been a central 
domestic factor in South Africa --- a factor which has fueled the rise of the National 
Party since it came to dominate South African politics. Indeed, the election of 1948 
which brought the NP to power has been interpreted as a victory of Afrikaner 
nationalism which has, until recently, been inextricably linked with the ideology of 
apartheid. 
Historically, the NP was the political arm of Afrikaner nationalism. As Lawrence 
Schlemmer has argued, in contemporary discourse the "National Party is frequently 
referred to as the party of Afrikaner nationalism".23 Traditionally, the National Party 
has propagated the ideology of apartheid in the name of Afrikaner nationalism as a 
tool for Afrikaner minority control. As Hermann Giliomee has argued, 
"The political order which the NP constructed after 1948 was aimed at 
enhancing Afrikaner nationalism by entrenching white political control in South 
Africa. Through apartheid, Afrikaners governed not only themselves, but also 
all other groups in the society."24 
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Nationalism may be defined as an expression of group identity that is usually 
based upon (putative) common descent, common language and religion, and a common 
territory. Afrikaner nationalism, in particular, is rooted deeply in an association 
between a strong ethnic group affiliation and a particular territorial environment. Its 
traditional strength came, in part, from the ability of Afrikaner leaders to play upon 
a widespread fear among Afrikaners of a loss of their status as the dominant group 
and of their country. 
Thus, traditionally, Afrikaner leaders, predominantly from the National Party, 
have been able to mobilize political support under a banner of nationalist 
identification. By presenting itself as the party of the Afrikaner pation, the National 
Party managed to unite a disparate group of Afrikaners with a wide variety of class 
interests around the common cause of national survival.25 
Since the late 1960s, however, this Afrikaner coalition has gradually been 
subject to increasing strain as the NP's primary support-base diversified and Afrikaners 
became even less cohesive as an ethnic group. From the early 1970s the NP has been 
moving away from the use of Afrikaner nationalism as the sole driving force of its 
appeal and has been consciously striving to broaden its base by incorporating English-
speaking whites. 
The establishment of the HNP in 1969 and, especially, the Conservative Party 
(CP) in 1982 sheared away substantial numbers of its traditional Afrikaner supporters, 
largely working-, lower-middle-class, and poorer farmers. To interpret the split 
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exclusively in class terms is inadequate, but it is true that through the 1980s the NP 
increasingly became a middle-class party. The binding force of its traditional ethnic 
glue declined and it became more responsive to the interests of business. 
Moreover, beginning with P.W. Botha's becoming Prime Minister in 1978, the 
NP began a slow, halting process of reform, that involved an incremental abandonment 
of some of apartheid's ideological and institutional pillars. Nevertheless, the reform was 
regarded as too slow and insignificant by some international policy-makers and of 
course, by all but the most pliant of internal black political leaders. This caused 
growing international isolation (stemming from previous multilateral arms/oil embargos 
of the 1960s and 70s) and a steady intensification of the imposition of sanctions from 
the international community in the 1980s. 
Indeed, by 1990, the NP had broken completely with its narrow ethnic pool; and 
the leading figures now spoke of 'one undivided nation in a undivided South Africa' 
and anticipated the adoption of a new constitution 'which will in all respects complete 
the broadening of our Nationhood to comprise all South Africans irrespective of race 
or ethnic origin.'26 
Nonetheless, while noting that the National Party has been in a rapid process 
of transition away from apartheid, traditional Afrikaner nationalism remains a force 
in South African politics. Despite the fact that the CP has largely taken over the 
symbols of traditional Afrikaner nationalism and claims today to represent a majority 
of Afrikaans-speakers, NP perceptions remain strongly motivated by the nati~malist 
backgrounds of many members. 
Exactly 80% of those interviewed for this study speak Afrikaans as a first 
language (Figure 4). Although the interviews were conducted during May/June 1990 -
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-- more just a little over three months after State President F.W. de Klerk's major 
reform speech of 2 February 1990 --- it is reasonable to assume that most of the 
respondents remained, in varying extents, conditioned by the NP's ideological legacy. 
Thus it is important to bear in mind the domestic setting that forms the environmental 
basis contributing to the perceptions of NP parliamentarians. 
However, as this study concentrates on NP perceptions of US foreign policy, the 
international level of analysis must not be forgotten. Clearly, the increasing isolation 
of South Africa by the international community has affected NP perceptions. Whether 
it has actually changed these perceptions is a separate issue. The extent to which shifts 
in US foreign policy, specifically speaking, the move to punitive sanctions, have actually 
changed perceptions within South Africa toward apartheid is a subject of current 
debate. The debate is lively and likely to continue for much time to come. 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to resolve this argument per se but 
rather, as stated earlier, to determine what precisely NP perceptions were toward US 
foreign policy in the 1980s. It is hoped that in so doing, this dissertation, will help 
identify whether US policy toward South Africa during this time led to more positive 
and cooperative relations between the two states or whether it resulted in more 
negative and conflictual ones. 
Ultimately this dissertation aims to make a significant contribution toward a 
better understanding of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy in general and of 
U.S. foreign policy in particular. It is to a historical overview of US foreign policy that 
we now turn. 
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Chapter Two 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
"It's always been recognized in this country that the executive 
is more or less entrusted with foreign policy because you can't 
run foreign policy with legislation." 
22 
President Ronald Reagan, 1981. 
2.1 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
In order to explain United States interests in South Africa and give a brief 
history of United States foreign policy toward South Africa since approximately the 
ending of the Second World War, it is first necessary to explain the factors and 
influences that led to the formation of United States foreign policy. 
In a world of independent and sovereign nations, national self-interest is the 
major cause of such foreign policy involvement. The United States does not operate 
in a vacuum. It is said that the United States "must take into account [its own] national 
goals and supply the means of attaining them. It must consider [its own] immediate 
needs as well as [its] long-range interests; [its] adversaries as well as [its] allies; [its] 
strategic requirements as well as [its] political ideals."1 Or simply put, the success of 
any policy will depend on the ability of the political leaders to weigh 'means' (using 
available resources and policy instruments) with 'ends' (the goal to be achieved). The 
best scenario for any policy requires the 'means' to fit with the 'ends'. 
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For any goal to be met, political leaders must have access to the necessary 
policy instruments and resources, therefore, when the availability of the 'means' 
become scarce or are not functional, the 'ends' fall short or are not met at all, thus the 
policy fails. 
The people who constitute the national government, whether they are elected 
or appointed, set out to accomplish certain foreign policy tasks. As Burns, Peltason 
and Cronin point out, these functionaries use policy instruments, (i.e.: bargaining or 
negotiation, persuasion or propaganda, economic assistance or pressures, the threat or 
actual use of armed force), to the best of their ability to "determine the basic objectives 
vital to national interests and to devise programs to achieve these objectives".2 
The central purpose of United States foreign policy has been throughout history 
and continues to be the preservation and the security of U.S. for its people. Secondary 
are those policies which protect United States interests. 
2.1.1 The Constitution 
The United States Constitution sets the responsibility of making United States 
foreign policy at the national level of government. The first three articles of the U.S. 
Constitution set forth the power given to the national government, dividing it among 
the three competing institutional branches, namely, the legislative (Article 1.), the 
executive (Article II.), and the judicial (Article III.). These three branches of the U.S. 
government provide a balance of power, thus limiting one specific branch from having 
too much power in any specific area. This is often called the system of checks and 
balances. Although the Constitution is not explicitly clear on the exact divisions of 
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power given to the specific institutions when it comes to foreign policy, it does give 
some specific allocations which are tricky to understand and often create debate, 
usually between and within the legislative and executive branches. As said by Kegley 
and Wittkopf, 
"The Constitution - often regarded as an open invitation for struggle between 
the executive and legislative branches of government - is not sufficient in itself 
to explain the distribution of decision-making authority over foreign affairs."3 
It thus becomes necessary to look more closely at the three branches of the U.S. 
government and the powers given to them. 
i. The Power of Congress 
The powers of Congress (the legislative branch) are outlined in Article I. of the 
U.S. Constitution. Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
being two separate bodies performing different but linked tasks. Article I., Section 8., 
sets down some Congressional duties in foreign policy: 
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States; 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations; 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, ... ;"4 
And Article I., Section 10., states: 
"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; .. 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay and Duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage 
in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit 
of delay."5 
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Thus Congress seems to enjoy some authority in making foreign policy through 
its powers regarding treaties, defense, war and money. But in reality, "as an institution 
Congress is poorly equipped to compete effectively with the executive when it comes 
to outlining the basic features of America's conduct abroad".6 There are linked factors 
to explain this, they are (1) parochialism: of members of Congress who are more 
geared toward and interested in the limited area of domestic politics. This is 
particularly true of members of the House of Representatives where re-election ( every 
two years) depends on satisfying the constituent voters at home rather than becoming 
preoccupied with global affairs; (2) Organizational weaknesses: which refers to the 
simple fact that with .the size and structure of Congress, its power and responsibility 
are fragmented. This, creates a "frustrating" relationship between the executive and 
legislative bodies where not one individual is able to speak on behalf of the whole 
institution. 7 
Moreover, Congress has a problem with secrecy which is not usually found in 
the executive branch. Due to the more open and public processes of Congress, it 
becomes easier for information to leak, unlike the office of the president where 
"executive privilege" is used to conceal information.8 
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The last factor explaining why Congress is poorly equipped is (3) Lack of 
Expertise: this refers to the lack of access Congress as a whole has to the flow of 
information and available resources on the international level necessary for making 
foreign policy decisions. Such access is limited usually to the executive branch 
organizations, i.e.: the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. 
Therefore, it can be said that Congress plays a definite but diffuse role in the 
formulation of foreign policy. It is more or less a 'watch dog' in opposing or supporting 
a policy but it lacks initiative in the actual making of a policy. Or as better explained 
by Hilsman, it becomes clear that "Congress - subtly and indirectly, but nevertheless 
effectively - plays a decisive role in setting the tone of many policies and the limits on 
many others".9 
11 The Power of the President 
When one observes the foreign policy actions of the United States, the 
President is the most visible actor. Whereas James Wilson says this is especially true 
because foreign policy making "depends" on the President's "beliefs and skills and on 
those of his chief advisers."10 
Executive domination over the construction and formulation of foreign policy 
seems to be a fact in most nations and the U.S. is no exception. But the Constitution 
of the United States is vague in its references to the official role of the President in 
foreign affairs. More specifically, as said by Kegley and Wittkopf, the President is 
granted very few powers. 
"The president's preeminent position in the foreign affairs government derives 
in part from the authority granted him in the Constitution. It also follows from 
the combination of judicial interpretation , legislative acquiescence, personal 
assertiveness, and custom and tradition that have transformed an otherwise 
coequal branch of the federal government into the most powerful office in the 
world."11 
27 
Article II, Section 2., of the United States Constitution outlines the specific 
duties of the office of the president on foreign policy matters: 
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States; ... 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; 
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, ... 1112 
These limited powers, together combined with events and various interpretations 
over time, have contributed to the vast authority the executive has over foreign policy, 
most of which has been acquired by the President himself, assuming power and 
authority which is more or less implied rather than written. 
The President maintains such a high level of control over foreign policy because 
of the size and capabilities of government institutions headed by the executive. Some 
50 government agencies are involved with foreign policy making, the President relies 
on all of them "from time to time to furnish advice and make decisions."13 
The President has the Department of State to advise and help formulate foreign 
policy. Because the main goal of U.S. foreign policy is the security of America, the 
President often seeks the advice of those in charge of the military and d~fence 
organizations. Due to the constant need of high-level, current and concise foreign 
policy intelligence which is necessary in a very complex global system, the President 
keeps in close contact with the six U.S. intelligence agencies. The best known and most 
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frequently used is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The President also relies 
heavily on the National Security Council, for coordination and organization of the 
officials and agencies involved with foreign, military, economic, fiscal and internal 
security policies that affect United States national security and interests. 
The resources available to the President to make effective and efficient foreign 
policy decisions are substantial. Aside from implied or written Constitutional guidelines 
set for the President or the amount of advice he receives, at the end of any foreign 
policy venture, whether it succeeded or failed, the President's reputation is what stands 
to gain or lose. 
m. The Power of the Judiciary 
The domination over foreign policy rests with the executive branch, which knows 
that the legislative branch has the power and authority to intervene if it so desires. 
Thus, the third branch of the Federal Government, the Judicial, would seem and does 
play a lesser role in foreign affairs. One of the most significant role of the judiciary is 
the power to decide the constitutionality of acts of Congress and the executive branch, 
by means of what is called judicial review. For the most part, however, the judicial 
system's role in foreign policy is to keep a watchful eye that the interpretation of the 
Constitution is not abused. Actual policy-making is only enjoyed by the courts when 
"they reinterpret the law or the Constitution in significant ways, extend the reach of 
existing laws to cover matters not previously thought to be covered, or design remedies 
for problems that involve the judges acting in administrative or legislative ways."14 
Such actions put the courts in a most powerful situation. 
29 
Article III., Section 2., of the United States Constitution outlines the power of 
the Judicial branch: 
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and 
Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States - between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction ... "15 
Therefore, the role of the Judicial branch in foreign affairs can be very 
significant, especially when an interpretation of the constitution is necessary. 
1v. The Power of Public Opinion 
There are both intricate and trivial factors that evoke and stimulate foreign 
policy which are not contemplated by the Constitution. One of these factors is public 
opinion. Different issues stimulate different responses from the public. There can be 
said to be three general groups within the public. Firstly, the mass public, (including 
of 75% of the adult population) which knows very little about foreign affairs despite 
importance of the subject. Second, the attentive public (including 10% of the 
population) maintains an active interest in foreign affairs. Lastly, the opinion makers 
and smallest public, whose job is to transmit information and judgements on foreign 
affairs and mobilizing support in the other two publics.16 
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The American public typically shows a lack of interest in foreign affairs usually 
because such issues are more remote and complicated than routine everyday domestic 
issues, which play a more important role in the day to day lives of most Americans. 
Most Americans, support the President in foreign affairs "largely on practical grounds" 
unlike "members of the political elite [who] tend to be well informed, [ and] give much 
less support to the president. .. "17 Such a practical approach on behalf of the mass 
public only picks up motivation for concern and becomes fueled "when American 
soldiers, especially drafted soldiers, are being killed". 18 
The public does, however, have the definite ability to change minds and 
influence policy makers. Through interest groups, grass roots and private organizations, 
plus other associations the public can and has exercised a substantial amount of 
influence. Very few policy makers ignore the power of the public and all Presidents, 
according to Roger Hilsman, value "the possible reaction of the mass public [when] 
shaping their policies".19 
The way in which public opinion mobilized power, from the grass-roots 
organizations like churches, unions, civil and human rights groups, university campuses 
and other interest groups, on the South African issue in the 1980s was of significant 
importance to the outcome of U.S. policy. The South African issue went against the 
common trend in foreign policy-making in the U.S., particularly in so far as the year 
1986 and CAAA is concerned. It was an example of a groundswell of public opinion, 
acting on legislator conscience, that inflicted a humiliating defeat on Reagan. It will be 
shown later in this chapter how public opinion and the strong tendency for Americans, 
especially blacks, to see South Africa as an extension of the civil rights issue was of 
meaningful relevance to the outcome of U.S. policy toward South Africa. 
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2.2 U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA 
For at least the past two decades the United States, has had a significant 
interest in the Southern African region and more particularly in South Africa. This 
interest has varied in intensity from administration to administration. A more detailed 
look at various administration policy approaches will be provided later in this chapter. 
For now it is important to identify some of those interests. 
During the 1980's under President Ronald Reagan, United States policy toward 
South Africa and the region, was viewed through the lens of the East/West Cold War. 
The perceived threat of Soviet expansion in the area enhanced the assumed strategic 
importance of South Africa, thought by some to be a key anti-communist state. The 
door of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa did not hinge solely on the strategic 
significance, but all other interests could, to a certain degree, be viewed as secondary. 
These non-strategic interests were: ending apartheid by eradicating human rights 
abuses and promoting political freedom, thereby minimizing the possibilities of 
instability and violence; the enhancement and development of western-oriented 
economic and political structures, thus protecting United States trade and investment; 
working toward improved and positive relationships with the Front-Line States 
(Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi and 
Tanzania) in order to exert some influence and to provide stability; and finally, trying 
to minimize the possibility that the racial conflict in South Africa could exacerbate 
racial tensions in the United States. A thorough look at these interests will be provided 
later in this chapter. 
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2.2.1 Strategic lmporf;ance 
The strategic importance of South Africa has often been said to be the main 
factor in determining U.S. policy toward South Africa. There are several key resources 
that South Africa either owns or controls that make this the case, particularly in the 
1980's under the Reagan administration. The arguments that support this opinion are 
four-fold. First, the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope are of 'geo-political' 
importance to the West. Second, South Africa is against Soviet/Cuban interference in 
southern Africa. Third, South Africa maintains the strongest military in southern 
Africa. And lastly, Western access South Africa's mineral wealth is a main factor.20 
The assumed 'geo-political' importance and available access of the Cape Sea 
Route was and continues to be important to the U.S. This argument stems from a 
contention that the Cape route is actually threatened by aggressive states wanting to 
achieve a strategic advance by controlling the sea-lanes around the Cape. The U.S. 
Government however, has declared that "the apparent consensus among U.S. defense 
planners is that these sea-lanes are under minimal threat ... "21 
Some argue that the most important factor concerning the Cape sea route is to 
allow goods, and mainly oil, to round the tip for access to Europe and the U.S. Since 
the 1960's, according to Larry Bowman, use of the sea lane around the Cape has 
increased due to the "the expansion of world trade and the vast growth of imports, ... , 
[ and] the growing use of oil supertankers that are too large to use the Suez 
Canal.. .. "22 It is the maintenance of this access that is of concern. 
Conservatives often maintained that South Africa was a defender of Western 
interests and a staunch opponent of communism, curbing the Soviet threat in the 
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southern African region, both of which considerations were held to be of importance 
in protecting U.S. interests. The importance of reducing violence in the southern 
African region remained an issue, therefore it was necessary to maintain correct, if not 
necessarily cordial, relations with South Africa, especially due to the wars being fought 
in Mozambique and Angola, the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980, and the possibility 
of the eventual freedom of Namibia. All of these events on South Africa's borders 
created the possibility of Soviet interference, given the Soviets' proclivity in the 
Brezhnev era to fish in troubled waters. Thus if Soviet influence and regional instability 
were to increase, U.S. access to the Cape Sea Route and the supply of valuable 
minerals could be jeopardized, especially if South Africa were to be transformed into 
"a close ally or satellite of the Soviet Union."23 Later in this chapter we will see that 
such a perception on the part of Reagan and his advisers proved a catalyst for the 
constructive engagement policy. 
Accepting South Africa as a regional power was viewed by some as another 
means of protecting U.S. interests by providing stability. As the strongest military 
power in the southern African region, with "advanced equipment and sophisticated 
facilities," according to Bowman, "this would be beneficial to the West in times of 
hostility or war."24 
Probably the major factor that keeps South Africa on the priority list when it 
comes to U.S. interests in southern Africa, is her mineral wealth. According to 
Giliomee, "One of the most important strategic determinants in international relations 
is the availability of strategic minerals."25 Notably this is true of U.S. relations, however 
the U.S. is not alone on its dependency on the mineral trade it has with South Africa. 
Robert Price explains that the U.S. along with its western allies of Western Europe and 
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Japan rely on "a variety of mineral resources that are essential to the production and 
process of highly industrialized economies.1126 
South Africa, along with Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire,in the southern African 
region are endowed with a vast amount of mineral wealth. These countries can account 
for a superior quantity of the world's known stockpile of minerals and can make 
available and produce meaningful contributions to this stockpile of minerals if 
necessary. Due to the limited availability around the world, United States relies on 
having access to these minerals (Appendix A), not only for economic reasons, but 
mostly for the purpose of national defense. As claimed by the U.S. government, 
"The United States imports more than 50 percent of its needs for over two 
dozen minerals deemed of either "strategic" or "critical" importance to U.S. 
national defense. Three at the top of the list - - chromium, manganese, and 
platinum - - are obtained in large part from South Africa, and much of a fourth 
(cobalt) is exported from land Jocked countries in the region through South 
Africa's transport system and ports.1127 
It can be concluded that the strategic importance of South Africa to the Unitea 
States has had a significant amount of influence on foreign policy decisions, especially 
in the 1980's, for the reasons mentioned above. Successive U.S. administrations have 
believed that the U.S. cannot afford to lose its access to the valuable res_ources that 
only South Africa can provide. Recognition of United States strategic interests provide 
insight into policy decisions that have been made by several U.S. administrations over 
the past 30 years. The next paragraphs give a background of U.S. foreign policy toward 
South Africa. 
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2.3 BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA 
United States/South African relations seemed to have intensified since 1945 and 
more particularly over the past approximately twenty years. Intensification of relations 
has been brought about by a wide and complex array of inter-related forces. These 
have, among others, included: 
I. The developing economic, political and social circumstances in South 
Africa and the needs to which they have given rise; 
II. The relations of South Africa with other states and territories m 
Southern Africa; 
III. The developing social concerns which have occurred in the United States 
and which have, by comparative association, spilled over into US/South African 
relations; 
IV. .The amount of influence carried by different policy approaches of 
previous and current U.S. presidential administrations; 
V. The shifting bilateral economic and political strat~gic interests of the 
United States and; 
VI. The changing patterns of economic and political values m the 
international sphere. 
These concerns have contributed to an alternating U.S. agenda towards South 
Africa, promoted through bilateral and multilateral channels. However, this body of 
foreign policy has not always been clear, has often lacked direction and has at best has 
been caught up in what would seem a conceptual morass. 
Following the end of World War Two, the United States pursued a policy that 
expressed "the refusal to make a major political commitment on any African issue".28 
This situation began to change in 1950, reflecting an increasing recognition that Africa 
was loosening its ties with Europe. Whereas before this time, particularly before 
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independence of Ghana in 1957, African relations were treated as just an extension of 
European relations. Moreover, 11American membership in the United Nations 
compelled it to take positions on resolutions dealing with South Africa11, whereas 
previously, 11relations with South Africa were an aspect of relations with Britain and the 
British Commonwealth, of which South Africa was an independent member.1129 
The following sections in this chapter provide brief overviews of the policies 
toward South Africa held by the seven post World War Two presidential 
administrations that preceded the Reagan administration. This will be necessary to 
form a background, whilst looking for foreign policy continuity and change, which will 
provide for a better understanding of the evolution, formation and condition of 
U.S./South African relations when Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1980. 
2.3.1 The Truman Administration (1945 - 53) 
President Harry Truman's approach to U.S./South African relations could be 
characterized as one of limited involvement. However, several key events in South 
African history took place during his era that are worthy of being addressed. But for 
the most part, as stated by Thomas Karis, the developments during Truman's 
presidency 11seemed too remote to attract much attention11 • 30 
The election in 1948 of the Malan Government and the National Party led to 
the implementation of the 11apartheid11 ideology, which massively increased _ racial 
segregation. In 1949, the major black political movement, the African National 
Congress (ANC), implemented a new strategy involving boycotts, strikes and civil-
disobedience. 
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While the implementation of racist policies was transforming South Africa, the 
Truman Administration and U.S. foreign policy was increasingly concerned with the 
Cold War. The U.S. relationship with South Africa is best explained in South Africa: 
Time Running Out, 
"The Malan government volunteered its support in the fight against world wide 
communism. The United States gratefully accepted its contribution of an air 
crew for the Berlin airlift and a fighter squadron for the war in Korea but 
ignored Malan's efforts to have South Africa included as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization's southern flank or to establish a South Atlantic equivalent 
of NATO. . . . During Harry Truman's presidency, South Africa was to all 
intents and purposes just another friendly country so far as America's bilateral 
relations with it were concerned.1131 
One of the most prominent trend-setting events that would continue for many 
years after the Truman Presidency, occurred in 1952: "apartheid" came onto the UN 
General Assembly agenda as a major item. At the time the United States was not 
particularly interested in domestic politics within South Africa, but it was becoming 
more sensitive about its own racial problems, which caused it to abstain from the vote. 
This led to UN condemnation of U.S. racism and anger by the UN at the U.S. for its 
failure to act on South African apartheid. 
3.2.2 The Eisenhower Administration (1953 - 61) 
The Eisenhower administration's views on South Africa were characterized by 
big words but a lack of willingness to act. Several events and attitudes can be seen as 
of critical importance in understanding the U.S./South African relationship in this era. 
In the first term of the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. refused to get involved in 
UN anti-apartheid debate. Open relations between the U.S. and South Africa led to 
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a working bi-lateral ten-year agreement that established an atomic energy program in 
1957. Furthermore, during Eisenhower's second term, the U.S. for the first time, after 
many years of failing to vote, supported a mild UN General Assembly anti-apartheid 
resolution. On August 20, 1958, the United States established a Bureau of African 
Affairs in the State Department. In addition, the Bureau contributed specialist 
expertise on African issues, which dovetailed with growing domestic concern about 
racial issues. Thus, increased racial tension in the United States indirectly led to a 
stronger condemnation of South Africa's policies after the Sharpeville killings in 1960. 
Notwithstanding these developments, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles advised 
the Eisenhower administration to be aware of African nationalism and cautioned about 
the possibility of Soviet expansionism. 
In the. first term of the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. supported South 
African arguments that the UN was pushing for "unjustifiable intervention in the 
domestic affairs of a member. [When] No threat to international peace existed." The 
South African Government's domestic legislation was seen as unlikely "to impair 
friendly relations among nations."32 This was known as the "domestic jurisdiction" 
argument, referring to the view that the domestic affairs of a country are not the 
business of the UN. It was therefore stressed that "the United States does not regard 
the perpetuation of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the 
Union of South Africa as the proper means of dealing with the situation."33 It was 
stressed that the United States should adopt a method in which a constructive 
approach to problems of human rights is parallel to the perspective of the world wide 
human-rights situation.34 This policy approach subsequently led the United States to 
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abstain from all votes pertaining to anti-apartheid resolutions in the United Nations 
General Assembly. 
The racial issue in the U.S. was generating increasingly severe tensions and 
inevitably this was in conflict with the developing U.S. approach to international human 
rights. U.S. considerations concerning the Cold War were one factor that made the 
U.S. more embarrassed about its own human rights record. A key U.S. example of this 
was the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education which declared 
that 11 'separate' could not be 'equal' [which] set American racial policy irreversibly on 
a path opposite to that taken by Pretoria.1135 However, the U.S. continued to support 
rather right-wing dictatorships in pursuit of cold-war gains, regardless of the domestic 
politics at home. 
Eisenhower's second term brought a change of stance in its role in the United 
Nations concerning the South African racial issue. For the first time in six years the 
U.S. changed its vote of abstention on the apartheid issue in the UN General 
Assembly in October 1958. The U.S. voted "alongside the Soviet Union and against 
Britain and France" whereas the U.S. "abandoned the 'domestic jurisdiction' argument 
and [ accepted] a watered-down resolution that omitted 'condemnation'."36 
Never before had the United States realized the explosive environment brewing 
in South Africa. Its concerns were heightened by the Sharpeville disaster that occurred 
on March 21, 1960. Sharpeville "shook Washington as had no previous South African 
event.. .. 1137 In response, the U.S. State Department commented: 
"The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes that the African 
people of South africa will be able to obtain.redress for legitimate grievances 
by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not 
ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys 
normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from 
the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa."38 
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However much hope and sincere comment was given by the U.S. government 
over the Sharpeville shooting incident and other issues pertaining to human rights 
violations, U.S. foreign policy in the Eisenhower era nevertheless was concerned most 
with not upsetting South Africa, which ''was one more ally in the struggle against 
international communism."39 It was John Foster Dulles, who was responsible for this 
foreign policy perception. Secretary of State Dulles, according to Emerson and Nielsen, 
"perceived African nationalism as a tool of Moscow's creation rather than a natural 
out-growth of the colonial experience". Dulles believed "that Soviet leaders supported 
nationalism as a strategy to absorb colonial peoples in pursuit of their goal of world 
conquest.1140 
In summary, even though the Eisenhower administration set the trend for voting 
against apartheid in the UN General Assembly, and deplored the Sharpeville killings, 
"in an era of containment South Africa's friendship was of more enduring concern than 
the policy of separate development or apartheid".41 
2.3.3 The Kennedy Administration (1961 - 1963) 
The Kennedy administration neither paid much attention to nor neglected South 
Africa. U.S./South African relations reflected continuity with the Eisenhower era. 
President Kennedy expressed a "desire" to see the problems of South Africa 
rectified to help the "victims of apartheid", but maintained that the problem .within 
South Africa could not be cured by "punitive" measures and that change could only 
come from within. The role played by the U.S. in South Africa, as President Kennedy 
argued "should be, not punitive action against a recalcitrant government, but the 
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welfare of apartheid's unfortunate victims themselves .... Only the Government of the 
Union of South Africa itself, of its own free will, can lead the way to a peaceful 
solution."42 
In an event that took place during Kennedy's presidency but only became 
effective on 1 January 1964, the United States, following the lead of a unanimous UN 
resolution, implemented an arms embargo against South Africa. G. Mennen Williams, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that "When the question of 
apartheid in South Africa comes up at the U.N., we have no hesitation in declaring our 
unalterable opposition to that policy. We in the United States think that apartheid is 
wrong and harmful."43 That is why, said Williams, the United States "voted 'Yes' to 
the Security Council resolution condemning the policy of apartheid and calling upon 
states to stop- the sale and equipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military 
vehicles to South Africa."44 
However, the negative message of the arms embargo did not hinder United 
States cooperation, trade and investment in South Africa. As noted by Thomas Karis, 
"With regard to investment and trade, The United States officially gave neither 
encouragement nor discouragement .... Nevertheless, encouragement was 
hardly necessary in a growing economy based on cheap and tractable labor and 
yielding exceptionally high profits. The American economic stake in South 
Africa grew .... "45 
The theory of the possibilities of communism in the region also still remained 
a reality and seemed to have had some effect on the decision-making process 
throughout the Kennedy years. This attitude is best summed up by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, J. Wayne Fredericks, who said that "apartheid 
[ could] lead only to tragedy in South Africa - to an eventual eruption that will have 
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serious consequences for all its peoples, including an invitation to Communist 
penetration."46 
The short period of time occupied by the Kennedy administration brought the 
first negative economic/military measure toward South Africa over the issue of 
apartheid. The fact that it was draped in UN clothing allowed the United States to 
maintain close ties with South Africa while at the same time being on record as stating 
opposition to apartheid. 
2.3.4 The Johnson Administration (1963 - 69) 
Most accounts of U.S. foreign polic,y toward South Africa agree that essentially 
similar approaches were pursued in the J. F. Kennedy and L. B. Johnson 
administrations. Understanding this, it becomes important to note that the Johnson 
administration maintained the Kennedy policy of "neither encouraging or discouraging" 
bilateral relations with South Africa. And despite of dominance of the Vietnam War 
on the policy-making agenda, it is true that Kennedy's policy toward South Africa was 
reinforced and enhanced by Johnson administration and its willingness to demand 
compliance with the arms embargo. As stated by Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, the U.S. will "not sell to South Africa any arms, 
ammunition, military equipment or materials for their manufacture and 
maintenance,"47 thus supposedly discouraging the enforcement of apartheid. _ 
While admitting that U.S. relations with South Africa were contradictory, in that 
both countries "enjoy mutually beneficial relations .. .in several fields," but that "the 
racial policies of the Republic [ of South Africa] impose severe restraints on these 
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relations"48, according to Williams, the United States still maintained, as in the 
Kennedy years, that it was not willing to implement a stricter U.N. policy like 
sanctions.49 
In this section, however, it becomes important to mention several watershed 
events that happened during the Johnson years that indicated a slight hardening of 
attitudes. In 1964, a second economic message came from the United States. The 
United States Export-Import Bank halted loans with the intention of hindering trade 
between the two countries. As Karis points out, 
" ... for the first time except for the arms embargo the United States took 
economic action to show its disfavor when it stopped the Export-Import Bank 
in 1964 from extending direct loans to South African buyers of American 
goods.1150 
The issues of South Africa's occupation of South West Africa (Namibia) took 
on new importance during the Johnson years. The United States_'s "UN Ambassador 
Arthur Goldberg took a leading role in drafting a General Assembly resolution 
condemning South Africa for its continuing control over South-West Africa and asking 
the Security Council to take "effective measures" to bring about self-determination in 
the territory."51 
In 1967, the 1957 atomic energy agreement that was signed in the Eisenhower 
era was secretly renewed for another ten years. But probably the most important event 
of 1967 was the U.S. decision to stop U.S. naval ships visiting South African ports. It 
arose out of an incident involving the U.S.S. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whereby the 
carrier would not permit its crew to go ashore. The result of this event was that in 
future U.S. naval ships were permitted to call in South African ports only in 
emergencies. 52 
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Even though the overall policy attitudes and approaches of the Johnson 
administration toward South Africa were not made different from the previous 
administrations', key events made the Johnson era one of importance. Those key 
events being: the recognition that there were contradictory aspects to U.S. policy; the 
rise of the Namibian issue to the forefront; the. stopping of loans by the U.S. Export-
Import Bank; and the discontinuation of the U.S. Navy's use of South African ports. 
2.3.5 The Nixon Administration (1969 - 74) 
With the election of President Nixon to the White House, a whole new policy 
strategy for southern Africa was initiated. Nixon's policy shift was a personal and moral 
conviction that effectively aided the racial-conservative politics in southern Africa. 
Nixon, rhetorically at any rate, opposed apartheid, and essentially his policy approach 
not to apply pressure on white-controlled governments Nixon did this by propagating 
new policies of containment, as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had used the 
same personal and moral convictions to foster policies that were intended to protect 
human rights and political freedoms. 
It became President Nixon's goal to rebuild the National Security Council (NSC) 
which had been established in 1947 under President Truman. Nixon believed that the 
role of the NSC had diminished under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The 
President's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, was to be the key man in 
reaching this goal. 
Kissinger prepared National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) which 
became the written set principles for making foreign policy for the southern African 
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region. NSSM 39 was one of eighty-five such reports which were intended to evaluate 
U.S. policy worldwide and which aimed also at rebuilding the role of the NSC. NSSM 
39 was purported to be a 'realistic' attempt to reconstruct and transform U.S. foreign 
policy in southern Africa. 
NSSM 39 proposed policy options for the southern African region and 
"Kissinger chose the one that subordinated African rights and moral issues to U.S. 
economic and geo-political interests".53 NSSM 39, option two, propounded a policy 
approach that sought to enhance a relationship built on friendship and communication 
with the white-controlled and colonial governments of the region and deprecated the 
rhetorically anti-apartheid stance of the previous administrations. "It was decided" 
according to George Hauer, "that the former Kennedy and Johnson policies of verbal 
attacks on apartheid should be played down and a program of increased 
communication substituted on the theory that friendly persuasion rather than constant 
condemnation would be more likely to make the Southern African white-minority 
• governments modify their racial policies."54 
Confirmation of this significant shift in U.S. government attitudes and policies 
toward South Africa under the Nixon administration became evident when military 
equipment, which was considered in the "grey-area" of the arms embargo (1962) and 
restricted under Kennedy and Johnson, reached South Africa. Credit that was 
supposedly tied up in the 1964 decision for U.S. Export-Import Bank to halt trade with 
South Africa was relaxed; Washington and Pretoria extended and exchanged invitations 
for official visits; the strong condemnation of the South African government was toned 
down. 
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The Nixon policy was finally challenged in 1971 when the Congressional Black 
Caucus doubled its size after the 1970 Congressional elections. These congressmen 
began to express anger at the U.S. policy toward South Africa. They organized a 
caucus that met with the President in March 1971. The caucus recommended that 
President Nixon "isolate" South Africa by "developing disincentives ... to discourage the 
expansion of further private American investment there.1155 
However persuasive the Congressional Black Caucus may have been, the 
response from President Nixon was not to change· his policy, and he continued to 
implement the policies recommended by NSSM 39. As President Nixon previously 
stated, U.S. policy should maintain its current path: 
"The interests of the white regimes themselves surely dictate change. The 
United States believes that the outside world can and should use its contacts 
with southern Africa to promote and speed that change. We do not, therefore, 
believe the isolation of the white regimes serves African interests, or our own, 
or that of ultimate justice.1156 
Thus, it can be seen that the Nixon years can be viewed in the context of the 
Cold War and a policy of containment giving way to the flexibility and relaxation of 
many restricting measures which were continuing to pressure the white regimes of 
southern Africa. Option 2. of NSSM 39 stated: 
"The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can 
come about is through them . . .. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance 
toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial 
and colonial policies .... We would maintain public opposition to racial 
repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white 
states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the · 
scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response 
to tangible - albeit small and gradual - moderation of white policies. With out 
openly taking a position undermining the UK and the UN on Rhodesia, we 
would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime."57 
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The end of the Nixon years left many decisions to be faced by Kissinger and his 
successor, Gerald Ford. But, as for Nixon, his thoughts and actions toward the southern 
African region were to serve U.S. interests at the lowest possible expense, while 
maintaining key allies at a time when limiting Soviet influence was crucial. 
2.3.6 The Ford Administration (1974 - 77) 
The short occupation of the White House by the Ford administration witnessed 
several key events that would not only change the "old-order" of the southern African 
regions politics, but would also serve as a turning point in southern African/U.S. 
relations. Even though Kissinger was to maintain his containment policy, Option 2 of 
NSSM 39 would be undermined by four key events. 
First, in 1973 OPEC forced the petroleum prices up and linked to this was an 
Arab-launched oil boycott during the Arab-Israeli war. This made the U.S. more aware 
of how vulnerable and dependent its interests were on the oil- and other resource-
producing countries. Within this context came a heightened appreciation of the need 
for South African minerals. U.S.- perceived interests were thus inevitably tied to 
political and economic stability of those countries with which it traded. 
Secondly, in 1974 a military coup in Portugal, led to the speedy collapse of the 
Portuguese empire which later led to the independence of Angola and Mozambique. 
This independence, occurring amidst civil war and violence, saw the installation of 
governments that were committed to Marxist/Leninist doctrines. 
Thirdly, in 1976 political violence was erupting in South Africa's largest township 
of Soweto and elsewhere, creating doubts about the country's stability. 
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Lastly, Cuba and the Soviet Union came to the aid of the MPLA (Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) by assisting in establishing a Marxist-type 
government in Angola. 
These events, according to Robert Price, "drew Southern Africa into the vortex 
of international tension and propelled it to a top position on the U.S. foreign policy 
agenda".58 Kissinger saw the Angolan situation in terms of the bigger picture 
involving the conflict situation of East v. West. He thought that the only way to halt 
Soviet expansionism in the southern African region was to provide military assistance 
to those who were against the MPLA. The emotional baggage being carried by the 
U.S. after the Vietnam war limited Kissinger's capacity to influence the situation. In 
January 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Clark Amendment which forbade the 
president to provide direct or indirect military assistance to Angolan factions.59 
The Ford administration followed the Kissinger lead in analyzing and reviewing 
the situation and events in southern Africa. Even though Kissinger assisted m 
pressuring the Smith government in Rhodesia into supporting an agreement to 
negotiate a transition to majority rule, supported the 1966 UN decision which 
terminated the South African mandate over Namibia, and spoke out about South 
African racial issues and apartheid, he nevertheless maintained that containment of 
Soviet expansion by "economic progress" and paying attention to the "political 
challenges of the continent, particularly the issue of southern Africa", was in need of 
"urgent attention" by the "World community". "The primary motivation and goal of U.S. 
policy [under Ford-Kissinger]", according to Price, was the containment of "the Soviet 
Union, ... the same as it had been during the Angolan civil war.1160 
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2.3.7 The Carter Administration (1977 - 1981) 
The Carter administration provided "a pronounced shift in spirit from that of 
the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years".61 Carter felt the need to revert to the views of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, in terms of which African nationalism was 
regarded as the crucial political force in southern Africa, rather than communist 
expansionism that was viewed as the central force during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger 
years. Carter imposed changes both in policy and in style. His strong convictions about 
human rights and sympathy for the disenfranchised people of southern Africa gave him 
an understanding that his predecessors had lacked. 
The adoption of this new policy soon led to worsening relations between South 
Africa and the U.S. Whereas the previous administrations had viewed Pretoria as an 
ally against communism which effectively shielded the South African government 
against any criticism of its policies, Carter's views on human rights led to increasingly 
strong verbal attacks on the South African government. This is particularly true of an 
incident where, according to Price, a "leading spokesman pointedly criticized the 
apartheid regime and called for the introduction of majority rule in South Africa."62 
The most notable incident was in May 1977 when Vice President Walter Mondale met 
with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna. As explained by 
Gwendolen Carter, 
"During that meeting Vice President Mondale addressed Prime Minister 
Vorster with no uncertainty about the American goal of full political 
participation by all South Africans. While it was after the meeting that Mondale 
affirmed that his words meant "one man, one vote," there had never been any 
doubt about his basic meaning, nor Vorster's strong reaction against it, ... "63 
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Although the Carter administration's message was loud and clear about its 
dislike of South African internal policies, it nevertheless continued to oppose any 
negative economic measures like disinvestment and sanctions. It still maintained the 
view that economic relations between the U.S. and South Africa could foster positive 
change. 
This line of thinking adopted by the Carter administration paralleled that of the 
U.S. business community in South Africa and the U.S. Throughout the late 1970's and 
into the 1980's came several attempts by various international business communities 
to ameliorate the political situation in South Africa. These attempts were made by 
pressure groups in Western countries which traded with South Africa, in an attempt 
to make firms operating in the Republic take the initiative in dismantling apartheid by 
laying down "codes of conduct" which business organizations should adopt. Such codes 
have been tried by the British, the EEC, Dr. Leon Sullivan of the United States, the 
South African Council of Churches, the Urban Foundation and other employer groups 
in South Africa. 64 
One of the best known multilateral efforts by the United States business 
community to bring about positive change in South Africa was the corporate code of 
conduct known as the Sullivan Principles. Rev. Dr. Leon Sullivan was the author of this 
first United States code of employment practice for foreign companies operating in 
South Africa. 
In January 1976 Leon Sullivan approached 15 business leaders who represented 
major U.S. companies, "reminding them of the moral implication that required men 
of conscience in a Judea-Christian culture to take a stand on what was morally right" 
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in the ongoing "crisis" in South Africa. He urged them to 'Join together" and take a 
"first step" thereby setting an example in the international business community.65 
Sullivan's main goal was "to make American business truly a positive force for 
change in South Africa". Dr. Sullivan thought that rather than encouraging the negative 
step of withdrawing American capital, it would be more effective to "take a positive 
stance and call for American companies in South Africa to recognize the same working 
conditions they employ in America".66 As stated by D.R. Weedon in discussing the 
evolution of the Sullivan Principles, "the program", by using American companies as 
instruments of change, "could make a meaningful contribution to bring an end to 
apartheid".67 
The Sullivan Signatories program was subscribed to by about 200 of the 275 
American companies then operating in South Africa. As stated by Alison Cooper of 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the Sullivan Principles were voluntary and 
called for signatory companies to strive at achieving several principles that would 
improve the work place for disadvantaged workers. (Appendix B) 
It is very difficult to evaluate the success of the Sullivan Code. However, did the 
codes prove to be of any help in the South African situation, and did they do what they 
set out to do, namely, "make American Business truly a positive force for change"? It 
is important to target the positive aspects. 
Clearly President Reagan and Crocker saw some merit in the Sullivan Principles 
since he incorporated them in his September 1985 executive order. The executive order 
denied trade assistance to United States companies doing business in South Africa if 
they did not apply the Sullivan Principles. Title II of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act, which provides for United States economic assistance to South Africa, 
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contains "a suggested code of conduct ( similar to the Sullivan Principles) for US 
companies to use when employing South Africans." 68 
The codes were helpful in improving "the life of the workers".69 As 
Christopher Coker put it, "The influence which they [the multinational companies, 
employing between 200,000 and 315,000 black workers] are able to bring to bear on 
labor practices in general - and those relating to black workers in particular - should 
not, therefore, be undervalued or ignored ... 11 •70 The codes were also effective at 
influencing and providing access to upward mobility within companies, raising morale 
and stimulating the establishment and progress of unions. 
Even though the Sullivan Principles were written with the good intention of 
facilitating peaceful change in South Africa, there were several problems and many 
criticisms. This would lead one to believe that the end result of the Sullivan effort 
never reached the sought-after goal of being a major force for change in ending 
apartheid. Davenport maintains, that "the codes did not remove apartheid root and 
branch, and it would have been surprising had they done so."71 
One of the major criticisms of the Sullivan Principles came from the 
international corporations themselves. They found the Sullivan Principles to be 
prescriptive in that they, firstly, tried to prescribe or dictate the internal policy of the 
corporation, and in light of this, hostile attitudes to outside intrusion developed. 
Secondly, the principles were often regarded by some as a means of staving off future 
sanctions legislation. Davenport goes on to say that "firms often resented the intrusion 
into their privacy, while hostile labor critics were quick to argue that the real intention 
of the codes was to forestall more drastic international action rather than to promote 
real change in the apartheid system."72 Another major critic of the Sullivan Principles 
~"-~'"'~,,_~--r"-·- - ,.,.. . ...,,""'~, .. -~...,,. ... ~-~---·,.-
- -
53 
was found within the ranks of South African trade unions. In the beginning the unions 
had a positive attitude toward the principles and viewed them as stepping stone in the 
negotiating process, but later they failed to meet the unions needs. Hilary Joffe says 
that FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions), COSATU's (Congress of 
South African Trade Unions) predecessor, utilized the codes "as a form of pressure on 
Multinational employers to recognize and negotiate with black unions".73 In the end 
the unions rejected the principles as irrelevant. 
It is also very important to note that not every American company recognized 
the Sullivan Principles and by no means all joined the effort to implement the 
principles. "The corporate behavior of foreign multi-nationals" did not display much 
social responsibility, and their weak "efforts only became noticeable as a minority of 
them reluctantly embraced the Sullivan Code".74 This argument is supported in a 
speech given by Sullivan: 
"In America, of the approximately 300 multi-national corporations doing 
business in South Africa, 140 have signed the principles, employing 80% of the 
American company South African-based work force. The remaining 160 
companies have not as yet become signators."75 
Of the "minority" that did participate in the adoption of the Sullivan Principles, 
their actions were quite contradictory to the suggested actions of Sullivan and 
sometimes such contradictory actions were displayed harsh outcomes. An example of 
this is noted by Shridath Ramphal, claiming that "foreign and South African firms that 
declare themselves concerned about the sanctions-induced job losses, nevertheless, 
seem quite happy to sack workers by the thousands if they strike".76 Thus it is evident 
that corporations were not so much concerned with advancing the position of the black 
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man, but rather with what was best for company interests. Whether these actions were 
moral or not would seem of a secondary concern. 
A further example of the failure of the Sullivan Principles comes from the Sixth 
Report on the Signatory Companies, prepared by Arthur D. Little Company. This 
company was responsible for monitoring adherence to the principles. Its 1982 report 
noted: 
fewer companies were willing to report on their activities than in the 
preceding three years (nearly one-forth failed to file the required compliance 
questionnaires); 
of those who filed reports more than one-third received failing grades for 
non-compliance with the affirmative action principles; 
twenty-nine signatory companies (more than any previous year) dropped 
out of the program; 
· the proportion of blacks in supervisory and skilled positions declined 
since the last reporting period; 
• and due to continued inequality in training and pay scales, the already 
wide wage gap between white and black employees is growing. 77 
On 3 June 1987, Rev. Leon Sullivan announced that his principles had failed 
to end apartheid, and that more drastic measures were necessary. Upon revoking the 
Sullivan Principles, he called for all U.S. companies to withdraw from South Africa, 
and for a total U.S. economic embargo against South Africa. 
However, the Sullivan approach still carried some influence. In both of 
President Reagan's executive orders of 1985 and 1986, and in the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986 there are specific employment guidelines based upon the 
Sullivan Principles. When Rev. Sullivan withdrew support for his principles, the State 
Department, beginning on 15 February 1987, enforced the requirement that any U.S. 
company employing more that 25 people in South Africa must register with the State 
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Department and maintain records of its implementation of the guidelines. Failure to 
comply with the requirements outlined by the State Department could result in severe 
penalties. 
There are a few differences between the State Department's Principles and the 
Sullivan Principles, but both sets are essentially similar. 
Even though the employment practices stemming from Sullivan continued on 
into the 1980s, the late 1970s still held events of importance. In August 1977, perhaps 
the most serious blow to South African/U.S. relations came when the Soviet Union 
informed the United States that Soviet intelligence had detected an alleged atomic test 
site in the Kalahari Desert. The U.S. confirmed the allegation and pressed the South 
African government for assurance that the site would not be used. The message hit the 
South African government hard. This was particularly true, as noted in South Africa: 
Time Running Out, that it was clear that the U.S. "and its allies were willing to 
collaborate with the Soviet Union against South Africa11 •78 
To fuel the fire of the Kalahari Desert episode and provide more leverage for 
foreign criticism, on 12 September 1977, "black consciousness" and anti-apartheid 
opposition leader Steve Biko was killed while being detained by South African police. 
On 4 November 1977, the United States supported a UN Security Council 
resolution which again tightened the pressure on the South African government to 
change its ways. The resolution made the 1963 voluntary arms embargo mandatory. 
' Secretary of State Cyrus E. Vance, speaking on behalf of the U.S. government's 
attitude toward the arms embargo, stated that ''we, and indeed almost the whole world, 
have believed that it is necessary to take action as a result of those steps, and 
therefore, at the United Nations, we have supported a mandatory arms embargo to 
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reflect the internationa1"79 disapproval of internal South African disregard for human 
rights. 
The slowly mounting pressure on the South African government was 
accompanied by harsher verbal condemnations by several officials of the Carter 
administration. Various statements by some officials like Vice President Walter 
Mondale and Andrew Young, were used by the South African government spokesmen 
to whip up xenophobic resentment at 'foreign meddling'. Carter's strong attitudes and 
actions on human rights actually strengthened the Vorster government. Pauline Baker 
notes, " ... Vorster won a historic landslide victory by attacking the U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter for his criticism of Pretoria.1180 
The above events accelerated the decline in the U.S. relationship with South 
Africa. Moreover, the Carter administration also set as another of its goals for the 
region settlements of the Namibian and Rhodesian conflicts. In this area of focus the 
Carter administration's approach was very different from that of previous 
administrations in that it sought help from the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) in solving the region's problems. 
In September of 1978, this change in style led to the UN Security Resolution 
435, which was influenced by the Carter administration and backed and assisted by the 
Western Contact Group (members being U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, and 
West Germany), which was to assist in the transition to independence for Namibia. 
Looking back at the Carter years, it could said that the administration's 
approach was "accommodationist", meaning that it was willing to accommodate the 
transfer of power to radical leadership in southern Africa, which to some, was not in 
American interests. It has even been said that this willingness by Carter to put African 
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interests above U.S. interests is one of many decisions that possibly contributed to his 
loss of the White House in 1980. Regardless, however, if this is the case or not, 
according to Price, the "accommodationist" approach was based on three assumptions 
followed by the Carter administration: "that nationalist change in Southern Africa, even 
when it brought to power "Marxist" parties associated with the Soviet Union, did not 
necessarily threaten the interests of the United States; that, therefore, Southern Africa 
could and should be insulated from East-West competition and conflict; and that the 
only way in which American influence and interests in Southern Africa could be 
maintained and extended was for the United States to identify itself with the 
aspirations of the African states in the region."81 
The Carter administration's rhetoric contributed little to the dismantling of 
apartheid. Indeed the essence of Carter's policy approach, apart from strong verbal 
attacks on South Africa, was substantially similar to that followed by previous 
administrations. 
2.4 THE REAGAN YEARS - THE FIRST TERM AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
ENGAGEMENT 
When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, the United States's 
foreign policy toward South Africa did not change so much from that of previous 
Kissinger-influenced administrations of Nixon and Ford, as take on a new dimension. 
Largely under the guidance of Chester Crocker, an academic from Georgetown 
University who became Assistant Secretary of State to Africa, the Reagan 
administration developed a "different and highly controversial"82 new policy that not 
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only aggravated racial tensions in the U.S., but later led to the embarrassment of the 
administration by providing ground for a veto over-ride and, according to many, the 
acknowledgment of a failed southern African policy. This policy was called constructive 
engagement. 
The President "justified" his new policy, according to Pauline Baker, not only 
by criticizing the Carter Administration's "confrontational" approach to the southern 
African region and the apartheid government, but by also claiming leverage with the 
National Party for having a shared understanding of conservative policy.83 
This regional policy advocated by Chester Crocker and adopted by the Reagan 
Administration, was to "seek constructive change away from apartheid and toward a 
system based on the consent of the governed".84 The way they sought to achieve this 
goal was to impress upon United States policy-makers the importance of understanding 
"South African politics and the insecurities of the white minority population".85 
In Cracker's landmark article in the Winter 1980/81 edition of Foreign Affairs, 
titled, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", he argues the need for a new South African 
policy. He displays dissatisfaction with past U.S. policy toward South Africa, in that it 
has lacked "organization" in the formulation of both 'pro' and 'anti' policies and that 
the "contrasts in policy from one U.S. administration to the next has left South Africa 
with "false signals and the creation of unreal expectations".86 Thus, he implied that 
a policy like constructive engagement "was never seriously attempted" by previous 
administrations. 87 
In outlining the "fundamental goal" of constructive engagement, Crocker says 
that the United States policy should have a common belief and understanding not only 
about basic issues in South Africa, but about general American objectives and interests 
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necessary in making efficient and effective foreign policy in the southern African 
region. Thus the U.S. and South Africa must maintain a "friendly relationship, without 
constraint, embarrassment or political damage."88 
Crocker goes on to say that the objective of constructive engagement "should 
be to foster and support" peaceful change toward a nonracial system", while keeping 
in mind "the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the process".89 Failure 
to do this, says Crocker, will bring inevitable damage to United States interests in 
South Africa and in the region. 
Speaking to a Congressional Subcommittee, Crocker stressed that United States 
interests are "best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth, 
which alone can nurture modern African economic and political institutions11 •90 
Crocker's testimony also outlined specific areas of focus in attaining these objectives 
while safeguarding U.S. interests. They include: (a) strengthening communication 
between the Southern African countries to decrease tensions and improve security, 
while bringing about and fostering peaceful change; (b) aiding and solving the issue of 
Namibian independence; (c) ·seeking constructive change to ending apartheid; (d) 
enhancing relations and promoting "democratic institutions" encompassing all social, 
political and economic structures. 
In a paper by Crocker titled, "South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping with 
Vulnerability", he addresses the probability of a conflict situation in South Africa 
between blacks who are fighting the system and whites who are trying to maintain it. 
He stresses that political awareness, unity and an "unprecedented degree of 
determination" and optimism among black communities could lead to violence, while 
white opinion supports the maintenance of order in all circumstances. To understand 
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the situation, Crocker maintains that the "challenge to the system" will not "decline or 
disappear" but rather, it is hoped, that "over time, depending on the results of various 
forms of political conflict of this sort, a clearer pattern of leadership and organization 
1191 may emerge .... 
The following is an analysis of the policy of constructive engagement. There has 
been considerable controversy about it --- some categorically declare it to have been 
a failure; others maintain that it achieved a certain degree of success. There are many 
questions to be raised and specific elements explored. Therefore, the aim of the 
following paragraphs is to explore these approaches, questions and elements. 
2.4.1 Constructive Engagement's Policy Success 
One of the major misconceptions concerning the policy of constructive 
engagement is that it was a regional policy geared to solving the problems of the 
southern African region and not merely a policy for South Africa alone. If one is to 
evaluate the success of constructive engagement, one must examine regional 
developments and not focus exclusively on the specifics of the internal politics of South 
Africa. 
Defenders of constructive engagement claim as its most notable regional success 
the independence of Namibia, Africa's last colony. Moreover, other key events, 
according to Crocker, stemmed from Namibian independence.92 Firstly, Cuban and 
South African soldiers left Angola and Namibia, thus ending the civil war that had 
raged in Angola since its independence in 1975. Additionally, Cuban President, Fidel 
Castro, accepted a U.S.-designed peace plan and agreed to "exit from Angola". Lastly, 
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the Soviet Union accepted a new approach to the southern African region, 
demonstrating that "Soviets have abandoned their previous course of obstructing 
Western initiatives and exploiting conflicts in the region".93 
The positive outcome of the Namibian question also seemed to have also 
trickled into other troubled areas of the region such as Mozambique where attempts 
at a cease-fire have shown encouraging developments. Thus, the accomplishment of 
"the Namibia-Angola settlement of 1988", Crocker states, is perhaps "the best 
opportunity that regional leaders have ever had to build a constructive future."94 
While constructive engagement achieved some success in the regional context, 
it was the internal situation in South Africa which was the dominant issue. Constructive 
engagement would be judged a success or a failure in the light of what happened in 
South Africa. The rationale behind constructive engagement was the belief that only 
South Africans could resolve their internal conflict. Constructive engagement, by taking 
some of the international heat off South Africa, it was reasoned, gave the South 
African political leadership additional space for reform. Such reforms as it were to 
make, moreover, would be rewarded by U.S. approbation and encouragement. 
The Reagan administration took office in P.W. Botha's third year as Prime 
Minister. In his earlier years Botha had made some significant changes to what many 
had considered to be pillars of the apartheid order. For example in 1979 Botha's 
verligte Minister of Labor, Mr. Fanie Botha, was allowed to pilot through Parliament 
legislation that recognized for the first time black trade unions. While it may have been 
intended as a control measure, since independent black unions had burgeoned in the 
1970s, the new-found recognition legitimated and consolidated a powerful new force 
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in South Africa, giving black workers (that is those fortunate to have jobs) major 
leverage in industrial relations. 
Right down until 1986 Botha continued with a reform program of sorts. The 
program included: 'Petty' apartheid was steadily abolished; job reservation and related 
measures that discriminated on a racial basis in the labor market were removed; the 
legislation prohibiting mixed marriages and sexual relations across the color line was 
repealed; and recognition was accorded to the fact that urban blacks were not as 
previous apartheid theorists had maintained, 'temporary sojourners'. Perhaps most 
important of all Botha, in 1986, abandoned the 'separate nations' thesis (which was 
essentially the ideological core of apartheid) and accepted the principle of a common 
South African citizenship. In the same year influx control was abolished.95 
A far . more controversial reform was the introduction of the Tricameral 
Parliament in 1984, which gave parliamentary representation to the Indians and 
Coloreds in separate chambers, but excluded blacks, who, according to the NP, were 
separately catered for by the political structures in the homelands. 
The Tricameral Parliament was the center-piece of P.W. Botha's administration, 
and its repercussions were of immense significance: (1) led to the breakaway of the CP 
in 1982; (2) precipitated massive demonstrations on a countrywide basis, extensive 
violence in 1984-86, culminating in a State of Emergency. 
As implied in the U.S. policy, constructive engagement cordially welcomed those 
reforms that were palpably moves away from discrimination and thus was ambivalent 
about the Tricameral Parliament: 'The U.S. government said that while it condemned 
apartheid and the denial of fundamental rights to South Africa's black majority 
population, the issue was how to encourage practical steps away from the apartheid 
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system. The 66% 'yes' vote in the referendum among white voters was a reflection of 
the growing consensus within the electorate of the need to move towards more 
representative participation in the country's political process. It was the U.S. 
government's hope that the South African government would use its mandate to 
address the problem of political rights for the South African black majority.'96 
If this was criticism, it was criticism of a very muted kind, designed evidently not 
to offend P.W. Botha, but rather to encourage him to proceed further along the path 
of reform. 
An assessment of whether constructive engagement helped along such reforms 
went as far as P.W. Botha was prepared to accept remains a matter of controversy. 
According to past South African Ambassador to the U.S. and former senior Foreign 
Affairs Official, Herbert Beukes, 'constructive engagement was a profound policy that 
was helpful in stabilizing the South African situation'. However, P.W. Botha was 
'greatly influenced by individuals and not by American policy'. For the most part, P.W. 
Botha was generally 'anti-American'.97 
Perhaps, as a U.S. diplomat claimed at the time, quiet U.S. diplomacy 
discouraged even stronger measures against the rising tide of protest, but in December 
1984 P.W. Botha repudiated suggestions that American pressure had led to the release 
of certain detainees, saying that, 'no quiet diplomacy or hard shouting' would keep 
South Africans from taking the path of justice and that South Africa would make its 
own decisions. The South Africa Institute of Race Relations in a 1984 survey noted 
'that is was very unlikely that P.W. Botha would have responded in any fundamentally 
different way whether constructive engagement was or was not U.S. policy'.98 
'Constitutionalisation' of apartheid in terms of the Tricameral Parliament and strong-
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arm measures taken by the Botha government during 1984-86 to deal with protest 
deeply violated American sensitivities about human rights. Moreover, another point to 
consider when assessing P.W. Botha's reform program is that the apparatus of 
'draconian security laws' was left intact and, indeed, the security system was 
dramatically tightened up. The abuse of civil rights that was inherent in this approach 
was peculiarly offensive to almost all Americans and, certainly, persuaded a number 
of wavering members of the Congress to come down ultimately on the side of the 
sanction drivers in support of CAAA. 
Late 1984 saw the inception of a country-wide protest in the U.S. against 
apartheid --- a major cause of constructive engagement's downfall. 
2.4.2 Analysis Outlining the Failure of Constructive Engagement 
Because what was to follow the strategy of constructive engagement was such 
a drastic shift of policy gears, constructive engagement has often been viewed as a 
failed policy. There are several key events that led to this change. 
There can be little doubt that after the sharp criticism of the Carter 
administration, P. W. Botha's National Party government breathed a sigh of relief at 
the prospect of a "constructive" diplomatic relationship with the United States and the 
newly elected Reagan administration. As stated by Ungar and Vale, "The Botha 
government" misread the policy of constructive engagement as signalling a return to 
the days when the South African white regime could get away with portraying itself as 
a protector of the Western way of life, a bastion of freedom, decency and economic 
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development at the tip of a continent afflicted by tyranny, chaos and abject poverty -
above all, a bulwark against communism."99 
An indication of the Botha government's inability to read the signals coming 
from Washington is evident when a sanctions warning reached the South African 
Ambassador to the U.S. from thirty five conservative House of Representatives 
Republicans threatening sanctions against South Africa in December 1984. The letter 
stated: 
"Events of recent weeks in South Africa have raised serious questions about 
your government's willingness to move more progressively and aggressively 
toward real human rights reforms. With this letter we wish to make clear that 
we view the violence in your country and the questions raised by it with alarm. 
Furthermore we want you to know that we are prepared to pursue policy 
changes relative to South Africa's relationships with the United States if the 
situation does not improve .... We are looking for an immediate end to the 
violence in South Africa accompanied by a demonstrated sense of urgency 
about ending apartheid. If such actions are not forthcoming, we are prepared 
to recommend that the U.S. government take the following two steps: (1) 
Curtail new American investment in South Africa unless certain economic and 
civil rights guarantees for all persons are in place. (2) Or~nize international 
diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa."1 : 
With hindsight, it may be stated that even though the South African government 
was moving in a direction that signified change, it failed to recognize the growing 
power of the Congress and the increased salience of the South African issue among 
the American public. Past South African Ambassador to Washington, Brand Fourie 
notes, "Many South Africans underestimated the danger of sanctions and other forms 
of disinvestment". 101 "Botha and his closest allies", according to Crocker, "badly 
misjudged what would be required" for the success of constructive engagement.102 
Thus, it was this underestimation, and not the outright rejection of reform, by 
the South African government and its failure to produce enough "goods" in the form 
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of political change, that led in the longer term to the decline leading to the fall of 
constructive engagement.103 
Whether it was the outrage at the sluggish reform pace of the Botha 
government that brought a change in policy is a different debate altogether. What is 
important is that some critics have argued that there were several flaws in the ways in 
which constructive engagement was implemented. The following paragraphs try to 
identify these flaws. 
First, from the beginning constructive engagement was problematic in that the 
"American practice of attempting to reform the South African system" was "working 
entirely within [the South African system] and honoring its rules", so that U.S. policy 
attention was on a small faction rather than the majority of the population. "The 
problem" according to Ungar and Vale in 1986, was that constructive engagement 
"relies almost entirely on white led change, ... and ignores the needs, the politics and the 
passions of the black majority in South Africa."104 
Secondly, many South African black political activists became increasingly 
disillusioned with what they construed as the U.S. government's pandering to Pretoria. 
This inevitably, according to Pauline Baker, "branded the United States as an enemy 
in the eyes of the majority of the population"105, for which Christopher Coker 
blames the U.S. government for not having the insight to recognize the need for a 
shorter time frame to implement change.106 
The revelation of "a fundamental sympathy for the South African government 
and scant understanding of black sentiment" 107 not only hardened black attitudes 
toward the United States and its southern African policies but also caused yet a third 
problem. The U.S. policy of constructive engagement allegedly displayed a disregard 
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for many of the fundamental elements the U.S. claims to seek to uphold in world 
order, of which the most important is respect for human rights. As stated by long time 
South African critic and 1984 Nobel Peace prize winner, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
"It is such a system that the "constructive engagement" policy followed by the 
current administration of this land has helped to continue, a system which cares 
nothing about even the most elementary human rights. I hope one day that the 
United States, this great country, will recover and be true to its tradition to side 
with those who seek justice, democracy, peace and equity."108 
William Foltz backs up this argument by stating that no administration can 
avoid to recognize "symbolic" relationship between South African and the U.S.'s 
domestic racial problems. 109 
A fourth flaw in constructive engagement was its preoccupation with cold-war 
consideration~. According to Ungar and Vale, "the Reagan Administration viewed the 
problems of southern Africa in the context of East-West relations". Admittedly Soviet 
influence in the region may have been of concern to American interests, but the US 
"must resist the ever present temptation to use southern Africa as a place to score 
points in the East-West struggle11110 which ultimately would seem to choke the 
11voice11 of American "principles" and reduce any policy's credibility. 
Whether these criticisms of constructive engagement are valid will remain a 
controversial issue in scholarly debates for some time to come. 
By the beginning of 1985 there were clear indications that constructive 
engagement had run out of steam. Relations between South Africa and the U.S. 
deteriorated, as was shown by the U.S. decision to recall its ambassador to protest 
Pretoria's aggression on neighboring countries in June 1985. In July a major 
development occurred when the Chase Manhattan Bank refused to roll over South 
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African loans. Other foreign banks followed in September. This was a decision that was 
motivated primarily by market considerations but it was a highly significant signal to 
foreign investors that South Africa had, by now, become a high-risk country. Moreover, 
although the Chase Manhattan decision was not formally part of a sanctions package 
it certainly accelerated the move towards the adoption of sanctions. 
On the 21 July 1985, after hundreds of deaths as a result of conflict and 
violence in South African townships, the South African Government imposed a State 
of Emergency in specific areas of the country. Such an action was a complete negation 
of constructive engagement's goal of curbing violence and "fostering peaceful change". 
The following year on 12 June (four months before the U.S. Congress passed the 
CAAA over President Reagan's veto) the South African Government placed the entire 
county under· a State of Emergency. 
With the inevitable signs of a financial crisis on the horizon, State President 
P.W. Botha, on 15 August 1985, delivered a speech which further discouraged and 
undermined any positive progress that may have come from constructive engagement. 
This address, known as the "Rubicon" speech, rejected the move toward reform, except 
on his own limited terms. It was also an explicit and vehement rejection of foreign 
interference. Thus the "Rubicon"speech totally rejected and abandoned what Chester 
Crocker termed "pursu[ing] [U.S.] varied interests in a full and friendly relationship" 
while "steering" around the "danger" of "violence".111 
In an address before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, just one day 
after P.W. Botha's "Rubicon" speech, Crocker, still insisted that the US had "an 
important role to play"112 by sticking to its foreign policy. 
"Irrespective of how South Africa will be run - and by whom - damaging its 
economy now will not only stunt economic growth but will also ultimately stunt 
the lives of this and coming generations of young South Africans."113 
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Even though some important aspects of apartheid were changing, Cracker's sincere 
efforts were pushing against a mountain that would not move as long as President 
Botha was still in power. Botha had not the slightest intention of giving in to 
international pressure, or even more, of being perceived by his domestic opponents as 
bowing to such pressure. Aside from all of this Crocker still clung to the view that 
apartheid was indeed "eroding", "being challenged" and "being dismantled." 114 He 
ended his address saying, 
"We consider yesterday's speech [the "Rubicon"] to be an important statement 
in that it discussed some issues that are at the core o( the problem of apartheid. 
At the same time, the speech written in the code language of a foreign culture 
within a polarized society - is not easily interpreted and raises many questions . 
. . . What must be emrhasized is that a speech such as this is but an element of 
an ongoing process." 15 
Crocker did not mention the policy phrase "constructive engagement". Perhaps 
he too was finally recognizing its failure within South Africa and perhaps that a policy 
shift was required. But what he did stress was the basic fundamental principle that 
underlay the constructive engagement policy: that of still using "tools of influence", 
"remaining builders", "avoiding coercion" and keeping "communication" lines open. Why 
after the policy had so palpably failed did Crocker still cling to it? 
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2.4.3 Post-1986 Reagan Policy 
After the enactment in 1986 of CAAA the Reagan administration obliged to 
implement its provisions, despite the administration's continuing belief that the best 
approach to the southern African region was by method of a constructive approach. 
As Secretary of State Shultz put, shortly after the CAAA became law: 
"You don't just throw up your hands and say "I don't like it. I'm leaving." You 
stay there. You are, if I may use the term, engaged. So this is our policy -- to 
be engaged, and engaged with everybody, and we hope our actions will be 
constructive." 116 
The CAAA remained in force for three years after Reagan left office; the following 
paragraphs explain the Reagan administration's post-CAAA approach to southern 
Africa and more particularly South Africa. 
During the last years of the Reagan presidency, the Sou~h African issue lost 
some of the significance it had acquired by the mid-80s as a domestic political concern 
in the U.S. The reasons for this, according to Pauline Baker, are two-fold: Firstly, 
American public opinion has a "short attention span for specific foreign affairs topics", 
and most importantly, the South African government was successful "in crushing 
internal dissent and muzzling local and foreign media".117 In Reagan's second term 
the media coverage of political violence and unrest in South Africa was so limited that 
the U.S. public saw very little. Moreover, with the CAAA in place, many believed that 
the South African issue had been effectively dealt with and was, for the time being, off 
the agenda. 
After 1986 the Reagan administration hoped that the South African issue would 
quiet down so that the rancorous debates of the early 1980s would not be repeated. 
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By this time, the administration also softened its line on the ANC (which 
Reagan had previously called a 'terrorist' organization). This change was signified by 
a meeting in January 1987 between Secretary Shultz and Oliver Tambo, the then-
president of the ANC. In 75 years, as noted by Baker, this "was the first encounter the 
ANC had with a U.S. official11.118 
This among other things led the administration to search for new policies in a 
continuing effort to solve the region's problems. 
In retrospect Chester Crocker has noted, "the strategy of engagement in 
southern Africa problem-solving --- with all its risks --- worked better than I had 
imagined it could".119 If anything, the 1980s did one thing for U.S./South Africa 
relations: the U.S. became more involved in and aware of the events of the South 
African region than it had ever done in history. 
The following chapter explores the South African sanctions debate, as well as 
provides an analysis of U.S.-initiated sanctions. 
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SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the idea and possible threat of 
economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa was not a new or unrealistic 
phenomenon, whether imposed multi-laterally through the United Nations or applied 
bi-laterally by individual states. It is also true that economic sanctions have been 
utilized by m~ny nations throughout history as a foreign policy weapon to achieve 
various goals. (See Appendix C) Therefore, the South African situation, as a sanctions 
target, was not an isolated one. 
The aim of this chapter is to try to provide, as clearly as possible, a definition 
and understanding of economic sanctions, as seen in the case of U.S. foreign policy 
regarding South Africa. The question concerning why the United States opted for the 
sanctions choice will be addressed. Also, a complete statement of the United States' 
efforts to implement sanctions will be given, followed by facts and arguments 
surrounding the impact of economic sanctions. 
David Baldwin in his book, Economic Statecraft (1985), provides a 
comprehensive perspective on the "general nature" and "implications" of international 
economic policies that are likely to influence foreign policy-making. Baldwin defines 
statecraft by saying, "among students of foreign policy and international politics the 
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term is sometimes used to encompass the whole foreign-policy making process, but 
more often it refers to the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals".1 
He goes on to say that in order to study statecraft one must, "consider the instruments 
used by policy makers in their attempts to exercise power, i.e., to get others to do what 
they would not otherwise do".2 
Baldwin emphasizes the need for policy-makers to make decisions based on the 
various policy choices and alternatives available to them in order to produce the most 
cost-efficient foreign policy. This often results in a comparative analysis "about the 
costs and benefits of their perceived alternatives.113 
The concept of economic statecraft, as illustrated and defined by Baldwin, is 
deliberately broad in the sense that it encompasses many specific forms of economic 
leverage (which he terms sanctions), be they either positive or negative. Such 
broadness is necessary "as it must be if it is to subsume all of the economic means by 
which foreign policy makers might try to influence other intern~tional actors".4 The 
following data (See: Tables 3.1 and 3.2), as presented by Baldwin, illustrate the 
alternative choices for either negative sanctions (based on attempts to threaten or 
punish), or positive sanctions (based on promising or providing rewards). 
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TABLE 3.1 
Examples of Economic Statecraft: Negative Sanctions 
TRADE CAPITAL 
EMBARGO: prohibition on exports; ban FREEZING ASSETS: impounding 
on all trade assets, denying access to bank accounts 
or other financial assets owned by target 
country 
BOYCOTT: prohibition on imports CONTROLS ON IMPORT OR 
EXPORT: restriction on who can 
transfer how much capital for what 
purposes in and out of a country 
TARIFF INCREASE: increase in taxes AID SUSPENSION: the reduction, 
on imports from target state(s) termination, or slow-down of aid transfers 
TARIFF DISCRIMINATION: imports EXPROPRIATION: seizing ownership 
from target countries treated less of property belonging to target state 
favorably than those from other countries 
WITHDRAW OF "MOST-FAVORED- WITHHOLDING DUES TO 
NATION TREATMENT': ceasing to INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: 
treat imports from a country as favorably nonpayment, late payment, or reduced 
as similar imports from any other country payment of financial obligations agreed 
are treated to in the past 
BLACKLIST: ban on doing business TAXATION: assets of target state may 
with firms that trade with the target be taxed in a discriminatory manner 
country 
QUOTAS (import or export): THREATS OF THE ABOVE* 
quantitative restriction on particular 
imports or exports 
LICENSE DENIAL (import or export): 
refusing permission to import/export 
goods 
DUMPING: deliberate sale of exports at 
prices below cost of production 
PRECLUSIVE BUYING: purchase of a 
commodity in order to deny it to the 
target country 
THREATS OF THE ABOVE* 
• use of any of the above techniques is conditional upon certain kinds of behavior by the target 
81 
TABLE 3.2 
Examples of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions 
TRADE CAPITAL 
TARIFF DISCRIMINATION: import PROVIDING AID: extension or 
duties favoring imports from target continuation of aid via bilateral or 
state(s) multilateral channels in the form of 
grants or loans 
GRANTING "MOST-FAVORED- INVESTMENT GUARANTEES: 
NATION TREATMENT': promising to governmental insurance against some of 
treat imports from target state as the risks of private foreign investors 
favorably as imports of similar products 
from any other source 
TARIFF REDUCTION: lowering of ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE 
tariffs in general or on particular CAPITAL EXPORTS OR IMPORTS: 
products variety of incentives to import or export 
capital 
DIRECT PURCHASE: payment for TAXATION: especially favorable 
service or goods taxation of foreign capital investment 
SUBSIDIES TO EXPORTS OR PROMISES OF THE ABOVE* 
IMPORTS:· exports to or imports from 
the target state may be subsidized 
GRANTING LICENSES (import or 
export): permission to import or export 
particular goods 
PROMISES OF THE ABOVE* 
• use of any of the above techniques is conditional upon certain kinds of behavior by the target 
Source for Tables 3.1 and 3.2: David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 41 & 42. 
Baldwin gives three reasons for combining these ideas to think in terms of the 
"broad concept" which constitutes economic statecraft. They are: (1) because others 
think in terms of statecraft; (2) because economic techniques are peculiar; and (3) 
because other techniques of statecraft are treated at this level of generality.5 
For the purposes of this dissertation, only negative sanctions will be dealt with. 
There are three common meanings for the term 'economic sanction' according to 
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Baldwin. The first refers to "the use of economic measures to enforce international law. 
The second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented 
in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic 
techniques of statecraft. . . ."6 However, Baldwin questions the use of the term 
'economic sanction' and would rather avoid it, as the term is ambiguous and "used in 
so many different ways."7 
3.1.1 Defining Economic Sanctions 
Although the term "economic sanction" has become a "catch-all" phrase 
applicable to many forms of economic foreign policy, it can be more specifically 
defined. It can stand as an individual concept, but whether or not it encapsulates other 
elements of Baldwin's statecraft is a different argument. What becomes important is 
that a clear understanding of the term is obtained. The following are definitions 
presented by three different authors. 
"When economic measures are used as sanctions" according to Margaret Doxey, 
"the objective should be to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not 
conform to accepted norms of international conduct." 8 In agreement with this, Robin 
Renwick says "sanctions may be defined in legal terms as the penalty imposed to 
ensure compliance with a law."9 When using contemporary international discourse, 
Renwick continues by stating that "sanctions are conceived essentially as the imposition 
of economic penalties to bring about a change in the political behavior of the country 
against which they are directed."10 
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However, a definition that is more appropriate to the use of economic sanctions 
applied through multilateral channels is advanced by Dauodi and Dajani. In the event 
of "breach of international law", punitive sanctions are "initiated by a number of 
international actors, particularly a world organization such as the League of Nations 
or the United Nations, against one or more states for violating a universally approved 
charter. ... "11 
The first two definitions help to explain the "economic sanctions" route taken 
by the United States in 1986 in its foreign policy approach toward South Africa; while 
the latter definition more effectively explains U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa 
prior to 1986. 
3.1.2 The Assumptions Underlying Sanctions 
When a state or an international organization looks at the possibility of 
imposing economic sanctions on a targeted state, it does not necessarily imply that 
economic sanctions as the ideal policy choice: it may mean that sanctions are the best 
or most promising alternative among the choices available. Governments, when 
"deciding to impose economic sanctions" in response to an "international crisis", 
according to Renwick, can choose between three broad policy options: "(a) to do 
nothing; (b) to consider taking some form of military action; ( c) to seek to impose 
economic penalties."12 
It is necessary to look briefly at some of the major assumptions concerning 
economic sanctions that a government or an international organization will weigh up 
before it makes the decision to impose economic sanctions. 
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i. Limitations 
The use of sanctions as a foreign policy choice suggests several limitations, 
primarily because not all sanctions are successful when it comes to changing the 
internal affairs of the target country. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott list four of the 
major limitations on the use of sanctions: 
"One reason for failure is plain: the sanctions imposed may simply be 
inadequate to achieve the objectives sought - the goals may be too elusive, the 
means too gentle, or cooperation from other countries, when needed, too tepid. 
A second reason for failure is that sanctions may create their own 
antidotes. In particular, economic sanctions may unify the target country both 
in support of the government and in search of commercial alternatives. 
A third reason for the unsuccessful application of economic pressure is 
that sanctions may prompt powerful allies of the target country to lend support, 
largely offsetting whatever deprivation results from the sanctions themselves. 
A fourth reason for failure is that economic sanctions create their own 
backlash, abroad and at home."13 
Doxey shares this view, claiming that the chance for successful sanctions is 
reduced when states whose co-operation is required to strengthen sanctions are not 
willing to participate fully, thus "without universality of application, vulnerability to 
external economic pressure is drastically lessened".14 Moreover, it is difficult to police 
the sanction environment in that alternative markets and sources of supply become 
available. Sanction-busting actions are channelled through third states or friendly allies 
that may offer up loans, credits, gifts or even lines of transport to replace those 
affected by sanctions.15 
To monitor and ensure that a state's sanctions policy is having the maximum 
effect on the target state often becomes very difficult. Every state realizes that, when 
choosing to use economic sanctions as a possible foreign policy choice, it is a fact that 
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there are endless possibilities for the target country to evade sanctions by various 
means, illegal or otherwise.16 
3.2 WHY SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE? 
There are many reasons for choosing an economic route in foreign policy. 
Perhaps understanding one of the most basic reasons lies in understanding humanity 
itself. The need and desire for states or leaders of states to influence or to exert some 
control over one another has been said to have been part of human nature and a 
normal process in any society or social organization. "Human beings" according to 
Baldwin, "are political animals" who need to influence one another and "as states 
continue to exist, statesmen will make influence attempts." 17 
Perhaps a second reason, other than the human desire to influence, is the need 
by the sender country to coerce and to interfere in the internal affairs of the target 
country. "Sanctions are part and parcel of international diplomacy," according to 
Hufbauer and Schott. Furthermore, they go on to say that sanctions are an economic 
instrument used "to coerce a target government into particular avenues of 
response."18 
However, the most cogent reasons for using economic sanctions are given by 
Merle Lipton: 
"This tendency to resort to sanctions has been strengthened by the search for 
alternatives to war in the nuclear age, as well as by long-term economic and 
technological changes affecting the international system. Increasing economic 
interdependence and the communications revolution are creating a 'global 
society', in which the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs, between national sovereignty and legitimate international concerns, is 
being challenged. These changes have created increasing awareness of what is 
happening in other countries. Meanwhile, the conviction that outsiders have the 
right and duty to intervene is strengthened by the belief that such sanctions are 
likely to be more effective than hitherto."19 
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In addition to these general reasons for applying sanctions, the United States 
had three additional motivations. Firstly, due to United States sensitivity regarding 
racial injustice, sanctions can be an effective tool to express disagreement where 
fundamental racial equality and human rights are not being upheld. This is particularly 
the case with U.S. sanctions against South Africa. As Doxey has explained, African 
countries and the United States have established a certain level of "unacceptability of 
racial discrimination against blacks." This abhorrence of racial discrimination "gathers 
additional moral force and provides one of the few issues on which political consensus 
had been attainable at the United Nations .... [Therefore], sanctions against Rhodesia 
and South Africa derive status and credibility from their rell:).tion to a universal 
norm.1120 
A second reason derives from the high esteem the United States holds for its 
own political system. Many Americans see their own system as the most democratic 
and moral design available in the world to represent those people subject to what is 
seen as an unjust system. Such is "the belief of many Americans that their system and 
values are model for the rest of the world, and their convictions that they have a 
leading role to play in reshaping that world in their own image. Economic sanctions 
provide a weapon that seems well-suited for this purpose."21 This idea is closely 
linked to the fact that the United States is a world power and can, if it so desires, 
influence other states in the global arena to comply with U.S. ideals and goals. This is 
because, according to Hufbauer and Schott, it is large countries that "pursue an active 
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foreign policy .... " But more specifically, sanctions "have been used by big powers -
precisely because they are big and can seek to influence events on a global scale." 22 
The third and the most concrete reason for the United States' decision to 
implement sanctions is as stated above --- is because the United States is a world 
power, it can impose meaningful sanctions with little financial cost to itself. This is 
explained by Merle Lipton: 
"The United States accounts for about a quarter of the world's gross product. 
. . . Thus in applying economic sanctions the United States can expect to have 
a significant economic impact on others at relatively smaller cost to itself."23 
Because the sanctions debate is often viewed through cost/benefit eyes, U.S. 
policy-makers can both seek benefits from the imposition of economic sanctions and 
try to remedy a situation. Often the cost is greater if a state fails to act. However, the 
actual success or failure of the sanction policy will usually bring little or no cost to the 
country imposing it. " 'Demonstration of resolve"', as stated by Hufbauer and Schott, 
"has often supplied the driving force behind the imposition of sanctions." They note 
that this is the case especially for the U.S. "which frequently has deployed sanctions to 
try to assert its leadership in world affairs."24 Although United States administrations 
often impose sanctions to register strong disagreement with international "misdeeds", 
in effect they realize that influencing the behavior will often bring insignificant change, 
if any. The reason for this according to Hufbauer and Schott, is because "sanctions 
often are imposed because the cost of inaction - in lost confidence at home and abroad 
in the ability or willingness of the US to act - is seen as greater than the cost of the 
sanctions."25 It may also be the case that the imposition of sanctions is a purely 
symbolic gesture that 'sends a message' to the target state. 
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It must also be stated that there were many times recently before the 1986 
sanctions were implemented against South Africa where the U.S. sought to influence 
other countries by opting for the sanctions weapon. Most notably sanctions were used 
against Nicaragua and Iran in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, perhaps it can be 
stated that as sanctions were increasingly resorted to, the more feasible their 
application became in the South African situation. 
The above paragraphs give some indication why the United States acted the way 
it did toward South Africa in the mid-1980's, when United States foreign policy started 
to move away from constructive engagement. The following section seeks to explain 
the United States foreign policy shift toward economic sanctions. 
3.3 MOVE TOWARD SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS IN THE MID-1980'S 
3.3.l Reagan Sanctions and Executive Action 
Reagan's second term, and more specifically 1985, witnessed swift changes to 
the policy of constructive engagement. In both the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives punitive economic legislation was pending that sought to impose a 
series of strict punishments on South Africa. 
The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 (House Resolution 1460) and Senate Bill (S. 
995) both encouraged South Africa to abandon apartheid policies.26 The Senate-
House Conference provided a joint version of H.R. 1460 and S. 995 and the bill was 
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titled the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1985. This bill never became law due to 
legislative delays and the President's unwillingness to accept it. 
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan issued an Executive Order (No. 
12532) against South Africa which would impose limited sanctions. Reagan thought his 
Executive Order would further U.S. objectives. He stressed a need for uniformity of 
U.S. policy toward South Africa, and admitted that if the Anti-Apartheid Action Act 
of 1985 were to cross his desk for signature into law, he would certainly veto it. As 
stated by President Reagan in September 1985: 
"I believe the measures I am announcing here today will best advance our goals. 
If the Congress sends me the present bill as reported by the Conference 
Committee, I would have to veto it. That need not happen. I want to work with 
the Congress to advance bipartisan support for America's policy toward South 
Africa. That is why I have put forward this Executive Order today."27 
Reagan's Executive order28 was not merely designed to improve the situation 
m South Africa or even to improve U.S./South African relations, but, rather, it 
attempted to pre-empt the possibility of stricter sanctions legislation by Congress. As 
understood by President Reagan, such legislation could deeply undermine any progress 
made by the constructive engagement policy of his first term. 
A second Executive Order (No. 12535) on South Africa was signed by President 
Reagan on October 1, 1985. The import of Krugerrands into the United States was 
prohibited by this order and both Executive Orders (No. 12532 and No. 12535) were 
extended in September of 1986. 
The implementation of the Executive Orders was the cause of much debate and 
triggered opposition from all sides. "While it represented an attempt at compromise," 
according to Pauline Baker, "the president's executive order[s] pleased neither the left 
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nor the right."29 The executive order made those on the left angry as it undermined 
stricter punitive sanctions, while on the other side, "hard-line conservatives believed 
Reagan's willingness to adopt limited sanctions would tilt the United States toward 
South African black radicals and play into the hands of the Soviet Union.1130 
Even though President Reagan maintained that his Executive Order approach 
was the best method of nudging South Africa toward peaceful change, this direction 
would soon be changed. 
3.3.2 Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. 
It became clear in 1986 that stiffer sanctions against South Africa were 
becoming a reality and could not be stopped. The purpose of the president's executive 
orders had been to deter comprehensive sanctions, but instead of stopping sanctions, 
they only fueled the debate. According to Baker, "the question was no-longer whether 
sanctions would be imposed, but rather which sanctions wold be the most effective."31 
The sanctions campaign had been gathering momentum since the 1970s. As 
disenchantment with constructive engagement grew so also did pressure for stronger 
action. The sanctions campaign developed from grass-roots base of churches, civil 
rights groups, various African lobbies and anti-apartheid groups and in colleges and 
universities. By 1985-6 the sanctions campaign had a substantial U.S.-wide support-
base. As illustrated by Baker, it is important to understand the intensity of this debate: 
"The political dynamics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States 
were not limited to black activism. The crisis in South Africa touched American 
of all colors and reached into corporate boardrooms, local legislatures, city 
councils, campuses, churches, and labor unions. The anti-apartheid campaign 
rekindled a collective spirit of social activism that had been dormant since the 
1960s. Roman Catholic bishops, the major Protestant churches, and the 
National Council of Churches, to which most mainline Protestant and Orthodox 
churches belong, issued statements in favor of sanctions. Leaders of the 
country's largest civil rights organizations, labor unions, women's associations 
and Jewish groups added their voices, including Coretta Scott King, Benjamin 
Hooks from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), John Jacob from the National Urban League, Elanor Smeal from 
the National Organization of Women, Henry Siegman from the American 
Jewish Congress, and the presidents of the largest AFL-CIO-affiliated unions. 
. . . Campus activism sharpened the debate . . . as did a growth in the 
Congressional Black Congress."32 
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The more the South African sanctions question became debated, the more 
momentum it gained as being a major issue among legislative leaders in Washington. 
A widespread feeling in Congress was that the minor sanctions provided in President 
Reagan's Executive orders were not sufficient to induce change in South Africa. As the 
violence grew and a country-wide state of emergency was imposed increasing numbers 
in Congress felt impelled to adopt tougher measures against South Africa. The 
campaign for sanctions had by now developed a momentum and a depth of support 
that increasing numbers of legislators who may previously have been relatively 
unconcerned about South Africa or were hesitant about the wisdom of sanctions, now 
felt obliged to make a stand. 
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act or CAAA (Public Legislation 99-440) 
of 1986 was the result of this Congressional response. The CAAA was vetoed by 
President Reagan on the 26 September 1986. The House of Representatives overrode 
President Reagan's veto on 29 September by a vote of 313 to 83; the Senate overrode 
the veto on 2 October 1986, by a vote of 78 to 21; the bill became law on the· same 
day. 
The purpose of the sanctions was to persuade the South African government 
to move more quickly towards a negotiated end to the apartheid system and the unrest 
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in South Africa. The CAAA (Appendix D) had three primary stipulations: (1) it 
imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy on apartheid; 
and (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. The CAAA remained in force 
until recently when President George Bush formally lifted the sanctions legislation on 
10 July 1991. President Bush felt that the South African government had met the five 
provisions (Appendix D) for lifting sanctions. 
3.4 THE ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA 
Even though the CAAA has been revoked by the United States Government, 
many state and local governments in the United States along with private businesses 
still enforce sanctions against South Africa. Many other states were also allies in joining 
the sanctions effort against South Africa (Appendix E). Approximately, twenty four of 
South Africa's key trading partners implemented similar legislation while the European 
Community (EC) imposed its own sanctions. Much of that legislation has been relaxed, 
lifted or is in the process of being withdrawn. 
Economic sanctions, whether specifically dealing with disinvestment, trade, or 
international finance are all separate but linked. It can be said that some have had 
significant impact while others have been counterproductive. What is essential is to 
note is that not all economic pressure on South Africa was imposed in emulation of 
the CAAA, but rather the CAAA can be said to have influenced specific actions on 
business, trade, or lending. The 'demonstration effect' of U.S.-imposed sanctions was 
considerable, given its standing as a dominant power in the West, plus the threat clause 
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in the CAAA to sanction states that undercut the U.S. position by moving in to fill the 
trade opportunities that opened up. 
The scope of the sanctions activity was very extensive. It covered many U.S. 
states, counties, businesses, and universities. Major companies like Coca-Cola, IBM, 
Ford, and General Motors, equaling 179 in total, either sold or closed their businesses 
in South Africa. Moreover, in the U.S. alone, some 23 states, plus the Virgin Islands, 
19 counties and 79 have, in one form or another, imposed sanctions. Since the end of 
the 1970s more than 85 U.S. colleges and universities have either partially or totally 
divested.33 Much of this sanctions activity was not included in the CAAA but were 
individual pieces of legislation, or action initiated by grassroots communities, 
businesses, churches, and universities. 
3.4.1 The Economic Impact of Sanctions 
The CAAA, along with other sanctions measures, is said to have effected South 
Africa in many different ways. There continues to be a vigorous debate about whether 
sanctions have been successful in achieving their attended goals or have had a 
counterproductive impact on South Africa. As explained by Janice Love, evaluating the 
impact of sanctions is a difficult task because sanctions' success is "minimized by 
seemingly dispassionate analysts but overrated by those committed to punishing the 
target."34 Similarly, Merle Lipton adds: 
" ... the effect of disinvestment confirms the world wide experience that 
sanctions create both gainers and losers and that it is difficult to shape them so 
that their costs fall primarily on their intended targets.1135 
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Steven Lewis, Jr., says that "discussions of economic pressure/ sanctions as a 
policy tool used by foreign governments to promote change in South Africa have been 
blurred by several factors: 
A failure to distinguish clearly the specific measures being discussed and 
the processes by which they are supposed to affect economic 
developments, influence political behavior, and hence promote political 
change. 
Extravagant claims concerning both the successes and the failures of past 
attempts to use economic pressures. 
A tendency on part of both proponents and opponents of sanctions to 
mix and confuse arguments about the morality of sanctions with 
arguments concerning their efficacy. 
A failure to relate arguments about economic pressure to other 
processes at work in South Africa and to take into account the country's 
economic structure and history. 
A curious and inconsistent materialism that causes advocates on the 
extremes of the sanctions debate to argue that individuals who share 
their beliefs would not change their values or their behavior on the basis 
of economic considerations such as loss of income, but that their 
opponents can be forced through economic pressure to either change 
their minds or lose their will to resist.1136 
Keeping the above arguments in mind, the following paragraphs seek to explain 
some of the various consequences of sanctions and their various effects on the 
economic and political environments of South Africa. 
Firstly, it is important to note that the economic impact of sanctions can be 
analyzed by determining possible consequences of disinvestment, some possible 
repercussions of financial sanctions on South Africa, and some possible implications 
of trade sanctions. The second point to note is that disinvestment, financial sanctions 
and trade sanctions had various effects on economic growth, employment, and income. 
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3.4.2 Disinvestment 
The idea behind the implementation of sanctions was to "raise the cost" of 
maintaining the system of apartheid. These sanctions, according to Merle Lipton, 
"focused on securing disinvestment - the withdrawal from South Africa of foreign 
companies with direct equity investments".37 
The present United States Ambassador to South Africa William L. Swing 
admitted that U.S. "investment has fallen from about 360 companies down to about 
100. We've dropped from about $4 billion (about Rll.2 billion) equity investment to 
about $1.5 billion (about R4.2 billion)."38 In relation to European companies, Lipton 
said, a "higher proportion of [those who are disinvesting are] US companies.1139 
Bankorp's Chief Executive, Chris J Van Wyk, said that: 
"the effects of disinvestment are more difficult to quantify than those of trade 
and financial sanctions. . . . Disinvestment has a negative short-term 
psychological impact, and a negative long-term impact on technology and skill 
transfers, as well as on the general interaction between South African business 
and leading business corporations in the international sphere. It does not create 
drastic unemployment, but reduces many of the social development and 
community programmes sponsored by multinationals for the benefit of black 
people.'.40 
U.S. Direct Investments in South Africa have been on the decline. Table 3.3 
below shows the value of U.S. direct investments in South Africa which stood at $1.6 
billion in 1987. 
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TABLE 3.3 
U.S. Direct Investments in South Africa Year-end Position, 1982-87 









Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of 
Current Business. August 1986, June 1987, June 1988 in William H. Cooper, 
"Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on the United Statesi:, Congressional 
Research Service Issue Brief, January 16, 1990, p. 4. 
The decline in U.S. investment, implies several disadvantages and cannot merely 
be seen as a step in a positive direction. As Merle Lipton states, 
11The impact of sanctions has been most marked in relation to capital outflows. 
Yet although sanctions 'worked' in the sense of stimulating significant 
disinvestment from South Africa, the effects of this have been ambiguous. 
Disinvestment has not noticeably impeded the functioning of the South African 
economy; it has produced wind-fall gains for some rich whites; disadvantages 
for some blacks; and losses for foreign investors - although it has also been a 
blow to business confidence.1141 
When companies disinvest it is inevitable that a number of jobs will go with 
them. It has been argued by the National Party government that sanctions have caused 
and would continue to cause blacks to lose their jobs. According to Ronald Bethlehem, 
a recession in the early 1980s has brought a 'total employment decline which in "return 
has "produced an increase in unemployment.1142 
It is, however, difficult to establish conclusively that U.S.-imposed sanctions 
alone have caused job losses for blacks. Probably sanctions were a contributory factor, 
97 
but there is doubt if it is methodologically possible to factor out the precise 
contribution of sanctions. According to Congressional statistics, it has been estimated 
that "U.S. sanctions alone would result in over 600,000 unemployed, and the loss of 
jobs to these workers would mean the 3.1 million of their dependents would also be 
affected."43 However these statistics are hard to confirm or refute as it is difficult to 
establish exactly how many black workers were affected by sanctions. The difficult part 
is identifying the impact attributable to sanctions and the impact of the decline of 
investor (both foreign and domestic) confidence in the South African economy. In 
terms of job losses the latter was a far more significant factor. 
What is important is that there is clear distinction between (a) damaging the 
economy - which sanctions are bound to do, (b) nudging or pushing the rulers in a 
politically acceptable direction. Whether sanctions intend to do one but also do the 
other or visa versa, shows that there is proof that there is no guarantee of effectively 
hitting the desired target. 
3.4.3 Trade Sanctions 
South Africa, like most states in the global arena, have many items to trade on 
international markets. (See Appendix F and G) One must understand trade as a fairly 
straightforward process, according to Richard Moorsom whereas trade is one "activity 
in an integrated economic system."44 Thus trade volume has the ability to influence 
international capital flows, financial transactions, exchange rates or bans on investment 
and loan finance. 
98 
U.S. trade with South Africa from 1984 to 1989 is shown below in Table 3.4 The 
CAAA has had a major impact on U.S. imports from South Africa. It is apparent that 
at least 50% of the decline in U.S. imports from South Africa is due to the embargoes 
under the CAAA. 
TABLE 3.4 
U.S. Trade with South Africa, 1984-89 
(billions of dollars) 
1984 
U.S. Exports 2.3 
U.S. Imports 2.5 
U.S. Balance -0.2 





1986 1987 1988 1989* 
1.2 1.3 1.7 1.2 
2.4 1.3 1.6 1.2 
-1.2 -0.0 0.1 0.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, TradeNet 
Computerized Data Retrieval System. Exports are total exports valued on a f.a.s. 
basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis. in William H. Cooper, 
"Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on the United States", Congressional 
Research Service Issue Brief, January 16, 1990, p. 6. 
When the U.S. trade sanctions became policy, the South African market became 
open for new trade to replace the declining U.S. trade. To discourage other major 
Western nations (Appendix H) benefiting from U.S. disinvestment and trade sanctions 
against South Africa, Section 402 - 3 of the CAAA (see Appendix D) outlines the 
provisions for retaliation. After 1986, according to Lipton, all of South Africa's top 
trading partners were "trying to keep out of the hot seat of being the top trading 
partner."45 
To sum up the debate surrounding trade sanctions, Merle Lipton gives five 
lessons of previous cases of sanctions that are applicable to South Africa: 
II Sanctions tend to 'bite at first, but then trade, like a river, flows round 
the obstacles erected against it. Sanctions continue to impose some 
costs, but these act more as a discriminatory tariff on trade than as 
barrier to it. 
The impact of sanctions is greatly affected by conditions in international 
trading markets; indeed these have, to date had more impact on the 
performance of the South African economy than sanctions. 
The efficacy of sanctions has been reduced by their uneven adoption 
and enforcement. But attempts to multilateralise sanctions are likely to 
lead to friction between the United States and many of its Asian and 
European allies. 
The efficacy of sanctions has also been reduced by political pressures 
from vested interests. These have ensured that the minerals and metals 
which comprise two-thirds of South Africa's exports have been largely 
exempted from sanctions. Instead, protectionist pressures have secured 
the sanctioning of less vital exports such as textiles and clothing, 
agricultural products and uranium. 
A sanctions-busting industry has emerged,with profits for a growing 
group of middlemen and camouflage industries in many countries.1146 
3.4.4 Financial Sanctions 
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Historically, South Africa has always relied on an inflow of capital during 
periods of growth where it was easy to detect a pattern in the balance of payments. 
According to Alan Hirsch, economic problems that South Africa has experienced in 
the past --- caused by international oil price increases of the late 1970s coupled with 
political violence and disinvestment --- have led South Africa into a recession.47 
These factors, among others, have limited the amount of capital inflow coming into 
South Africa thus exacerbating economic problems as a consequence. 
With this historical perspective against the backdrop of mass political unrest and 
violence in South Africa, the first onslaught of financial pressure came when Chase 
Manhattan Bank refused to roll over loans to South Africa on 31 July 1985. On 4 
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September foreign banks followed, contributing to, and setting off, a financial crisis in 
South Africa. Lipton explains: 
"This precipitated a liquidity crisis, forcing South Africa to declare a partial 
moratorium on its debt payments in September 1985. South Africa's subsequent 
problems in rescheduling its debts and acquiring new capital inflows and the 
negative-to-low growth rates of 1985/86, led to the belief that South Africa was 
undergoing a "sanctions-induced economic crisis" and that this offered a major 
source of leverage over the South African govemment."48 
This belief was strengthened by Gerhard de Kock, the past governor of the 
Reserve Bank: 
" ... without sanctions the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
would have been 4% to 5% annually, but the growth rate rose from 1 % in 1986 
to a high of 3% in 1988, then fell to 1.5% in the first quarter of 1989. Inflation 
in April 1989 was 14%, slightly less than a high of 16.1 % in 1987, and the value 
of the rand in August 1989 was $.36, little more than the low point of $.35 in 
August 1985 after foreign creditors refused to roll over South Africa's debt."49 
Merle Lipton, however, argues that de Kock's conclusions place too much 
emphasis on the impact of sanctions per se, and too little on market trends and 
political assumptions and forecasts.50 
It becomes obvious that South Africa's slow growth rate and debt problems are 
due to a combination of factors and not merely due to sanctions alone. Whether or not 
these factors are linked to disinvestment, trade or financial sanctions ( all of which are 
economically linked) which cause pressure on the government, it is in practice 
impossible to distinguish 'market' decisions from decisions that embody a fear of future 
punitive sanctions. Due to a history of numerous external elements and market forces, 
sanctions have perhaps received added success.51 
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But the fact that sanctions have made some impact cannot be denied. It is clear 
that "sanctions have contributed to the country's economic stagnation", as stated by 
Ronald Bethlehem. This he says has lead to an unavoidably political restructuring of 
the country.52 
3.4.5 Political Impact 
Noting the above arguments, it is true that a number of factors have contributed 
to the impact of sanctions. Likewise, elements of the political sphere cannot be omitted 
when discussing the possible influence of sanctions. Even though results are not 
conclusive and nearly impossible to pinpoint at this stage, some broad statements about 
this highly debated issue can be made. 
Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of sanction debate was the 
hardening of white attitudes towards the U.S. as will become apparent when the survey 
data are presented. Many South African government officials were angered and 
disconcerted at the U.S. action especially when the government considered itself in a 
process of reform. This hardening of attitudes also displayed outrage and irritation at 
U.S. interference in the South African domestic situation. This criticism of the U.S. 
became one of the key issues on the NP platform for the 1987 election. Similarly, the 
CP who would later become the NP's official opposition, also used the issues of 
sanctions and reform in the same election to suggest that the NP was capitulating to 
international pressure.53 
It has also been argued that sanctions were politically dynamic enough to 
influence white South African attitudes in a variety of ways. While it was evident that 
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sanctions split white attitudes toward the government and reform, sanctions also 
became a warning signal to whites of international rejection of South Africa's domestic 
racial policies. The isolation imposed by the sports boycott is an example of this. 
Following this precedent pro-sanctions lobbies argue that severance of sporting ties has 
put pressure on whites. The imposition of a comprehensive sports boycott resulted in 
the near-total sporting isolation of South Africa. Most of the major white-controlled 
sports unions reacte~ to the boycott by taking steps to desegregate sports. Pro-sanction 
groups in the U.S. and elsewhere seized upon this precedent as an argument about the 
analogous shifts economic sanctions might cause. Sanctions also heightened white 
attitudes of distrust and anger at the international community. 
Likewise for the blacks, some viewed sanctions as a point of solidarity ---
because sanctions brought hope of forcing change --- in assisting the struggle against 
apartheid. Whether or not most blacks support sanctions because of the issue of 'job 
loss', the sanction issue gave a boost of support to anti-government groups and the 
majority of the disenfranchised population in that for once, unlike previous years, the 
international community was seen to be finally identifying with the struggle. 
Nonetheless, as opinion polls have consistently shown, a majority of blacks 
opposed sanctions if they were going to entail extensive job-losses. But, it is certainly 
true that major organizations like the ANC and UDF and high-profile individuals like 
Bishop Tutu supported sanctions. 
It is clear that no pro-sanctions group believed that sanctions alone . would 
topple the system, but that sanctions would be a marginal increment to other sources 
of pressure, mostly from domestic sources that would force the South African 
government to the bargaining table. This argument is put forward by William Minter 
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and Elizabeth Schmidt. They view the South African sanctions situation through the 
lens of the past sanctions experience weathered by the illegal Rhodesia Front 
. 
government. Their conviction is that sanctions were intended to help at the margins, 
for example, to give an extra bite to other forms of opposition/resistance.54 
In its official response to sanctions, the NP government has argued that the 
changes initiated during 1990 were not the result of sanctions. On the contrary, their 
argument is that sanctions delayed the reform process. The evolution of a more just 
and democratic system has been slowed due to the difficulties that South Africa 
experienced through international sanctions and isolation. In an interview, State 
President F.W. De Klerk acknowledged that sanctions had hurt South Africa. In a 
comment responding to the question: What role did sanctions play in your 
perceptions?· Mr De Klerk said: 
"Their economic impact is that while we've learned to live with them and while 
they didn't succeed to bring us to our knees, they did and do i~pede the sort 
of growth rate we need to address, in all spheres, the challenges we face in 
South Africa. Social and economic and human development, housing, education, 
all require a growth rate in the vicinity of five percent per year. Sanctions 
without question prevented us from meeting these ur!ent needs. So sanctions 
have hurt us and are hurting each and every citizen." 
Similarly, President De Klerk commented, at the time of the Inkatha-gate 
scandal in mid-1991 --- in fact during his TV statement/press interview --- that 'we were 
being strangled by sanctions'. 
Another NP opinion states that it was not sanctions at all that brought change, 
but rather that apartheid was no longer capable of enforcement. According to Leon 
Wessels --- Minister of Local Government, National Housing and Public Works --- a 
leading verligte and former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'sanctions were not the 
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reason why the government was striving for a just and democratic South Africa, rather 
it was the fact that apartheid had failed.'56 
It is clearly evident that the sanctions issue, whether viewed in regard to its 
political or economic impact, remains a contentious issue. The following chapters will 
discuss more thoroughly how members of the ruling National Party perceived the 
reasons underlying the imposition of sanctions, and what they believe the outcome will 
be. Questions concerning the political effect of sanctions will be considered in the 
conclusion in the light of the data. 
The exact political effect of sanctions in promoting change in South Africa will 
remain a contentious issue for some time to come. The following chapter aims to make 
a contribution to the debate by attempting empirically to ascertain how U.S. measures 
impacted on individual legislators of the ruling National Party. 
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NATIONAL PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY IN THE 1980s 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the core of the research field data. 
The following is a series of responses obtained from personal interviews with the 
sample amounting to third of the National Party caucus. This chapter will present 
. 
National Party perceptions of United States foreign policy and of its objectives and 
motivations. 
4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research procedure was that all National Party (NP) Members of 
Parliament (MP's) were approached by post asking for their cooperation with this 
research project. Out of the 102 NP parliamentarians, 35 were available for personal 
interviews in May and June of 1990 (Appendix I). The State President, Ministers, and 
most Deputy Ministers were unavailable due to complicated schedules. 
In addition, a select group of officials of the South African foreign affairs 
department who have had a particular concern with United States/South African 
foreign policy were interviewed. To obtain the opposition point of view, interviewing 
was done with Conservative Party (CP) MPs. Also interviewed, were present members 
of the United States State Department, and past U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Herman. 
Nickel, who was ambassador during the time-period being analyzed. However, these 
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interviews are intended to provide a contrast with the perceptions of those held by the 
NP. The core of this study focuses specifically on the 35 NP parliamentarians' 
perceptions. 
The interviews were conducted at times convenient to the individual's schedules. 
The respondents were assured of confidentiality and every effort was made to limit 
interviews to 30 minutes. Each respondent was given a fact sheet of material containing 
those issues to be discussed in advance, and each individual was asked the same 
questions. A standard structured interview schedule was used for all interviews and the 
response of each respondent was entered on a separate data sheet. To facilitate 
accuracy in recording responses, a tape recorder was used during each interview. The 
direct quotations used in this chapter remain unedited except for a few minor stylistic 
changes to improve clarity. It is hoped that actual NP perceptions are presented as 
clearly as possible. 
The interviews were conducted in English, due to the writer's inability to speak 
Afrikaans. The Afrikaans-speaking respondents were both gracious and generous in 
agreeing to speak English. 
4.2 PERSONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING RESPONDENTS 
To gain an understanding of the type of NP Members of Parliament interviewed 
the following pie charts depict levels education, age, language and gender, and indicate 
the types of constituencies represented (Figure 1 - 5). 
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The interview schedule contained two distinct parts asking questions parallel to 
the two prominent foreign policy approaches adopted by the United States in the 
1980's. The first part of the interview schedule explores NP parliamentarian responses 
to President Reagan's foreign policy approach of constructive engagement (most 
prominently from 1980 - 1985), while the second part explores NP parliamentarians' 
responses to the foreign policy switch from constructive engagement to punitive 
sanction measures known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 
through July 10, 1991, enacted by the U.S. Congress over the veto of President 
Reagan. Both parts of the interview schedule sought to extract NP perceptions, 
understanding and underlying motives of the two different policies. 
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4.3 PRESENTATION OF THE DATA - PART I: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
When asked if over the past the past ten years if United States/South African 
relations have been fairly cooperative, the following responses were obtained: 
"I would say fairly, with emphasis on fairly." 
"I don't think so, that's a personal opinion." 
"No. I feel that America to put it bluntly has been putting its nose into 
our affairs and they've been interfering in a way which we did not 
appreciate." 
"No, I wouldn't say they've been cooperative. On the contrary, I think 
America has been the bully boy." 
"No. There are a few things that I think stimulated that sort of a view. 
The first is that we are exposed to media coverage and not involved in 
direct discussions. And the perception that you get from the general 
media is that they don't really appreciate the problems in South Africa. 
You feel pressurized, you feel neglected with appreciation of the fact 
there are problems in South Africa that we in all sincerity try to resolve. 
But people don't seem to recognize that, and we've been exposed to 
sanctions and the worst part is economic sanctions. Our solution within 
South Africa lies within the economic environment. If we can stimulate 
our economy, create job opportunities, give people the opportunity to 
work for a living." 
"I think in some fields yes, but I don't think that the media permitted 
the cooperation to be as good as it could be which I think is a pity. And 
I also think that a lot of other things stopped the relations from really 
developing. But out of the constructive engagement program came a lot 
of good ... But a lot of good came out of it and I am really grateful also 
_to the Reagan Administration. for a lot of things that they [did] so, ... " 
"I would say there was involvement from both sides on different levels, 
but once again my perceptions sometimes that in general, the United 
States because it's big, it's got its own agenda. I believe {the U.S.] will 
have a more powerful side of the coin to decide on issues. I would say 
and in relationships as such [between the U.S. and South Africa] will be 
more ruled by them than us." 
"Yes, I would like to agree to a certain extent. I think fairly cooperative 
but up to the end of the Reagan Administration I would say that it was 
not so clearly spelled out what constructive engagement really meant. 
But I'm pretty sure, we in South Africa experienced the cooperative 
from the Reagan side, and from our side as well. Of course there were 
always talks between Chester Crocker and the government." 
"Yes - One will have difficulty if you speak about U.S. relations. I must 
say in my opinion that it is very difficult to evaluate at particular times, 
especially lately, what U.S. relations is and to describe it as fairly 
cooperative. At particular stages I would say yes. At other stages I'm 
uncertain to say if it was cooperative." 
"Yes, with of course some reservations I should say that on the 
diplomatic level I think we've been in constant contact with one 
another. I think that I can answer that in the affirmative. Ordinary, 
openly, I think the ordinary voter actually didn't get any real impression 
about the cooperativeness of the relations between South Africa and 
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America. That's what I should say, but I believe on the diplomatic level, 
at least that level, we cooperated fairly well, that's what I should say." 
"I think more cooperative at the earlier part of the ten years than at the 
present." 
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A total of 20 Parliamentarians responded to this question by offering some 
comment. The remainder did so by simply just stating 'yes' or 'no', seven of whom 








The following themes of NP perceptions become evident: 
the majority of those who responded agreed that US/SA relations were fairly 
cooperative, of which several put emphasis on 'fairly'; 
that the U.S. is perceived as interfering; 
that the media played a key role in shaping U.S. perceptions of South Africa; 
that South Africa has felt pressured and neglected; 
that South Africa is grateful to the Reagan Administration for its policy of 
constructive engagement; 
that the U.S., due to its size and economic capabilities, is seen to have an upper 
hand in the relationship; 
and that the first part of the ten years were more cooperative that the last part. 
The following pie chart depicts the response to the question which asked if 
respondents believed that constructive engagement was effective. Four choices were 
given: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. Of the number that responded 
(n=20 at the bottom of chart) 85% agreed and 15% disagreed, while no one either 
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When asked what they believed motivated the US Administration to develop 
its policy of constructive engagement, the following are a representative sample of 
some of the responses that were obtained: 
"Obviously the US feels itself an important player in the world stage 
that in terms of the continuation of the rivalry with the Soviet Union 
it was important that the US. play a role in Southern Africa. Therefore, 
to achieve stability and democracy within South Africa, the US felt it 
had to have a direct say on the development of South African policy. 
The US made it clear that it would do what it could to encourage South 
Africa to take steps to lead it to greater democratization." 
"Well I presume they tried to find cooperation with South Africa and 
a solution to our specific problems... I [ am not] a student of that 
specific field, [in] that I really made such a thorough investigation of all 
the motives. But in my opinion the most important was to find a 
settlement for the constitutional problems in Namibia." 
"[As far as motivation for constructive engagement] The US only [have] 
had their own interests in mind. They saw that they couldn't get any 
foothold into Africa as they would [have] liked to and they started to 
impose constructive engagement to please their own people in their 
Senate and while at the same time [they] were trying to please the. 
people in Southern Africa [to avoid not] having any say in the region." 
"We need trading partners like America needs trading partners ... 
America needs our chrome etc., it needs our precious metals, it needs 
our gold. We're too far away from the market place for fresh produce 
so it is mainly raw materials." 
"Yes, I believe that the Democrats [under Carter] had adopted a policy 
for purposes of the US to appease the African countries in the Third 
World and in so doing, really estranged themselves from South Africa 
and really began the whole process of economic boycott and sanctions. 
It was therefore with a great deal of relief and anticipation that we 
came to the era of Ronald Reagan when he introduced through his 
[Secretary] of State the Constructive Engagement policy toward South 
Africa. In so doing, he indicated very clearly in the beginning that his 
intentions were that [the US] should rather effect change through 
negotiation and dialogue and dealing with South Africa, rather than a 
policy which was totally opposed, a policy of isolation followed by the 
previous administration." 
'Well, I personally believe that the motive was an honest one, one 
aimed at upliftment of the quality of living of our colored communities. 
As it was evidenced in the emphasis on the Sullivan Code." 
"Well as I always understood it, there were two schools of thought and 
that the policy of constructive engagement was actually a compromise 
against sanction drivers." 
"I think the US or at least some organizations or some people in the 
US use South Africa as a motive for their internal political situation 
because they have a large number of black people. They try to use 
South Africa for their own purpose. I think one of the reasons for this 
constructive engagement is to try and find a way around the anti-
apartheid lobbies, to try and get them to be not so [drastic] and not so 
radical against South Africa." 
"Yes, I think it's difficult for me to interpret your government's policy. 
But I would say that constructive engagement was a good policy. I have 
no doubt in my mind that change in South Africa can only be brought 
about when there is progress and when we are dealing with a real 
economically sound society. I would say that the Reagan administration 
understood this and that they felt that by following this policy they 
would encourage change." 
" ... , but in general I have the impression that the major reason why the 
US administration developed this policy, is because the US 
administration realized years ago that South Africa is the strong base of 
Southern Africa. There is no sense in trying to pull down South Africa, 
South Africa should rather be supported and thereby increasing the 
western democratic base in the whole of Southern Africa. I think that 
is the main reason why the US decided on this policy." 
"Well basically I think they switched to constructive engagement 
because it was realized by the US that the previous policy especially 
under the Carter administration was not that successful and they felt it 
might be better to try and persuade and work along with the South 
African Government than to be just pure opposition in everything." 
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"To be able to ignore the problem and to satisfy both sides, the 
opposition [in the US] and South Africa at once without having to do 
a lot." 
"I think they had some sort of idea of [our] problems and they were 
very honest in trying to help us." 
"I don't think it's easy to just make almost a blunt statement about it. 
One would have to define how I perceive constructive engagement. 
Because I know that I was in the US in 1988 and I know the 
constructive engagement, the term was totally out. It was a negative 
phrase. So as far as I'm concerned, one would have to define 
constructive engagement first of all. Perhaps Mr. Reagan had good 
intentions when he came up with the idea of constructive engagement 
and as I see the word constructive engagement, the concept of 
constructive, then, it was a question of becoming involved in a 
constructive way. The way they applied sanctions and disinvestment was 
as far as I'm concerned, totally destructive and our black people are 
paying the price today. So as far as I'm concerned, there was no 
constructive engagement." 
"Well I think it's also in the interest of the United States and the 
Western World to have a stable solid pro-western government in South 
Africa. And I think maybe that was one of the main reasons, not 
· because they like us, but because we can be of use to them." 
"Frankly, because [the U.S] has a long nose and likes to have its beak 
in. everybody's business, but over and above that I think it had certain 
reservations about what would happen to our mineral wealth, if it didn't 
become involved." 
"Yes, I think the US Government thought that constructive engagement 
will give them 'a say' in the policy making process of the Republic of 
South Africa. The reason ... is because when they found out that with 
guys like Wolpe and Dellums around, the sanction campaign in Trans-
Africa going around there in the United States, it's not really 
convenient back home to be seen to be very involved where they must 
take the part of the underdog. And you know it as a Yankee, that the 
Yanks back the underdog. Now the only hope I have for the future is 
that we now become the underdog!!!... So I think what motivated them 
was perhaps primarily what they saw as, to have 'a say' in policy making, 
to influence processes and also to hurt when they wanted to hurt. But 
also to pat us on the shoulder: 'well done guys.' .. .I guess overall, it was 
motivated by, I think and pardon me for being frank with you, but 
motivated typically because of American style and tradition." 
"Well from what I have gathered, I wasn't really in politics at that stage 
but we followed what's happening. I would say that Americans like all 
countries throughout the world have a tendency to care for people in 
the [under] privileged situation and I believe because of this, because 
of the history of America they felt themselves fit to try and become 
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engaged in the South African situation. I believe that was the biggest 
motivation. I've asked many Americans, 'Why are you really involved in 
the South African situation?' And that was mostly their reply." 
"Well it's really perhaps the same issues that motivated them in the 
course that they're embarked on at the moment. I think it's purely 
domestic issues. I think their first thought was 'get in because we don't 
want to make an enemy of South Africa'. The only way we can justify 
our presence there is upliftment, persuasion to change their wicked 
racial ways. [It was] at a time when the black politicians in America put 
tremendous pressure [on the Reagan government] as far as I [perceive 
it]. The administration wanted to [enforce constructive engagement] and 
move away from a fiercer policy, [i.e. as Carter's policy]. So, the same 
basic feeling that we've got to engage South Africa somehow, a stick 
policy rather than a carrot one. A watershed or certainly in my view of 
it, certainly in terms of my experience of it, was when Leon Sullivan 
decided that he really couldn't be seen constructively engaging. He had 
to join the other side. There was tremendous pressure to do the 
opposite." 
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Of the 34 responses obtained on NP perceptions of the motivating factors that 
led the United States to develop its policy of constructive engagement, the following 






that South Africa was perceived as an issue in the Cold War struggle between 
East v. West and therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South Africa for 
the sake of its mineral wealth; 
that there was confusion and uncertainty about whether sanctions were the 
consequence of constructive engagement's failure. There was also confusion 
about who initiated/promoted the sanctions policy, some even believing that 
President Reagan himself was responsible; 
that the constructive engagement policy was developed to find a solution to the 
Namibian situation; 
that the purpose of constructive engagement was an honest attempt to 
encourage upliftment and democracy; 
that constructive engagement brought a welcome change from the attitudes of 
the Carter administation, which had been unsuccessful in its efforts to promote 





that constructive engagement derived from a strong tendency in U.S. historical 
tradition to wish to bestow upon other states the blessings of American-style 
institutions; 
that the U.S. was often perceived as interfering in South Africa's internal affairs; 
and that the U.S. developed the constructive engagement policy to please both 
South Africa and anti-South Africa people in Washington for the purpose of 
heading off the pro-sanctions lobby. 
When asked what elements of the policy of constructive engagement NP found 
to be 'positive', the following are some of the prominent responses: 
"The most important factor here is that this was not a punitive type of 
policy, but one which aimed at empowering black people within South 
Africa to play a role in a future South Africa encouraged by rewarding 
the South African government for its movements toward democracy." 
· "Of course from our point of view, we did not in fact accept any 
principle in terms of which our policy in this country would be dictated 
to by outside agencies. In other words, as South Africans, we have 
always believed they must solve their problems themselves, but the 
situation is quite clear, where as before we were placed in a total 
position of isolation under Jimmy Carter, we were very happy to know 
that America was turning around and at lease prepared to talk to us, to 
do business with us. And so to encourage us to make changes which 
otherwise would have been purely cosmetic." 
"Well, I would say that American politicians did try to facilitate talks 
through various agencies between various South Africans to bring 
opposing views together etc, I would regard that as a bit of a positive 
input." 
"No, I don't want to say no element positively contributed toward 
solving some internal problem in South Africa, ... Politically, I don't 
think so. [However], I think that in the field of labor relations in SA, 
the US attitude certainly contributed positively. Secondly the US 
involvement in Angola [was] at times negative as far as South Africa is . 
concerned, but at times also positive as far as Dr. Savimbi is concerned. 
I think also [the US] had an influence as to the present attitude taken 
by our government. Those are two issues that I would like to identify 
at this stage." 
"That there wasn't outright confrontation and that we seemed to have 
had the sympathy of the president, although we didn't have the 
sympathy of the people or the Congress of America." 
"Well, the fact that... your president tried to prevent further sanctions 
and further disinvestment at a certain stage." 
"We thought that, especially the economic side, tried to help us to build 
the country, to create jobs. You see the NP over a long time, never 
perceived the NP policy as being a really racist policy. When I look 
back on it I'm inclined to see it a bit different. But during that time, [I 
saw it as] actually a policy of evolving and building up something. [In 
the beginning], with the strong third world element, ... and the white 
people being a first world element of the population, (it was difficult for 
the white people to] try to establish themselves and then help the other 
part of the population to come along. So I think from that point of 
view, I think that the constructive engagement policy to a certain extent 
supported that." 
"Well, the fact that there was somebody in the administration that said 
'look we're prepared to give you a chance and not impose sanctions'." 
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The following themes became evident in NP perceptions of positive elements displayed 








that constructive engagement was not punitive in its approach; 
that the US was perceived as adopting a different approach from that of the 
Carter era; 
that President Reagan displayed real interest m the South African reform 
process; 
that constructive engagement provided for open communication and negotiation 
on differences between the U.S and South Africa; 
that constructive engagement embodied a positive attitude toward labor 
relations and assisted in resolving the Angolan/Namibian situation; 
that constructive engagement influenced the attitudes of the South African 
government; 
that constructive engagement displayed sympathy from President Reagan in that 
the President was anti-sanctions and was willing to give South Africa, by its own 
volition, a chance to reform; 




and that constructive engagement helped South Africa's efforts to overcome 
poverty. 
When asked what elements of the poJicy of constructive engagement the 
National Party found to be 'negative', the following are some of the common 
responses: 
"Firstly, the very fact that a foreign power felt that it had to play a role 
in the internal developments of South Africa itself. This was resented 
by a number of people. It was resented even more as constructive 
development gave way to punitive measures. But under constructive 
engagement there was underlying resentment to the overweaning role 
of a Superpower, particularly at the time when South Africa felt that it 
was taking steps which were in any case being dictated by internal 
activities." 
"The point is, if you're not constructively engaged with dealing with 
· people, although we still have vocal contact with the United States, but 
you never get to the root cause of what the problem is and you couldn't 
help the country with solutions to the problem, if you don't have 
constructive engagement. 
"I mean this is just crazy that the US would say that by sanctions 
they would solve our problems, we've got to solve our own problems. 
They can't solve our problems. And also the people that it hurts most, 
I would say are blacks, the 'have not's'. So if they were hoping to hurt 
the 'haves', they did it the wrong way." 
"The tendency to be a little prescriptive. As we saw it was all very well 
to have a policy of constructive engagement, but we did not appreciate 
America, which is very powerful, the most powerful state in the world, 
endeavoring by constructive engagement to determine our internal 
policies for us. To that extent it was possibly negative. The other aspect 
was that in spite of the fact they indicated constructive engagement the 
policy as it developed, didn't produce the fruits we expected it would 
develop. Because of the internal criticism of that policy in America 
itself. The Democratic Party's overall majority in the [Congress], 
obviously in a way [tied] President Reagan's hands to really go forward 
with his policy of constructive engagement and it was a limiting factor · 
which he was up against." 
"Yes. I think to the extent it was obvious to me and us that the 
eventual aim of the US was not that honest all the way." 
"Well on the negative side I would say there is a wrong perception of 
the political situation in South Africa. On the one hand, perhaps the 
perception that by constructive engagement as it is put, the political 
policy of South Africa can be influenced in a way to conform with the 
political ideas of the US. A wrong perception that the old, shall I say, 
Verwoerdian apartheid as it is considered is still applicable in South 
Africa and that discrimination on the basis of race and color is still rife 
in SA I regard that as negative motivation for the policy." 
"Well in a way it affected our autonomy with our friends overseas. It's 
always been our policy that we're autonomous. And in a way we 
considered it as interference in our internal affairs and in a way it was 
an indirect refusal of acceptance of our bona fides." 
"I think the negative contribution is basically that the US being as 
powerful as it is economically, militarily-wise etc., has the attitude that 
everyone else in the world must think as the Americans do and 
therefore they try to often persuade people, or put pressure on them 
to persuade them which is very difficult for smaller countries to resist." 
"(A) That it was merely a moral standpoint which had no economic or 
strategic advantage for us and (B) that it definitely didn't carry the 
support of the American people or the Congress with it or even the 
Senate." 
"The prescriptive ones. In all fairness, I listen to congressmen in the 
United States, I told you previously, I did spend under the IVP program 
a couple of days at Capitol Hill, and they haven't got the faintest idea 
as to what's going on in South Africa. NOT THE FAINTEST IDEA 
Secondly, the fact that they run away from their own problems. I want 
to mention two to you. (1st) While I was there they tackled me on 
education and it so happened that very night there was a program going 
on one of the [T.V.] channels of the Japanese invasion into the US, and 
they also touched on education. And it was claimed on television, I 
don't believe it up to this day, that four out of five [US] children 
leaving school are illiterate. I challenge Congressmen on this thing in 
the US and they all agreed. Let's say two out of five, now for the world 
leader to admit, for a politician of the world leader to admit that two 
out of five children are totally illiterate, means that they've got 
problems back home. 
Now what I found negative was the total ignorance of what was 
going on in South Africa. And also the absolutely, I wouldn't like to put 
it this strong, but the arrogance, the absolute arrogance: 'We know 
everything, what the hell do you know?' We went through this in the 
mid-West, we went through this in the South etc. And look at · 
Mississippi Burning, and look at Driving Miss Daisy. you know, look at 
all these things. In fact a black politician [in the US], I wouldn't like to 
name him, was totally astonished when I told him I watch the Bill Cosby 
Show, in South Africa and I like it! I said, 'But you go to hell, whether 
you believe me or not, do you want to know what happened in episode 
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seven? I can tell you' This guy said, 'Well my eye!'. I said 'Well my 
bloody eye!' So that's what I found so negative. 
(2nd) What I also experienced negative was the influence the 
lobbyists have on decision-making. In all fairness, [shrug], people that 
are hurting their own people. . .. for instance Tutu. I'm not attacking 
Bishop Tutu this morning, let's call a spade a spade, the fact of the 
matter is, Tutu collected, I was told by Mr. Brooks, that Tutu went 
there [to the US] and collected a million dollars for Tutu on a Sunday 
morning after Church. OK? To do what? Some kind of struggle? -
super! Now he gets back to this country and calls on the children to 
stay away from school. But his own children are in private schools, so 
their education goes on. But he's hurting the very people HE claimed 
to help. And the absolute arrogance of some [U.S.] decision makers not 
to accept that as a fact. So a lot of negative elements, but I think you've 
heard a lot." 
"We actually to my knowledge never found anything to be so negative 
that it should be mentioned." 
"That's a little bit more difficult one. I think that America views to a 
large extent the whole question of majoritarianism as the fulfilment of 
democracy. I think we have a different approach towards democracy. I 
think that maybe they think once there is going to be a black majority 
government, that the black majority government is still going to pursue 
the values of democracy, [i.e.,] freedom of speech, freedom of 
movement and you know what I mean, all of the bill of Rights that any 
country usually has. I should say that there is a wrong perception in 
America, namely that our hesitancy to yield to the claims for majority 
government is that we are actually not in favor of democracy. But our 
point of view is, and this is something that the Americans must really 
comprehend in my opinion is that, I'm not so concerned about who is 
going to be the government, but how this country is going to be 
governed. Unfortunately we are part of Africa and we have the 
experience of the African continent concerning democracy and I think 
that a negative aspect is that America departs from this point, namely 
that they think once there is a simple majority system in South Africa 
that will still be democracy and I think that is the negative aspect." 
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The following themes become evident in NP perception of negative elements 
displayed about the constructive engagement policy: 
* 
* 
that a number of South African people resented the U.S. interfering in their 
internal affairs; 










that constructive engagement had prescriptive tendencies; 
that the aim of US foreign policy was not honest in its approach; 
that the US had the wrong perception of the South African political situation 
and in some respects Americans were totally ignorant; 
that constructive engagement affected South Africa's autonomous relationship 
with its overseas friends; 
that constructive engagement didn't carry the support of the US people or 
Congress; 
that the US instead of concentrating so much on South Africa should focus on 
its own problems at home; 
and that the US approach to democracy was totally different from South 
Africa's. 
The following pie chart displays the result to the question asked: Is your attitude 
toward the policy of constructive engagement performance positive, negative or other? 
Out of the 34 that answered, 76% agreed to a positive attitude, 9% thought the policy 
was negative, while 5% were neutral in their response. 
Figure 7: 
(n = 34) 
What is your attitude toward 
the policy of Constructive 
Engagement? 
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When asked if they saw the rationality behind the United States decision for the 
policy of constructive engagement, all 35 answered yes. 
4.4 PRESENTATION OF DATA - PART II: SANCTIONS 
When asked if they viewed the Western world as being sensitive to the South 
African situation, the following responses were obtained: 
"Well it depends what one understands by the Western world. 
Personally I don't think that the United States is as sensitive to South 
Africa's situation as the case with Europe." 
"Not in full perspective, no." 
"I don't think so, the reason for it being, I don't think they understand 
the situation completely. I do understand that they do get a · lot of 
information from different people and they must weigh that. [The 
. sensitivity] might [come from some] people who are more willing to 
work and care and approach the situation rationally. They won't try and 
just get the power and misuse the situation. Now, [on the other hand] 
the people who are not in the position of having power are very set 
with their ideas [of] what they want and how they feei. I don't think 
that they are sensitive enough and in that way I think they are really 
creating problems rather than to really give help. In some ways, once 
again the person must always say this is only one side of the coin 
because there are people that are sensitive. There are people like Mrs. 
Thatcher that I think really care. [It] might be because of some 
involvement in the past in some other way. I think there are people on 
the other hand that are sensitive in the way that they really feel or care 
for people. But to put it into perspective, its quite a problem." 
"Yes, but not sensitive in the way that I would prefer them to be 
sensitive. Sensitive from their own interest point of view." 
"It seems that they take quite a lot of note of what's happening here for 
different reasons. Whether that is sensitive in the positive sense that 
they really care for South Africa, I don't know. If I can say that 
sometimes it does appear that they act more in self-interest than to 
really care for the people of South Africa." 
"Well, I think they are now. I think there has been an exponential 
growth in their sensitivity towards the South African situation in the last 
five years." 
126 
Of the remaining 14 responses to this question, 13 said simply yes, while there 
was only one respondent that said 'no'. 
The following themes were evident in the NP perception of whether they view 




that the U.S. is not as sensitive as Europe; 
that the U.S. is not sensitive to the South African situation because they don't 
understand it; 
that there are two different types of sensitivity at hand: one with a sensitivity 
abhorring racism, and the other meaning sensitive in that there is sympathy for 
the South Africa government. 
The following are some of the most prominent responses obtained when asked 
if United States sanctions policies had any direct effect on their constituencies: 
"Yes. I would say that there has been a resentment that has grown 
amongst the people who are in my constituency towards the US and a 
growing belief that the US was playing to an internal audience rather 
than to promote the interests of democracy in South Africa." 
"The extent that they had directly on the constituency was in the 
Tygerberg hospital where certain instruments which [are] to be used for 
sick people and that sort of thing were not at all available from the US 
and had to be bought from other countries at extremely high costs." 
"Well this is one of those vague questions, yes and no. Where it has had 
an effect is that certain companies, we had one or two American 
Companies still in East London and the positive side of that is they 
have an agreement, the Sullivan Principles. But on the negative side is 
that quite a few companies actually pulled out of South Africa. [It's a] 
matter how you look at it, it affects Johannesburg, it affects East 
London. So it's all a monetary thing." 
"Yes it has. To an extent, negative, to an extent positive. It forced us to 
look for other markets. It forced us to upgrade our overseas marketing 
expertise, which was positive. But negative was that it had the marginal 
negative effect on income, especially as far as fruit concentrates were 
concerned." 
"Yes. I would say especially now with the MOSSGAS project. I would 
say that it indeed had an effect in as much as of course we depended 
to a large extent on overseas technology for the development of this 
project and obviously there must have been in many respects a 
detrimental effect. And also, of course in my constituency being as I 
said, farming is one of the pillars of the economic infrastructure and 
farming everything that is imported, if you can import it, farming 
implements and things like that, you have a problem as far a~ that is 
concerned. It had a detrimental effect." 
"Yes it did have. My constituency depends entirely on exports and we 
export to 25 countries. And I was involved in setting up alternative 
systems and schemes, and dealing with the States. It had a cost effect. 
We could still go on because the sanctions didn't exclude us totally. We 
were just required to get a 35% added value in another foreign country. 
So we could go on in lieu of the States but it cost us a lot of money." 
"Yes it has hurt us. My constituency is an exporter of fruit and fruit 
juices. One of my constituents actually on a experimental consignment 
was stopped on the high seas and his freight alone was a loss of 
R35,000, apart from the value of the product." 
"No. We actually, my constituency specifically, benefited from sanctions 
being adopted against SA because, I won't say sanctions since 1986, but 
sanctions such as the Arms Embargo actually stimulated events in my 
constituency because two of the major ARMSCOR industries are 
located within Brentwood constituency. Atlas, and the arms industries 
· actually boomed on account of the arms embargo. If there wasn't an 
arms embargo, there wouldn't have been an arms industry in South 
Africa." 
"No. It has on the black township next to my constituency - most 
definitely Yes. Because a lot of companies withdrew from our Isando/ 
Spartain, its the largest industrial area in the country in one specific 
area and in one municipality as well. A lot of them lost their jobs 
because of the withdrawal. The effect was not on white people at which 
it was directed. Because it directly influence the black people." 
"I would say yes because the black townships Crossroads/Khayalitsha are 
slap bang in the middle of my constituency and I could see the poverty, 
and it's there to see everyday - the hunger, those conditions that those 
people live in - and sanctions had a very direct influence on their 
lifestyle, on their quality of life. It was there for me to see, and it's still 
there." 
"In a sense yes, but not to a very large extent but it has a very negative 
effect on the black community surrounding the new constituency around 
Port Elizabeth as a whole." 
"Yes. In our constituency we've got one of three integrated steel works 
and that specific works relied very heavily on exports. And when 
sanctions came about we had certain constraints in getting steel in the 
American market." 
127 
"Well the direct effect it had on my constituency was first, for starters, 
my constituents telling me, 'you're telling us that we have to reform so 
as not to be isolated and what are we are getting in exchange for the 
reforms? ... so we can't trust the Yanks'. They told that to me. They say 
it to me and its not nice for you to hear this, but I'm giving you an 
absolutely objective opinion. The effect it had was the Conservative 
Party almost doubled their votes in my constituency. The fact of the 
matter is where they just in 1987 polled 2900 votes they polled 4000 in 
this election that just passed [1989]. I also polled more votes but with 
much more effort and much more money and much more everything. 
The fact of the matter is this, the average [white] South African, the 
average constituent in my constituency doesn't believe that we have to 
reform so as to be accommodated and to be in the world ranks again. 
It had a negative effect on my constituency." 
"Well in a sense yes, because one part of my constituency is a fruit 
growing area and well we stopped exporting fruit to Canada and the 
US. So in that sense yes." 
"In a sense it might have hardened attitudes of white people at a 
particular stage against change. Whether thinking that we are doing the 
right things just to meet this attitude from the outside world, [brought 
the attitude] so why must we do the right things? Which is not a 
. thinking that I am agreeing with but it had that effect to a certain 
extent." 
"Yes, Yes there are some members or many members in my 
constituency who really don't trust the Americans unfortunately. And 
it's very difficult to explain these things because they think that any 
nation who applies sanctions to South Africa must have some kind of 
a concealed purpose. The concealed purpose that they see here is that 
through sanctions, they would like to force us to yield to a black 
majority government according to the African style. It is very difficult 
to influence your voters to the contrary because if I tell them, that's not 
the real issue. It's very difficult for me as a representative to have great 
success convincing my people that the American, why they apply 
sanctions is that they would like to have a fair and equitable situation 
in South Africa, they just don't believe that. They think that America, 
by doing this, will force South Africa to surrender this country to simple 
majority government as they say according to the African style. It's 
difficult to convince them because of the fact that our conservative 
opposition is very successful in attacking the Americans because of 
sanctiqns and that definitely influences the voters in my constituency." 
"Well my constituents are white employees basically, and certainly there 
have been layoffs. I don't think it's had a major effect but its 




Only nine out of 35 NP parliamentarians held the perception that United States 
sanctions policies had had absolutely no direct effect on their constituencies. Of the 
rest that responded, there was definitely a consensus that sanctions had some, either 









that it has caused a rising attitude of resentment among (white) people in South 
Africa towards the United States; 
that sanctions have made certain imports unavailable and the alternatives have 
been costly; 
that it has had a financial effect on the South African economy; 
that it caused exporters to look for alternative overseas markets; 
that it stimulated South African technological advancement in many fields and 
brought new industry such as MOSSGAS, SASOL and ARMSCOR; 
that sanctions measures affected many black townships that suffered job losses 
due to disinvestment; 
that it hardened white attitudes which bolstered Conservative Party support in 
many constituencies; 
and that sanctions measures contributed to the general economic recession. 
The following pie chart depicts the NP perceptions held about whether or not 
South Africa would have to yield to pressure due to United States sanctions. Of the 
33 that answered, 21 % agreed that yes, eventually South Africa would have to yield to 
pressure, while 64% answered no, that they had confidence that South Africa could 




(n = 33) 
Other 
15% 
When you think about 
sanctions, do you feel that 
sooner or later South Africa 
will have to yield to 
pressure? 
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When asked if they saw the rationality behind the U.S. decision to implement 
sanctions, the following are the most prominent NP responses: 
"No - well yes, I don't regard it as rational to implement sanctions 
against this country, but if they want to try to impress or try to rally the 
black vote within the US behind a certain party well then it's rational -
- - this is the thing to do." 
"Yes and No. I see the rationality yes in the sense that the specific 
policy I see is founded actually in internal political issues in the United 
States of America. You've got the very important black caucus. What 
I actually see is that during election times the black section of your 
population go to the polls in their droves [herds/flocks]. As to when it 
comes to the white part of your electorate they're very lethargic. It's 
very important I would say in terms of internal policy to have a policy 
toward SA as the good guys hammering us on the racial discrimination/ 
issues." 
"From their point of view, once again, yes - from our point of view, no." 
"Purely political - no rationale what so ever." 
"No I really don't see that. But I can understand why they tried to do 
this. They want to be seen to be backing the underdog, to be helping 
the under-privileged and to be ·doing a lot of these little things, but 
that's besides the [point]." 
"If I have to look from their point of view, how they see it, there might 
be some sense in it. But if I have to look from my side, not at all. Not 
at all because, what's happening as I've said in the previous question is 
that they are really hurting people. They are creating havoc. They are 
creating the ability to really create a revolution. They aren't helping us. 
If they want to create the negative they are succeeding, if that is their 
rationale behind everything." 
"No I can't see it and yes I would like to elaborate on this because I 
don't believe sanctions [were] really created [for the] intervention by 
the [U.S.] government itself. It was mostly private companies except of 
course for the passing of the CAAA legislation. It was really organized 
by your bigger companies as well as petitions with political advantages. 
Political aspirations that make this type of decision and therefore, I 
oppose that totally! If you look at what's happening at the moment, 
then of course you can say, sanctions eventually had an influence on the 
reform process, but then of course on the other hand there are lots and 
lots of other [things] happening, like what was happening in East Bloc? 
What happened to Russia? What happened to communism? That also 
brought about a change in this country and made to open up new 
avenues." 
"I would say yes, because I think that the American population [is] 
much more onto what you call human rights, than what we are. So from 
that point of view, I would say yes." 
"If one understand the rationality of why they act in a particular way, 
if I may say with self interest as their main motivation, in the internal 
politics of the United States that has nothing to do with South Africa, 
then I understand it. But to say that I accept it, NO." 
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"It is very difficult to see the rationality in terms of our situation and 
normal considerations, but I presume it... The way I see it, it is very 
much related to American domestic politics and their guilt feelings." 
132 
Of the 21 NP parliamentarians that responded when asked if they saw the 
rationality behind the US decision to implement sanctions, six answered simply no, of 





that the rationale was to serve internal political purposes in the United States; 
that several respondents could understand the implementation of sanctions from 
a US perspective but not from a South African one; 
that there was perhaps confusion on what factors caused the implementation 
of sanctions; 
and that the US public is more aware of human rights than South Africa. 
When NP parliamentarians were asked what they felt prompted the United 
States to introduce sanctions, the following are some of the most prominent responses: 
"An internal pressure group growing amongst the black voters." 
"I don't know the United States all that well but I would say it was 
pressure from a group of people and it's called the Jesse Jackson crowd. 
That group of people which I would say, [want] to appease the black 
American." 
"I think it's wrong perceptions in the first instance. Also the perception 
that SA can in this way be, if not forced, then at least be induced to 
change to the idea to accept the ideas of the US. The US regards the 
position of SA of how the country should be governed. The idea that 
we may be induced into following their lead. Unfortunately as I have 
said, the wrong perception of our own position. Perception that we still 
stick to old, outdated apartheid ideology and that sort of thing. Perhaps 
even the humanistic or what ever you want to call it sort of attitude 
towards the position of the blacks in South Africa. That they can be 
assisted by sanctions, [but] in actual fact they've been harmed most in 
that [the] economic development and growth in South Africa is retarded 
as a result of sanctions. [The blacks] are the people who suffer, because 
they are the people who lose their jobs as far as employment is 
concerned, they [are] hit hardest." 
"I think that" there are a certain political groups in the States which are 
over-reacting because of their own guilty conscience towards the black 
people in their own country. Because after so many years my experience 
in the States, the blacks are still the blacks in the country, part of the 
3rd World to a great extent." 
"I think two things. One was that the [idea] that it was possible that by 
applying sanctions ... [that] they will just push over the so-called white 
minority regimes. That we will surrender to a black majority. The 
second one, I think many of the companies were a little bit worried that 
we are going to develop just into another African country. Because 
what is very interesting, not one company [which] is pulling out of 
South Africa is investing in Africa. They just pull out of Africa. So 
worrying that South Africa will eventually give into pressure, allow a so-
called black majority to govern, become another African country and be 
just a banana republic." 
"I think there might be several factors in this regard. I think there is a 
perception that the South African society is an unjust society. I think 
that motivated, to a large extent, the US to introduce sanctions. I think 
there could be, there is definitely a perception amongst people that 
there is an oppressed majority in this country. I also believe that 
apartheid to some people in the United States had become a business, 
and that by motivating sanctions they are keeping themselves in 
business. although I believe that some of their perceptions could have 
been justified, because they were perceptions, I also believe there are 
people whose motives are not so honest as they would like to be 
perceived." 
"I think two-fold - the international climate has been created against the 
South African internal politics and of course also American internal 
politics itself, especially your black component of your society which 
politically can exert a certain pressure." 
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"Well I don't want to be nasty to your government, so, ... My personal 
view really is that countries who introduce sanctions against South 
Africa, all of them, the lot of them, are in this respect a lot of 
hypocrites - All of them who are involved in sanctions in SA are a lot 
of hypocrites. They should look at their own door first, and then look 
further afield. But, as I say, I don't want to be nasty toward your 
country but that is really my personal view." 
"Can I be very honest? I think there may be a number of reasons why 
they wanted to introduce [sanctions]. First, I think the Americans have 
got a very big guilt complex about the way in which they handled their 
indigenous people. And this is now reflected in their policy. Secondly, 
they see again as the leading power they are very sensitive to any form 
of opposition and therefore they would like to sort of press their point 
of view on smaller groups. Thirdly, I think that there is motivation for 
and I think it is a good intention of the Americans, to try and be fair 
and in this respect where there are inequalities in the South African 
situation, there are those who are motivated by thinking that they are 
genuinely contributing towards getting a more fair and equal society." 
"Definitely the policy of Apartheid and the fact that the majority of 
South Africans were not included in the political set up of this country." 
"Fact is, they wanted to (a) hurt the South African economy, which they 
did, (b) they wanted to be seen to be on the side of the so-called 
oppressed people, (c) As I pointed out previously, they want to back 
the 'underdog' and the deprived of rights and privileges and ( d) I think 
what really motivated them was the fact that a lot of ill-informed people 
eventually took a decision. [They] started lobbying [against] us, I'm not 
saying the entire Congress, I say a tiny little group started this and they 
are ill-informed and they succeeded through the media, to create a 
perception of South Africa which is a distorted picture. And they, I 
always find this interesting, very conveniently forget about the entire 
Africa. Conveniently they forget about that. I laugh!" 
"Well, firstly, I think foreign policy is certainly based on the principle: 
'[Do] what is to my advantage as a country'. That was the first question 
to be asked by the United States government. 'Will it be to my 
advantage to introduce sanctions against South Africa, Yes or No?' I 
think they [the US] decided 'Yes', they're sensitive about South Africa 
that why we're going to change from constructive engagement towards 
sanctions. In a certain sense, I think the Black Lobby, the Black caucus 
perhaps, in Washington played a major role in introducing sanctions 
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against South Africa. And well at the time in 1986 things were not as 
good as it is now. And we had a very difficult period in our political 
history. We were about to change our leadership. We were a little bit 
uneasy within the National Party ranks about leadership, so it was a 
difficult time even in South Africa. There was no hope that we were 
going to have a bright future. Today, it's a lot better. So in '86, I can 
understand why they did it at that stage." 
"It's a question of they want to improve the lives of the black people in 
South Africa in a way to force us to do more than we can do." 
"Two reasons that I should say. The first one is the efforts by the anti-
apartheid people in America, in Europe and I'll also include with that 
the ANC. Linked with this I should say the Americans became the easy 
victims of a wrong presentation in South Africa because they are highly 
motivated by the whole question of human rights." 
"Well, I believe the average American or even the average politician is 
not so be-all and end-all as far as sanctions in South Africa. You've got 
a few that make it an issue. You've got it amongst your negroes in 
particular. Where you talk about the whites in the United States, i.e., 
the congressmen and senators and so on. They've got constituencies and 
I don't believe the problem between white and negro has really been 
solved in America. There is a lot of tension there still to complicate one 
another. [Politicians] say, 'well look, you know, we've got to sort out 
our brothers in the South and we think it's unfair'. Therefore, that was 
one major motivation on the part of the United States causing them to 
introduce sanctions against South Africa." 
"Well, I suppose there is a certain amount of moral outrage at racism 
and discrimination. Which is shared by a majority of South Africans 
now. So, I think people agree with that. We're against discrimination, 
apartheid and so on. But I think it is underwiitten by the fact that in 
America there is a huge guilt complex about what went before. For 
instance, there was no widespread slavery in South Africa and I was 
struck when I went to America and American blacks if they heard that 
you're a visiting white from South Africa, even if they didn't take in that 
you were from South Africa, they mentioned within ten minutes that 
their grandfathers were slaves or grandmothers or something. And I'd 
never been exposed to that and I think there is a huge guilt complex in 
America about the whole slavery issue and the treatment of the 
lynching, the whole treatment of blacks there which I actually think 
perhaps in many ways, more crass and worse than it is here. So now 
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that blacks are the minority in America that has to be protected and to 
be bolstered up. Ghettoes have to be done away with, it's a major 
political issue in American politics. We're an obvious whipping boy and 
I'm sure it is [part of the motivation]." 
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The following themes became evident in NP perceptions of the motivations which led 











many NP parliamentarians held the perception that internal human rights and 
other groups, especially the black lobby with in the US was one of the most 
prominent motivating factors; 
that the US has wrong perceptions about the South African situation; 
that the sanction issue became a 'business' in the US and the sanction issue was 
motivated to make an easy 'buck' regardless of the implications for the South 
African situation; 
that the US and others who implement sanctions are hyprocrites; 
that the US feels guilt for the way it treated its own black people, therefore, it 
tries to rectify this guilt by punishing South Africa; 
that the US is motivated by thinking that it is genuinely contributing towards a 
democratic society; 
that the international climate provided an atmosphere for change; 
instability within the NP ranks due to the CP split and an unclear agenda 
motivated for sanctions; 
that the US was outraged at racism and discrimination; 
that South Africa became an easy target for the internal politics of the US. 
• 
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The following eleven pie charts represent NP parliamentarian perceptions of 
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How important do you 
think the response to 
prominent black South 
Africans ( eg. Tutu, ANC, 
etc.) was in influencing the 
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When NP parliamentarians were asked what they felt the US expected to 
achieve through the imposition of sanctions, the following are some of the prominent 
responses: 
"Firstly, to quiet the strident voices coming within the United States. 
[Second] to show itself a leader in the human rights campaign, generally 
to satisfy the democracy drive that the US engaged in throughout the 
world and to achieve a stable position in South Africa in terms of 
competition with the Soviet Union at that time." 
"Well I think they tried to find a solution to the constitutional problems 
of South Africa, but whether that would be successful, it hurt South 
Africa but, it doesn't bring about a solution." 
"Heaven only knows, I don't! I assume that if the sanctions were in 
place because of a genuine motive to make things right in South Africa 
for South Africa, that what has happened recently would have taken the 
motivation completely away. But I don't believe there was a genuine 
reason for the imposition of sanctions. It was basically a reason imposed 
on Congress by the Democratic Party and their lobbyists in seeking to 
ensure the most votes for themselves. And it seems to that extent they 
were successful in obtaining a majority." 
"The answer to that question wouid depend on how I value the main 
objective of the sanctions. There [are] many views that the US objective 
was the safeguarding of important strategic minerals?. The question 
would have been to safeguard them for future access to those materials. 
Were [was] their major objective to assisting and establishing a stable 
long term government system? They would have expected to achieve 
that." 
"What they expect to achieve is to change the government structure in 
SA, to a, what our State President has referred to as a simplistic one 
man one vote system, which would result in Black majority rule. A 
simplistic sort of approach to the SA situation of what is commonly 
regarded as a democratic model like in the US. The point that I'm 
trying to make is, so when I say, when I talk about a democracy, I want 
to get a point across that a democracy in one country doesn't 
correspond in all respects with a democracy in another country which 
is also a democracy. I mean you have all sorts of built-in qualifications 
to the concept of a democracy as meaning one man, one vote and each 
man's vote counting as much as the other man's in a popular sort of 
election, sort of thing. 
"In replying to your question here, I think that there is a certain 
amount of, excuse me saying it, naivety in the US impression or their 
perception, a naivety in their perception that a democracy must 
correspond with the US model. And I think because we can't have a 
democracy on the same basis as the US in South Africa, as a result of 
the diversity of our population. They [the US] can't accept it. When you 
argue with them they keep coming back to the American basis, that 
being the 'ideal', the 'model' that you have to aspire to and, sorry, I 
can't accommodate you. In replying to your question; They're trying to 
persuade us through constructive engagement to work towards this 
model. Now we're working towards a different model. A South Africa 
model, which will be as democratic as the American one, as democratic 
as the Swiss one, as democratic as the British one, but not the same as 
any of them, because of the peculiar circumstances of South Africa." 
"I think the main reason is to try and satisfy their own black lobby, the 
human rights groups and trying to pressurize South Africa into doing 
the things the US wants them to do." 
"They probably know, I don't." 
"I think basically what they'd like to achieve is to weaken South Africa's 
economic position because I think they very well realize as we do with 
the typical example of Rhodesia where after a period you find that if 
your economy is not strong enough, that it is suffering, then obviously 
your ability to attend to some of the problems of pressures, whatever 
.you'd like to call them is weakening. Take for instance, just the issue of 
housing. I mean, with a weak economy you cannot spend the same 
amounts on social upliftment, housing, education etc. and therefore that 
would lead to even more social pressure. I think that is very important. 
· Another aspect which in my view is the US, you can see it from this Act 
[CAAA] the fact that it's a leading country in the world, it uses its 
position to isolate South Africa effectively and I think it -is not so much 
American sanctions, because its relatively probably the first or second 
most important trading partner. But in itself, it's not that powerful to 
bring SA economically to its knees. But I think the fact that, for 
instance, the pressure put on Japan, just to give one example, where 
Japan said, 'now what? I can't get America to be cross with me and I'd 
rather abandon the profits I make there [in SA]'. I think that is what 
America tried to achieve. To isolate South Africa to a very large extent. 
"The whole spirit of this legislation [the CAAA] is to find a non-violent 
solution." 
"I think th~ US, when it comes to a sense of guilt looking at the past 
history of what took place in the US, I would say to them it's fairly 
important to be seen at the end of the day when a new dispensation is 
being introduced in terms of a constitution in SA they want to be seen 
as being on the right side." 
"The US is not just one big body; a constituency that all agree on the 
same matter. There are different people which [with] different 
motivations. The ones who canvassed .... they really created an industry, 
an apartheid industry. Obviously sheer impersonal gain as far as I'm 
concerned. I don't think they're really worried as to what they've 
achieved. It was a question of carrying on until they got a one man one 
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vote [system] and then got us out and then they wouldn't be interested 
in us anymore after that." 
"In my view, this is a view that may change depending on what the US 
does. But in my view, all along sanctions were intended to bring about 
political change in this country of a nature, well, as we saw in the rest 
of Africa, a one man one vote system, a unitary system where we will 
have a black running the country eventually then, of course as you saw 
in Africa, the rest of Africa, as a dictator. This is what I felt, although 
the ideas behind imposing sanctions could have been sincere, that the 
people might have been sincere in wanting to bring about what was 
called a just and equitable society. That in the end, it would end up 
with us having a black dictator and this is something that I did not 
appreciate." 
"I think that the Americans thought they would bring in sanctions, 
reduce the white government to its knees, make the country absolutely 
in a state of depression and then it could be handed over to black 
majority rule. This is what they're after, no more and no less. And then 
they would've ended up with another third world country in Africa. And 
then [third] they would've turned their back on it and walked away 
without giving it any assistance whatsoever, as is the history of Africa 
and America." 
"That's a million dollar question - I would love to know myself. I can say 
a lot of things but it won't really help." 
"[The] liberalization of the South African situation [and] freedom for 
the blacks." 
"Well it's fairly plain to me that by putting pressure on the economics 
of a country, especially where you have a, sort of a part of a country 
like South Africa here where we've got quite high technology, and 
industry so we are actually very susceptible to the effect of sanctions. 
It must eventually have a very serious effect. On the other side of it we 
need much capital for building up and developing the country. So with 
sanctions, you cut that line of financing. I think it's actually a very 
effective situation." 
"Well, I think they absolutely want a democracy in South Africa, a 
broadening of democracy in South Africa. I think that's what they 
want." 
"I wonder how sincere they are about anything they want to achieve in 
relation to South Africa." 
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The following themes become evident in NP perceptions of what the US expects 









that the US wants to be seen a the international leader in the human rights 
effort; 
that the US wants to find a solution to the constitutional problems in South 
Africa; 
that there is evidence of self-interest among US politicians to utilize the South 
African issues for personal advantage; 
that the US expected to safeguard important strategic minerals; 
that the US sought to weaken the South African economy to effect political 
change; 
that the US hoped to isolate South Africa from the international community; 
that the US wanted to bring political change to a one-man, one-vote system or 
black majority rule; 
and to bring democracy to South Africa. 
The following pie charts represent NP parliamentarian perceptions of intended 
effects of sanctions and their importance: 
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When asked what effects do you believe sanctions have had on South Africa, 
the following NP parliamentarian perceptions are contained in the most prominent 
responses: 
"The first place has been to make the sanctions groupies more 
important so that you now have an anti-South African industry which 
is very hard to defeat. Secondly, it has caused resentment amongst most 
whites, and in the specific case, ... resentment against the US. There has 
been an effect upon sport but the US has certainly not been a major 
player in or sports activities abroad, therefore that was one of the lesser 
effects in the US itself. And I would say that in terms of morale it was 
the biggest blow to South Africa to have banks of the US pulling the 
mat out from under South Africa." 
"Obviously it has hurt our economy, if we're talking money, rands and 
cents. In various ways, there are a lot of goods, articles, etc., we could 
export, not necessarily import, to the States. Let's take for example the 
Krugerrand. The USA was one of our largest purchasers of the 
Krugerrand, for example. But it has definitely hurt us financially, 
without a doubt. But it hasn't brought SA to its knees. 
"If you talk about the actual perception of the South African 
towards an American, it's not bad as a person, but as a country, the 
effect on South Africans I pick up in the market place is, so what, 
whereas if they would've been allies of America, they now like 
Americans, as I said earlier, turned their back on us. So why should we 
be their buddy---bottom line? But it's definitely dampened the spirit of 
America being seen as the big western power and our friend. We've 
now learned that America is not our friend, because if they'd done their 
research properly and looked at the possibilities, other possibilities, I'm 
talking [about] the government without sanctions, I believe it would've 
been a lot more effective. [We] could have had , for example a lot 
better economy at the moment with a smaller disparity in wage-earning 
between white and black, which would have made the transition a lot 
easier. But as long as you keep the black man down on his knees where 
he is, and we have this disparity which is actually enormous in some 
aspects, and the only way to overcome that is job creation." 
"They did have an effect. The main effect they had was to slow our 
growth rate in the economy. And in so doing they created many 
unemployed persons in the wake." 
"It forced us [the South African government] to a major re-think on the . 
issues on hand" 
"Politically they have had the effect of making the government and the 
supporters of the government only more determined to overcome 
sanctions and not to be subjected by sanctions. On the other hand, as 
far as the blacks are concerned, perhaps it has given them some 
encouragement to, as they put it, to keep up the struggle for freedom. 
A struggle that as far as we're [NP] concerned, there was no need for 
a struggle ... it was a struggle within the ranks of the white electorate, 
to convince the white electorate it was necessary to implement changes. 
There was no need for an armed struggle from the side of the blacks 
but anyway, in as much as they regard it as a struggle, alright there was 
encouragement for them which also had a negative effect in the form 
of needs of terrorism and that sort of thing. So one could say it 
[sanctions] incited the radical element in the black community. 
"Economically, of course, it did have a very detrimental effect. 
Fortunately the SA economy was and is strong enough to withstand the 
pressure of sanctions. But still it harmed the economy and as I said 
previously it harmed the people that it was supposed to help and assist. 
It harmed them most in the way of job-creation, employment etc. [The 
economy] was negatively affected by the sanctions. SA needs growth to 
employ its people and if we're subjected to sanctions, then SA's 
economy can't grow, can't flourish and that means fewer jobs and more 
people unemployed. So in that way it did detrimentally affect the South 
African economy." 
"I certainly believe to be quite honest with you, I think that sanctions 
have certainly been productive in outlining the realities of world 
perception about situations in SA I think sanctions have had positive 
effects to a certain extent. On the realization that change has to be 
brought about quicker in this country. It also, I think to a certain 
extent, had an adverse effect on the economy of this country and, which 
concerns me most, it has certainly had a major adverse affect on the 
development of SA's economy which has delayed, to my way thinking 
the upliftment of the deprived parts of the population and in the final 
instance, although it has, I think, influenced and underlined the 
importance of reform in the country. I think it has had a major adverse 
effect on bringing about stability and progress in this country which I 
believe are of the utmost importance to really bring about reform in 
SA" 
"In the first instance, a very irritating effect amongst white and black. 
It definitely did not have the positive results that the US administration 
may have had in mind. It's irritating white and blacks in South Africa. 
Whites because of obvious reasons and the blacks, especially the 
opinion-formers amongst the blacks, who realize that the effect of 
sanctions is certainly not in the interest of black people in SA So [why] 
should the US penalize ... black people in South Africa in trying to 
convert the white electorate to another political line of thought? So it's 
certainly also an irritation for many blacks in South Africa." 
"Well it retarded economic growth in this country definitely. Therefore 
also our ability to deal with the socio-economic issues. 
"I think the SA economy is relatively large in African terms and 
diverse and in the sense I don't see the same can happen [as it did] in 
Rhodesia where you ground everything to a standstill. SA would be able 
to exist even if you continue sanctions for another 10 or more years, 
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since SA has .been fairly effective in circumventing many of its sanction 
measures. 
"I think the major thing, of course, is, where I think I've 
mentioned where you cut the potential economic growth. I f I may just 
mention here in 1985 when the American banks wouldn't roll over the 
loans and still make capital available, I think it's like the individual 
who's not bankrupt but needs an overdraft to carry on activities at a 
certain level and now he's cut back, I think this sort of effect. 
"I don't know whether this is an appropriate point, I would like 
to state that is about the double standards, selective morality. I think 
this is the one aspect that impressed me most if you go through this Act 
[CAAA]. I was aware but here again I came under the impression this 
selective morality, those things that America needs, those were excluded 
from [the CAAA]. And in other words, 'fine, I can pressurize you SA 
but I don't want any pressure for myself from that point of view'. And 
secondly, that I found only here, which the ethics of that [CAAA] can 
be questioned, the companies and American sectors are pressurized to 
do things in order to achieve what has been set as goals or objectives, 
irrespective of any law or legal requirement. I see that as openly 
disregarding and disobeying the local laws, no matter how reprehensible 
they may find them. I think that is an international behavior, whether 
you agree with the laws in a country, and if you make use of the 
hospitality of that country you abide by those laws. That was something 
astonishing I found." 
"Well it has certainly had a very positive effect in the fact that we have 
to a great extent realized that we have to look after ours~lves. We have 
built up a lot of industry that has achieved world recognition and I have 
to refer to ARMSCOR here as one specifically. · 
"The negative thing it has done is that it has amongst your 
ordinary man in the street it has brought sort of an almost, very 
negative, very negative feeling against the United States of America. As 
far as I'm concerned, these people are not going to prescribe to us any 
longer and whatever we do, we are easily blamed. That we are sort of 
handing over the United States. If we do anything, they see it as 
pressure from the United States. 
"And of course, the third thing is that they [the US] have 
certainly been very much blamed for the poverty which still exists in our 
country, despite the fact that we've made mistakes in the past, 
everybody has, so has America, everybody else has. Now they've got a 
Constitution they're trying to push down upon us. But when we try to 
rectify the situation they withdrew money from South Africa, so that we 
couldn't build or strengthen our infrastructure to cope with the 
tremendous increase of the growth of the black population. At this 
stage we have the highest growth in schools. We have a compound 6% · 
average since 1954 of children entering the education system, the black 
education system. No Western world can cope with that with sanctions 
and disinvestment. Obviously it's not possible for us to do so. So they 
[the US] have really only achieved to worsen the SA situation as far as 
the black people are concerned. The whites have not really suffered 
very much." 
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"They have certainly retarded our economic growth, no doubt about it. 
But not withstanding that, we are still not showing negative growth. 
We're showing a positive growth. Notwithstanding the great America 
and its sanctions. Because I don't believe America is the number one 
nation in the world to be quite frank. I believe she's got the skates 
underneath her." 
"I think I've already referred to it, that it has brought about change, 
there is no doubt in my mind. But, as I've stated, it wasn't sanctions 
only. I believe that Sept./Oct. last year was actually the turning point, 
because of change in government, because of sanctions, because of the 
change in the East bloc in Europe. Because of a time of peace that 
arrived throughout the world. That's a perception, so I don't think that 
sanctions only [alone] played a role. But it played a role. If you tell me 
that it didn't play a role, then of course I don't think so." 
"Precisely in that it was effective in the way it cut off our development." 
"I think more than we're going to admit." 
"Different effects. Especially sanctions on the more economic/financial 
side; the availability of loans; roll-over facilities of our loans. I think that 
had an effect that negatively affected growth in South Africa in a sense 
that although we still had a positive growth ' rate, we did not have the 
· type of growth rate that we need to provide for all the needs of all the 
people in the country. Especially to provide all the people that are in 
need of jobs. So it had the effect on a lot of people without jobs and 
without the economic development that this country could have 
provided for them in a normal economic situation. That's the most 
important. There are other side factors in a sense it affected the views 
of white people [that enhanced] the growth of the right wing in this 
country. I think sanctions played a part in that and the polarization of 
black thinking in this country was supported by that." 
"Well I don't think that they've wrecked our economy at all but I think 
it's made it more difficult to have a good standard of living and of 
course the lower end of the economic scale has suffered more than the 
people who have means. So you've had a lot of people rendered jobless 
through closures of factories which is the obvious one but doesn't affect 
large numbers of people if you look at it on a country-wide basis. I 
suppose it affects a fair number. 
"But the general economic recession which we have had, to 
which sanctions have been a contributing factor has obviously caused a 
lot of misery in the economic brackets, in the lower income brackets 
and I think it's inhibited the growth of the country. I think the worst 
has been financial because we have to worry about our balance of 
payment to repay debt. I mean for a developing country it needs to 
produce vast amounts of housing and infrastructure constantly to be an 
exporter of capital which we have been is madness anyway. Nobody else 
does it, nobody else could. I mean its an indication of the innate health 
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of this economy. The intrinsic health of it is that we've been able to do 
this and still grow. That's quite extraordinary." 
148 
When looking at the NP's perceptions on what they believe were the effects of 
















sanctions made the pro-sanctions campaign hard to defeat and gave the blacks 
encouragement to keep up the struggle; 
sanctions created anti-American attitudes and attitudes of resentment, especially 
amongst white people; 
sanctions were a blow to white South African morale; 
sanctions made South Africa more self-sufficient; 
sanctions forced South Africa to lose billions of Rands; 
sanctions rendered many South Africans joble~s; 
sanctions hurt the South African economy; 
sanctions slowed the South African growth rate; 
sanctions forced the South African government to re-evaluate the issues at 
hand; 
the sanctions issue made the South African government more determined to 
survive and overcome sanctions; 
sanctions outlined world views about South African politics; 
sanctions delayed upliftment; 
sanctions were seen by the South African government to have a double 
standard; 
sanctions enhanced the growth of the political right wing; 
and sanctions made it more difficult to obtain a good standard of living, 
especially for those at the lower end of the economic scale. 
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The following ten pie charts list several results that have been said to have been 
due to sanctions. NP perceptions depict what degree of influence sanctions have 
actually had on these results. 
None 
53% 
Figure 26: How much did the US 
sanctions influence the 
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attitude: 'Black resolution 
to lose jobs rather than give 
up sanctions'? 
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How much did US 
sanctions influence the 
attitude: 'Resentment of 
foreign meddling'? 
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the 1989 elections? 
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Figure 31: How much did US 
sanctions influence rising 
unemployment? 
(n = 34) 
None 
100% 
Figure 33: How much did us 
sanctions influence the 
lifting of Influx Control? 
(n = 19) 
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Figure 35: How much did US 
sanctions influence soul 
searching in South Africa? 
(n = 20) 
The following bar charts list the same results depicted in the pie charts above 
that have been said to have been due to sanctions. NP perceptions depict which groups 





Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 36: ·Which groups would say that the imposition of the State of Emergency 
was as a result of US sanctions? 
Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 37: Which groups would agree to the resentment of foreign 'meddling' as a 





Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
·Which groups would agree that blacks would rather lose their jobs than 
give up US sanctions? 
Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 39: Which groups would say that slower economic growth was a result of US 
sanctions? 
154 
Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
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Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 41: Which groups would say that the shift to Conservative Party seats in the 





Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANG lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 42: Which group would say that the re-evaluation of Homeland policies was 
as a result of US sanctions? 





Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANG lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 43: Which groups would say that the lifting of Influx Control was a result of 
US sanctions? 




Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
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Figure 44 ·Which groups would say that black impatience/violence was a result of 
US sanctions/ 
(n = 20) 
80 
65 
Whites Blacks NATS Far Right ANC lnkatha 
Category 
Figure 45: Which groups would say that soul searching in South Africa was a result 
of US sanctions? 
(n = 20) 
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The last set of bar charts ask NP perceptions on which of the future US action 
they would find helpful. (1 = Most Helpful - - - 5 = Not at all Helpful). 
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The results of the previous questions demonstrate the wide range of perceptions 
held by the National Party of U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, 
the various outcomes have produced responses in South Africa which have ranged 
from opposition to those of cooperation. Still it is important to keep in mind that the 
superficial face value of the response is not what is most significant, but rather often 
there are perceptions that are based on a deeper underlying understanding of the 
policy that are not verbally mentioned. Trying to accomplish a thorough analysis here, 
given the time frame and purpose of this dissertation is nearly impossible. 
Thus, this section seeks to do one thing: give a broad interpretation of a 
selected part -of the previous data. As it is not possible to unpack all of the data in this 
dissertation and the purpose is rather to display perceptions of the NP than to dissect 
them, this will be done by selecting three of the common themes that frequently 
occurred throughout the interview process. 
The theme that the U.S. is perceived as interfering in the internal affairs of 
South Africa, is a response which was present in the answer to questions asked about 
constructive engagement and those concerning sanctions. As witnessed in the historical 
United States/South African relationships explored in previous chapters, the U.S., apart 
from verbal condemnation of apartheid, seldom if ever acted unilaterally against South 
Africa, and most U.S. punitive measures were taken jointly through the United 
Nations. 
The unilateral attention given to South Africa by the U.S. in the 1980s 
intensified the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa. The U.S. bypassed the 
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UN unlike its actions in any previous measure. This action, especially in the 1986 
sanctions, seemed the most efficient way for the U.S. to influence the situation in 
South Africa. According to Merle Lipton: 
"This tendency to resort to sanctions has been strengthened by the 
search for alternatives to war in the nuclear age, as well as by long term 
economic and technological changes affecting the international system. 
Increasing economic interdependence and the communications 
revolution are creating a 'global society', in which the traditional 
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, between national 
sovereignty and legitimate international concerns, is being challenged. 
These changes have created increasing awareness of what is happening 
in other countries. Meanwhile, the conviction that outsiders have the 
right and duty to intervene is strengthened by the belief that such 
sanctions are likely to be more effective than hitherto."1 
The perception that South Africa was an issue in the Cold War struggle 
between East and West and, therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South 
Africa for the sake of its mineral wealth. This perhaps led the South African 
government to believe it was merely an ally for strategic mineral purposes and for no 
other reason. The arguments that support this opinion are four-fold: 
"l. It is important geo-politically for the West to maintain control of the sea 
lanes around the Cape of Good Hope; 
2. South Africa is a bulwark against the Soviet/Cuban threat to Southern 
Africa; 
3. South Africa is the dominant military power in Africa; 
4. South Africa uniquely possesses key minerals that are increasingly critical 
to the economies of the industrial democracies. Assuring this continued 
access is thus seen as a central consideration in any policy formulation 
toward South Africa."2 . 
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The perceptions held by the NP parliamentarians concerning U.S. interference 
in South Africa could be linked to a third set of ideas. The policy approach of the 
Carter administration had been unsuccessful in its efforts to promote change in South 
Africa. Moreover, its attempts to promote change, Carter's policy was often 
prescriptive and confrontational on human rights issues. This is evident in the meeting 
between Mondale and Vorster in 1979. Thus the relationship between the Carter 
administration and the NP was strained. 
It obvious from referring back to the data collected concerning NP perceptions, 
that they liked the interaction between the U.S. and South Africa, if the U.S. made few 
or no demands, other than verbal, to force political change. This is true particularly 
during constructive engagement where 85% agreed that constructive engagement was 
effective US. foreign policy (figure 6) and 76% held a positive attitude toward the 
policy of constructive engagement (figure 7). 
When asked which of the following U.S. actions they would find helpful (figure 
47), the NP respondents claimed that investment in Black housing, education, health 
and small business would indeed be helpful. They also agreed that diplomatic pressure 
would be helpful if exerted on the ANC (figure 48). 
The majority of responses collected concerning the sanctions issue viewed the 
sanctions measures as negative, prescriptive and containing other motives rather than 
to help search for solutions to South Africa's internal problems. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this: 
(1) that the U.S. Congress thought the only way to influence the internal 
situation in South Africa was to implement sanctions; 
(3) that South Africa did play a role in the East v. West struggle, where 
keeping South Africa as a close ally was in U.S. interests; 
( 4) that U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa under Carter was perceived 
by NP parliamentarians as negative; 
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(5) that the NP parliamentarians interviewed, desire U.S. interaction but 
only when it does not dictate or punish; 
The second key theme chosen for discussion, is the NP perception that the 
motives of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa were largely fueled by guilt from 
U.S. human rights movements (figure 10), pressure from American blacks (figure 12), 
pressure from U.S. human rights activists (figure 13), and the fact that United States 
politicians saw the South Africa issue as a vote-catcher (figure 14). 
The goal for the policy of constructive engagement, as formulated by Chester 
Crocker, was the following: 
"The emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United 
States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship 
without constraint, embarrassment or political damage."3 
The purpose of the sanctions legislation (CAAA) was to_ persuade the South 
African government to move more quickly towards a negotiated end to the apartheid 
system and the unrest in South Africa. The CAAA had three primary stipulations: (1) 
it imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy on apartheid; 
and (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. By contrast the study of NP 
perceptions indicate the following: 
(1) that there is a lack of trust and or understanding of the foreign policy 
. goals issued by the United States or; 
(2) that the United States was considered unfair in its approach toward 
South Africa. 
The third theme provides evidence that while most (64%) NP parliamentarians 
held the perception that South Africa could follow its own course rather than yielding 
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to sanctions pressure (figure 8), nearly all admitted that sanctions' measures have had 
some effect on bringing the current political changes to South Africa. 
This brings to light the question of actual success of U.S. sanctions efforts 
implemented toward South Africa. Have sanction measures failed or succeeded in 
bringing about their desired goal? One opinion states: 
"Sanctions have been instituted 155 times since World War I, but 
usually without much effect. Gary Hafbauer, professor of international 
finance at Georgetown University in Washington, calculates that only 
30% of the restriction imposed during the past decade have had even 
a marginal effect in changing a target nations policies. 
"Generally, either nations have been unwilling to impose 
sanctions severe enough to cripple the economy of an offending country 
or the restrictions have been widely evaded. The moral obloquy that 
proved so galling to white South African means nothing to dictators 
such as Saddam Hussein or Iraq and Deng Xiaoping of China, who are 
determined to maintain their power and to hell with world opinion. 
Some analysts suspect that even in South Africa, sanctions that 
devastated rather than only damaged the economy might have produced 
· a laager backlash. For once, the U.S. and other nations imposed 
sanctions just strict enough to have the desired effect - but there is no 
guarantee they will get the calculation right next time."4 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Several conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the data. One must keep 
in mind that crisp conclusions are not possible. The surface value of a particular set 
of perceptions often contains deep or underlying messages that must be decoded and 
analyzed. This must be done against the backdrop of other source material. Some very 
broad and general statements can be made about the data presented on the previous 
pages of text. 
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Firstly, it is easy to see that the NP had great hope for and felt positively about, 
the policy of constructive engagement, but were confused about what the policy 
actually sought to achieve. 
Secondly, the overall NP perceptions toward the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act and other sanctions were negafo,e. They were seen as contributing to stress and 
contention in US/South African relations. However, all admitted that in one way or 
another that sanctions had had some effect on the current and recently past political 
changes in South Africa. 
Thirdly, many times throughout the data it is recognized that many of the 
respondents sought to identify or ridicule similar problems in the United States rather 
than addressing the question at hand. Again, this must be more thoroughly analyzed, 
but can be seen as an admission of guilt or not wanting to accept the issues at hand. 
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The results and discussion presented in the previous chapters show a wide range 
of perceptions held by National Party parliamentarians concerning the objectives and 
motivations of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa in the 1980s. It is not possible 
to infer from the data a succinct and unified view on the effects of sanctions because 
the individuals interviewed had in most cases no clear-cut views. One's impression is 
of a considerable reluctance on their part to acknowledge that sanctions were a 
significant factor in causing the dramatic change in South Africa that was signalled by 
State President F.W. De Klerk's historic speech to Parliament op 2 February 1990. 
Moreover, as this conclusion will show, statements by leading NP figures on the 
political effect of sanctions have been characterized by ambiguity and even 
contradictions. More extreme advocates of sanctions, on the one hand, are inclined to 
the view that sanctions were 'decisive' in causing the South African government to 
move .boldly towards a non-racial democracy; opponents of sanctions, on the other 
hand, are inclined to be dismissive of any such claims and to assert instead that 
sanctions either played no role in causing the change or that they retarded it. 
The causes of the change are a complex amalgam of different factors, including 
moral qualms, recognition of the unworkability of apartheid ( and the neo-apartheid 
modifications introduced by P.W. Botha), as well as a sense that the world was a 
different place with the collapse of Marxist-Leninist states. Single-factor explanations 
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of apartheid's demise are inadequate. Accordingly, we may reject any attempted 
explanation of it as solely the result of sanctions. 
It is methodologically impossible to factor out the precise political impact of 
sanctions, any more than their psychological impact can be isolated. We may assert 
confidently that while sanctions undoubtedly inflicted economic damage on the South 
African economy, they did not cripple it and neither did they force the government to 
its knees. To the extent that sanctions played a part in causing change it was probably 
a marginal one, but even this conclusion must be offered tentatively since even 
marginal impacts can be significant. As Minter and Schmidt argued, sanctions were 
intended to achieve marginal increase in the pressure on the South African government 
(see p.103). 
The question of the impact of sanctions is likely to be debated at length in 
scholarly and political circles for years to come. Many concerns and questions are still 
unanswered and an attitude of ambivalence surrounds many key areas of debate. 
Moreover, much of the South African government's information on the effect of 
sanctions and what was said in Cabinet and elsewhere inside the state machine remains 
shrouded in secrecy. The conclusion, accordingly, must of necessity be appropriately 
modest, preventing such hard data as exist and drawing attention to issues that remain 
controversial. 
This dissertation sought to explore the perceptions which have underlain and 
influenced an aspect of white South Africa's responses to the foreign policy approaches 
of the U.S. in the 1980s. By examining the National Party's responses both to the policy 
of constructive engagement and the 1986 switch to punitive sanctions this dissertation 
aimed at deepening one's understanding of NP parliamentarians' perception of U.S. 
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foreign policy. The data and questions presented in this dissertation offer interview 
material that has been little studied in the past, which give the findings the virtue of 
freshness and uniqueness. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, studying perception presents a question of reality. 
Are the perceptions displayed by the NP parliamentarians a true picture of reality 
about U.S. foreign policy and sanctions in the 1980s or are they a distortion of it? In 
other words, in attempting to understand the relationship between the following 
hypothetical statements and NP perceptions of reality, one must understand the 
environment which the NP parliamentarian operates. Thus far in the previous chapters, 
the dissertation has, as much as it is possible, provided a discussion of this 
environment. However there are several possible myths and factors in the environment 
that could distort or alter the data. In this concluding chapter, some of these myths and 
factors will be discussed. The following presents a discussion of the hypotheses and the 
data of NP parliamentarian perceptions. 
In Chapter 1, the dissertation, while acknowledging the array of possible 
idiosyncratic explanations for NP perceptions, offered three general hypotheses. 
Hypothesis one operated from the assumption that the change in U.S. policy 
signalled by CAAA was perceived in an almost exclusively negative light by NP 
parliamentarians. It states that: 
National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy of sanctions to be 
motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the United 
States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and 
interests of South Africa as a whole, white population included. 
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If we refer to the data presented in chapter four, U.S. initiatives were perceived 
in a negative light by NP parliamentarians particularly those responses that concerned 
the CAAA. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to restate the central objectives outlined in the 
CAAA: (1) it imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy 
on apartheid; (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. It also laid out criteria 
that, if met, would result in the lifting of sanctions. 
Several sets of responses by NP parliamentarians suggest that in general NP 
perception of the U.S. CAAA policy tended to be emotional, rather than clinically 
dispassionate or analytical, suspecting that the policy had other motives than trying to 
improve the internal situation in South Africa. Such a perception was understandable 
in the light of the near-paranoid suspicion among whites of 'outside interference' in 
South Africa's. domestic affairs. 
Of the 21 NP parliamentarians that responded when asked if they saw the 
rationality behind the U.S. decision to implement sanctions, 29% answered simply no; 
among the remainder, the following themes were evident: that the rationale was to 
serve internal political purposes in the U.S.; that several respondents could understand 
the implementation of sanctions from a U.S. perspective but not from a South African 
one; that there was a degree of confusion concerning the exact reasons underlying the 
implementation of sanctions; and that the U.S. public is more aware of human rights 
than South Africa. 
Many NP parliamentarians held the perception that coping with the demands 
of internal human rights and other groups, especially the black lobby within the U.S., 
was one of the most prominent motivating factors; that U.S. lawmakers held wrong 
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perceptions about the South African situation; that the sanctions issue became a 
'business' in the U.S., affording a comfortable living to activists, who were in fact little 
concerned about the consequences of their demands for the South African situation; 
that the U.S. and others who implemented sanctions are hypocrites; that the U.S. feels 
guilt for the way it treated its own black people, therefore, it tries to atone for this 
guilt by punishing South Africa; and that the U.S. was outraged at racism and 
discrimination; and that South Africa became an easy target for the internal politics 
of the U.S. 
NP parliamentarian responses that display more 'favorable' perceptions are: that 
the U.S. is motivated by thinking that it is genuinely contributing towards a democratic 
society by implementing sanctions; that the international climate provided an 
atmosphere for change and that sanctions were an insignificant part of that process; 
there was instability within the NP ranks due to the CP split and an unclear agenda 
motivated for sanctions. It is evident from the majority of themes presented above that 
the U.S. is perceived in negative a light, supporting hypothesis one, whereas only a few 
represent data supporting hypothesis two. Also, in quantitative terms, the 'negatives' 
substantially outweigh the 'positives'. 
To further this argument, figure 11 shows that only 9% of NP parliamentarians 
that U.S. policy-makers to be sincere when they introduced sanctions to bring about 
a change in South Africa. Additionally, figure 14 shows that 100% of NP 
parliamentarians perceived that using the South Africa issue as a 'vote-catcher' had 
some degree of importance on the U.S. policy-making agenda. 
Thus, hypothesis one --- that National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign 
policy to be motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the 
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United States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and 
interests of South Africa --- is substantially validated: The change in U.S. policy 
signalled by CAAA was perceived in a largely negative light. 
Hypothesis two, on the other hand, assumes a more positive perception of U.S. 
intent on the part of NP politicians. It states that: 
National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a 
sincere desire to ensure not only fundamental change in the South African 
social formation but also a significant political and economic role for whites as 
well as non-whites. 
Several responses from NP parliamentarians reflect a positive perception of 
U.S. foreign policy. This is particularly true of Reagan's first term (ending in 1984) 
when constructive engagement was being implemented. As noted earlier, the 
fundamental goal of constructive engagement, according to Crocker, was "the 
emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its 
varied interests in a full and friendly relationship", accordingly the U.S. should foster 
and support "peaceful change toward a nonracial system". 1 
Figure 6 shows that, 85% of NP parliamentarians agreed that constructive 
engagement was an effective policy. In addition, in figure 7, 76% of NP 
parliamentarians' perception had a positive attitude toward the policy of constructive 
engagement. These responses prove hypothesis two to be correct. 
However, not all NP responses regarding constructive engagement were positive. 
Some NP parliamentarians allude to possible confusion over the policy, while · others 
saw it as 'interference'. 
The following themes among NP perceptions are evident in response to 
questions about what motivated the U.S. to develop its policy of constructive 
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engagement: that South Africa was perceived as an issue in the Cold War struggle 
between East and West and therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South Africa 
for the sake of its mineral wealth; that there was confusion and uncertainty about 
whether sanctions were the consequence of constructive engagement's failure. There 
was also confusion about who initiated/promoted the sanctions policy, some even 
believing that President Reagan himself was responsible; that the constructive 
engagement policy was developed to find a solution to the Namibian situation; that the 
purpose of constructive engagement was an honest attempt to encourage upliftment 
and democracy; that constructive engagement brought a welcome change from the 
attitudes of the Carter administration, which had been unsuccessful in its efforts to 
promote change in South Africa; that constructive engagement derived from a strong 
tendency in U.S. historical tradition to wish to bestow upon other states the blessing 
of American-style institutions; that the U.S. was often perceived as interfering in South 
Africa's internal affairs; and that the U.S. developed the constructive engagement 
policy to please both South African and anti-South Africa people in Washington for 
the purpose of heading off the pro-sanction lobby. 
The data in chapter four suggest that while NP perceptions of constructive 
engagement were favorable to the positive, 'open communication' and 'negotiation' 
side of the policy, equally, they manifested 'resentment' at interference and 
'prescriptive tendencies' from the U.S. Thus, hypothesis two --- that National Party 
politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a sincere desire to ensure 
fundamental change in the South African social formation --- is correct in reflecting NP 
perceptions of some aspects of the U.S. policy of constructive engagement. 
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Before reviewing the data concerning hypothesis three, it is necessary to stand 
back and place the question of the political impact of sanctions in a wider context. The 
core of the dissertation has been a study of perceptions, and more specifically NP 
parliamentarian perceptions of sanctions, but perceptions may not correspond with 
'reality' ( although reality to be sure, misperceptions of other states' policies and their 
impact are 'real' enough in international relations). Finally, hypothesis three states that: 
U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, played a 
marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South African government 
to make fundamental changes. 
Only nine out of 35 NP parliamentarians held the perception that United States 
sanctions policies had had absolutely no direct effect on their constituencies. Of the 
rest that responded, there was definitely a consensus that sanctions had some either 
positive or negative effect on their constituencies. Of the data collected, the following 
themes are evident: that it has caused a rising attitude of resentment among people 
in South Africa towards the U.S.; that sanctions have made certain.imports unavailable 
and the alternatives have been costly; that it has had a financial effect on the South 
African economy; that it caused exporters to look for alternative overseas markets; that 
it stimulated South african technological advancement in many fields and brought new 
industry such as MOSSGAS, SASOL and ARMSCOR; that sanctions measures 
affected many black townships that suffered job losses due to disinvestment; that it 
hardened white attitudes which bolstered Conservative Party support in many 
constituencies; and that sanctions measures contributed to the general economic 
recession. 
The question was raised whether or not South Africa would ever have to yield 
to pressure due to U.S. sanctions. (Figure 8.) The data presents the following results: 
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Of the 33 that answered, 21 % agreed that yes, eventually South Africa would have to 
yield to pressure, while 64% answered no, that they had confidence that South Africa 
could follow its own course, and 15 % were uncertain. 
According to the data of NP parliamentarian perceptions of the political, 
psychological, and economic effect U.S. sanctions have had on South Africa suggest the 
following conclusions: that sanctions made the pro-sanctions campaign hard to defeat 
and gave the blacks encouragement to keep up the 'struggle'; sanctions forced the 
South African government to re-evaluate the issues at hand; that sanctions underlined 
world hostility to South Africa's racial politics; that sanctions delayed upliftment; and 
that sanctions enhanced the growth of the political rightwing. 
The specific perceptions obtained from NP parliamentarians about the 
psychological. effect of sanctions state: that sanctions created anti-American attitudes 
and attitudes of resentment, especially amongst white people; and that sanctions were 
a blow to white South African morale, that the sanctions issue made the South African 
government more determined to survive and overcome sanctions. 
The specific perceptions obtained from NP parliamentarians about the 
economic effect of sanctions state: that sanctions made South Africa more self-
sufficient; that sanctions caused South Africa to lose billions of Rands; that sanctions 
rendered many South Africans jobless; that sanctions hurt the South African economy; 
that sanctions slowed the South African growth rate, and that sanctions made it more 
·difficult to obtain a good standard of living, especially for those at the lower end of the 
economic scale. 
Thus, hypothesis three --- U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed 
by other states, played a marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South 
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African government to make fundamental changes --- is substantially validated: U.S.-
imposed sanctions forced the South African government to re-evaluate the issues at 
hand. 
In order to do this, the remainder of this concluding chapter seeks to explain 
certain myths and external events that could alter make a difference on NP perceptions 
held about the success of the sanctions debate (hypothesis three). 
MYTHS and EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The question to be raised here is how much of the change in South Africa since 
February 1990 is attributable to sanctions, and how much to other contingent factors 
occurring in the external environment during the mid-to-late 1980s? Two issues have 
previously been alluded to: Firstly, an event of much importance occurred July 1985 
when Chase Manhattan Bank refused to roll over loans to South Africa. This set off 
a chain reaction followed by other international banks in September of the same year. 
How much of Chase Manhattan's decision was due to abhorrence of apartheid or was 
it rather the reaction to influences in the international market? Or, put another way, 
due to other pressures did the Bank foresee financial difficulty in having its loans to 
South Africa repaid and was the South African situation used as the reason for 
refusal? Chase Manhattan's chief executive office said in August, 1991 that its decision 
was taken purely on the basis of market considerations: 
In 1985 we felt that the risk attached to political unrest and economic instability 
became too high for our investors. We decided to withdraw ... It was never the 
intention to facilitate change in South Africa with this decision. The decision 
was taken purely on account of what was in the interest of Chase and its · 
assets.2 
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However, South Africa's inability to secure finance from abroad was not only due to 
sanctions but to a worldwide lack of investment capital. Merle Lipton states that South 
Africa was not alone in being unable to secure finance: 
"The international debt crisis was, in part, the result of the drying up of the 
petro-dollars that flooded the world markets during the 1970s and of the 
subsequent worldwide shortage of investment capital that followed the collapse 
of oil prices during the early 1980s. Many developing countries, faced with 
soaring interest rates on their large debts and unable to secure new loans, 
found themselves being converted into net capital exporters."3 
Secondly, to what extent was change in South Africa and the apparent 
effectiveness of sanctions a matter of a contingent historical event? South Africa, under 
the leadership of P.W. Botha, was a state that exemplified tunnel vision. Botha 
believed in the 'total onslaught' of Soviet influence in the region, and he maintained 
a strong 'anti-interference' stance, especially when pressured by the international 
community. This was seen very clearly in a speech by President Botha, in 1985, which 
displayed a hardening of attitudes toward international pressure. 
"I have said on various occasions that I am not prepared to lead the Whites to 
abdication, but I warn that if injudicious elements abroad should have their way, 
they will unleash injudicious forces in this country and that will lead South 
Africa to only one thing. It will not only lead South Africa to poverty but to a 
blood-bath. If South Africa is plunged into a blood-bath, however, many people 
in this country will suffer. South Africa is so constituted that it could easily be 
turned into a blood-bath by any fool. ... Consequently I hope that responsible 
leaders in the free world will themselves make a stand, as they have already 
started doing, to stop this fools errand the left-wing radicals have embarked 
upon."4 
Only optimism of the most utopian kind could have predicted such a drastic shift in 
South African ideology in the short period since the Presidency of P.W. Botha. 
Assessing the precise impact of sanctions on South Africa's political leadership is made 
difficult by the fortuitous historical fact that P.W. Botha was laid low by a stroke early 
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in 1989 and thereafter faded from the political scene in a messy transition. Had this 
contingent event not happened, it is possible that Botha, a head-strong and intransigent 
man, would have remained in office for another term, adopting an even more defiant 
attitude to the outside world. This is obviously an hypothetical argument, but it surely 
complicates any simple view that sanctions 'were decisive' in forcing radical change on 
the South African government. As late as 1989, and even after De Klerk became 
Acting State President, there was general agreement among political analysts that 
fundamental change was not imminent. Some, indeed, spoke in terms of a twenty-year 
time-frame for such change. 
A second contingent historical fact was the effect on the South African 
leadership of the collapse of communism, especially the way in which Marxist-Leninist 
regimes in Eastern Europe went-down like ninepins in 1989 and the USSR itself 
continued its decline. Many in leadership actually believed their own 'total onslaught' 
propaganda, and supposed that the ANC was little more than a client of the Kremlin. 
The collapse emboldened them. This was a major factor in promoting change, but it 
had nothing to do with sanctions. 
A third event of watershed importance was that of the Namibian settlement. 
Even though it too had little or nothing to do with sanctions --- indeed, it could be 
seen more as a product of constructive engagement combined with a growing belief 
within the South African government that holding the line on Namibia/Angola was not 
worth the cost in terms of lives and military expenditure. The situation · in Namibia 
demonstrated to the South African government that a negotiated transition to a free 
and fair democratic process was possible. Moreover, the strong showing of the anti-
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SW APO parties encouraged the NP to hope that it ( and its allies) might achieve a 
comparable result, perhaps even victory, in future democratic elections in South Africa. 
In analyzing the change in the South African government's policies, Pauline 
Baker states that the previous ideological 'myth' of white politics had been discredited: 
"Of all the myths about white South Africans, none has been so widespread as 
the assumption of white intransigence, regardless of cost. This has often been 
described through the metaphor of the "laager," the circle of ox-drawn covered 
wagons used by eighteenth-century Afrikaner settlers during conflicts with 
Africans. Politically, the term has come to refer to a unique political mentality; 
it was thought that the ruling white regime, under pressure, would only harden 
its position further."5 
This myth, claims Baker, "proved false, not only in the former British and 
Portuguese colonies, but in South Africa as well. Accumulated internal and external 
pressures forced the South African government to recalculate basic policies and 
principles that had been in force for 40 years.116 Even though the political approach 
that is still accepted by the CP supports the "laager" theory, the actual government 
ideology of the NP has changed significantly. 
Baker's comments are partly right, but they are also irrelevant in a crucial 
respect. She is obviously correct in saying that pressures did not create greater 
cohesion in South Africa --- indeed, especially after the formation of the CP in 1982 
and the mushroom-like growth of ultra-rightwing organizations in the 1980s. Intra-white 
political conflict has been more intense than at any time since the 1940s. 
Sanctions were virtually unanimously opposed by whites of all political stripes 
(including liberal organizations like the PFP/DP and individual liberals like Alan Paton 
and Helen Suzman), although there were marked differences among the parties over 
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how best to respond to them. Surveys of white attitudes conducted on behalf of the 
South African Institute of International Affairs in 1989 and 1990 suggest a marked 
hardening of attitudes to foreign interference.7 H. Kotze' and E. Lourens correctly 
predicted in 1987 that the CP would be favored by 'a further deterioration of the South 
African economy with concomitant unemployment and a drop in living standards'.8 
CP Members of Parliament were not interviewed in this survey but it is relevant 
to the point being made here to note the comment made to the writer by a senior CP 
parliamentarian. According to then (1990) CP information ·officer, Koos van der 
Merwe, 'sanctions have definitely strengthened the CP and it is impossible to measure 
the enormous success the CP has enjoyed due to sanctions'.9 It is not part of 
dissertation to discuss the prospects for the CP, but it is relevant to stress the 
relationship between worsening economic conditions and the strength of the rightwing 
backlash. Any 'balance-sheet' on the effects of sanctions has to include their 
contribution to the CP's growing strength and, hence, to complicating transition. 
The general election of May 1987 was the first opportunity white voters had of 
expressing an opinion on sanctions. Since the election took place only a few months 
after the enactment of the CAAA, one would have expected 'outside pressure' to be 
a major issue in the campaign. This was not to be: no fewer than 58% of a sample of 
voters declared it to have played a small role or no role in voter perceptions of the 
issues.'10 Much more significant were the issues of security and political reform. The 
relative lack of attention paid to sanctions was probably attributable to two factors: the 
violence that began to taper off only a matter of months before the election; and the 
fact that sanctions had, as yet, not begun to bite. 
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Baker makes no effort to isolate sanctions as a causal factor in explaining the 
change. She does however ignore the political repercussion of a contracting economy, 
which may yet thwart South Africa's quest for democracy. Just as Mao Zedong is 
reported to have replied, in answer to a question about the effects of the French 
Revolution, 'it's too soon to tell,' so with regard to sanctions. They may have played 
a marginal role in achieving change, but they may also prove to be a contributory 
factor to an uncontrollable economic decline that will make a South African democracy 
impossible. 
Sanctions-busting and the drive towards for greater economic self-sufficiency 
became a common practice of the South African government during the sanctions era. 
There is much debate concerning some of the practices and projects adopted to 
alleviate sanction pressure. The Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr. Theo Alant, told the 
Free State National Party congress on 3 September 1991, that: 
"With hindsight MOSSGAS was a bad investment, as very much more could 
have been done with the millions spent on that project."11 
Huge sums of money had been expended on efforts to circumvent what would 
probably have been the most damaging sanction of all, a comprehensive oil embargo. 
SASOL (an oil-from-coal plant) and MOSSGAS (an offshore natural gas installation), 
together with large amounts spent on stockpiling oil ( and other strategic requirements), 
all represent huge expenditures of an essentially uneconomic nature. Recently, it was 
reported that MOSSGAS funding has risen to R12bn --- almost R5.5bn more than 
originally expected in 1987.12 
By no means all of the economic adjustments initiated by the South African 
Government were necessarily unsuccessful. The ARMSCOR industry, for example, is 
179 
a case-in-point which has unquestionably brought substantial success to the South 
African government in its search for self-sufficiency in armaments. ARMSCOR's 
prowess has also made South Africa a not insignificant exporter of arms. 
If it is acknowledged that sanctions have damaged South Africa's economy, 
perhaps one of the most significant questions to be asked are what is the long-term 
damaging effects of sanctions? It is an uncontested fact that sanctions slowed economic 
growth, brought higher unemployment and virtually stopped international economic 
investment. The argument that sanctions were significant, even decisive, in promoting 
change still has to reckon with the argument that sanctions, by contributing to the 
dramatic slowing-down of the economy in the 1980s, may yet have an indirect baneful 
effect on South Africa's capacity to sustain democratic institutions. State President, 
F.W. De Klerk notes that: 
"As we near our political goals, several economic challenges face South Africa 
and the whole Southern African region .... For unless government can provide 
for the material needs of its people, create economic frame-works that bring 
opportunity and the prospect of a better life, it risks endangering the very 
democracy that it is building."13 
And as stated Deputy Minister, Theo Alant, 
"If we don't succeed in attracting massive foreign investment our economy will 
not reach its potential."14 
It has now become a common place in the theory-building of transition to 
democracy that all of the recent successful transitions have taken place in growing 
economies. South Africa is seeking to incorporate a large new electorate, which will 
undoubtedly make huge demands on the Treasury, while its economy remains sluggish. 
There is general agreement that sanctions damage the economies of targeted states, 
.. 
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and South Africa has been no exception, but whether sanctions lead to benign 
outcomes for the polities of !argeted states is altogether a different issue. 
In November 1990 personal interviews were conducted with a sample of high 
ranking officials in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. (Appendix J) The 
Department of Foreign Affairs officials, who were interviewed for the purpose of 
obtaining a slightly different perspective, substantially shared the NP perceptions. With 
no exceptions, all believed that U.S. sanctions had some influence in deciding change, 
the degree to which it influenced such change will probable remain unknown and a 
topic for debate for some time. Additionally all officials opposed sanctions. The 
important conclusion to be drawn here is that the sanction issue has had a curious way 
of merging white decision-maker opinion. 
The above paragraphs have sought to outline possible areas of thought which 
are significant in determining the outcome of the South African sanctions debate which 
have an inevitably effect on NP perception. These remarks are by no means conclusive 
in predicting the destiny of South African politics, but rather their purpose was to give 
a possible outline of key influences that could alter the future process undertaken by 
a new South Africa. The impact on inducing change in South Africa has and continues 
to inject more data into this debate. 
Reverting to the three hypotheses, it is true that U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s 
has generated both positive and negative situations according to NP parliamentarian 
perception. The political, psychological and economic impact of U.S.-imposed sanctions 
against South Africa is influenced many external and internal environmental factors, 
and it is unlikely that one can draw steadfast conclusions. However, as shown 
conclusively by the data, NP parliamentarian perception almost unanimously have 
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shown that U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, did 
play a marginal, yet very significant role in pressuring the South African government 
to make fundamental changes, and 'evaluate the situation at hand'. This apparently 
paradoxical conclusion needs explanation. Sanctions were not the major factor causing 
the changes initiated by President F.W. de Klerk in February 1990. They were, 
however, an additional source of pressure on the South African government. The 
cumulative impact of these pressures on the South African government. The 
cumulative impact of these pressures from different sources persuaded de Klerk that 
fundamental change was necessary. 
As stated earlier, this dissertation sought not to resolve the sanction debate per 
se, but rather to determine what precisely NP perceptions were toward U.S. foreign 
policy in the 1980s. It is hoped in doing so, this dissertation has helped to identify 
whether U.S. policy toward South Africa during this tim~ led to more positive and 
cooperative relations between the two states or whether it resulted in more negative 
and conflictual ones. Ultimately, this dissertation sought to make a significant 
contribution toward a better understanding of sanctions as an instrument of foreign 
policy in general and of U.S. foreign policy in particular. 
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APPENDIX A 
South Africa's * role in World mineral production, 1985. 
World Market Economies** 
Commodity Unit Production % Rank % Rank 
Alumina-silicates kt 196 39 1 48 1 
Antimony a t 7 390 14 3 23 2 
Asbestos kt 164 4 5 10 4 
Chrome ore kt 3 340 32 1 49 1 
Coal b kt 173 500 5 5 11 2 
Copper c kt 195 2 11 3 9 
Diamonds d Kear 10 206 16 4 19 3 
Ferrochromium t 856 989 28 1 37 1 
Ferromanganese kt 569 9 3 14 2 
Ferrosilicon kt 75 2 11 3 9 
Flurospar kt 349 7 5 13 2 
Gold t 671 43 1 55 1 
Iron ore Mt 15 3 8 5 6 
Lead c kt 98 3 9 4 : 7 
Manganese kt 32 54 1 60 1 
metal e 
Manganese ore kt 3 600 15 2 28 1 
Phosphate rock kt 2 452 2 10 2 8 
Platinum-group kt *** 23 3 43 2 
metals 
Silicon metal kt 36 6 5 7 4 
Silver c t 208 2 13 2 10 
Titanium minerals f kt 326 18 3 20 3 
Uranium c j t 4 880 na na 14 2 
Vanadium g h t 25 027 43 1 76 1 
-
Vermiculite kt 184 35 2 37 2 
Zinc c kt 97 1 15 2 11 





Excludes Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, 1ranskei, Venda and South West 
Africa/Namibia 
Excluding centrally planned economies comprising Albania, Bulgaria, China, 
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany DR, Hungary, Kampuchea, Korea DPR, Laos, 
Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Vietnam 
Classified 
a - metal concentrate; b - bituminous and anthracite; c - contained metal; d - gem and 
industrial rough; e - electrolytic; f - metal content of minerals, excluding slag; g -
contained 
V 20 5 ; h - includes Bophuthatswana; j - concentrate; na - not avaliable. 
Source: Minerals Bureau of South Africa, August 1987 in The Official Year Book of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1988 -89. 14th edition, (Pretoria: Bureau of Information, 1988-
89) p. 314. 
APPENDIX B 
THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES: 
Principle number 1: Non-segregation of the races in all eating and comfort and 
work facilities. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination. 
- Remove all race designations signs. . 
- Desegregate all eating, comfort and work facilities. 
Principle number 2: Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. 
Each signator of the Statement of principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Implement equal and fair terms and conditions of employment. 
- Provide non-discriminatory eligibility for benefit plans. - Establish an 
appropriate and comprehensive procedure for handling and resolving individual 
employee complaints. 
- Support the elimination of all industrial racial discriminatory laws which 
impede the implementation of equal and fair terms and conditions of 
employment, such as abolition of job reservations, job fragmentation, and 
apprenticeship restrictions for blacks and other non-whites. 
- Support the elimination of discrimination against the rights of blacks to form 
or belong to government registered and unregistered unions and acknowledge 
generally the rights of blacks to form their own unions or be represented by 
trade unions which already exist. 
- Secure rights of black workers to the freedom of association and assure 
protection against victimization while pursuing and after attaining these rights. 
- Involve black workers or their representatives in the development of programs 
that address their educational and other needs and those of their dependents 
and the local community. 
Principle number 3: Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for 
the same period of time. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Design and implement a wage and salary administration plan which is applied 
equally to all employees, regardless of race, who are performing equal or 
comparable work. 
- Ensure an equitable system of job classification, including a review of the 
distinction between hourly and salaried classifications. 
- Determine the extent upgrading of personnel and/or jobs in the upper 
echelons is needed, and accordingly implement programs to accomplish this 
objective in representative numbers, ensuring the employment of blacks and 
other non-whites at all levels of company operations. 
- Assign equitable wage and salary ranges, the minimum of these to be-well 
above the appropriate local minimum economic living level. 
Principle number 4: Initiation of and development of training programs that will 
prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, 
administrative, clerical and technical jobs. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Determine employee training needs and capabilities, and identify employees 
with potential for further advancement. 
- Take advantage of existing outside training resources and activities, such as 
exchange programs, technical colleges, and similar institutions or programs. 
- Support the development of outside training facilities, individually or 
collectively--including technical center, professional training exposure, 
correspondence and extension courses, as appropriate, for extensive training 
outreach. 
- Initiate and expand inside training programs and facilities. 
Principle number 5: Ine;reasing the number of blacks and other non-whites m 
management and supervisory positions. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Identify, actively recruit, train and develop a sufficient and significant number 
of blacks and other non-whites to assure that as quickly as -possible their will be 
appropriate representation of blacks and other non-whites in the management 
group of each company at all levels of operations. 
- Establish management development programs for blacks and other non-whites, 
as need, and improve existing programs and facilities for developing 
management skills of blacks and other non-whites. 
- Identify and channel high management potential blacks and other non-white 
employees into management development programs. 
Principle number 6: Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work 
environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health 
facilities. 
Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: 
- Evaluate existing and/or develop programs, as appropriate, to address the 
specific needs of black and other non-white employees in the areas of housing, 
health care, transportation and recreation. 
- Evaluate methods for utilizing existing, expanded or newly established in house 
medical facilities or other medical programs to improve medical care for all 
non-whites and their dependents. 
- Participate in the development of programs that address the educational needs 
of employees, their dependents, and the local community. Both individual and 
collective programs should be considered, in addition to technical eduction, 
including such activities and literacy education, business training, direct 
assistance to local schools, contributions and scholarships. 
- Support changes in influx control laws to provide for the right of black 
migrant workers to normal family life. 
- Increase utilization of and assist in the development of black and other non-
white owned and operated business enterprises including distributors, suppliers 
of goods and services and manufacturers. 
Principle number 7: Increased dimensions of activities outside the work place. 
- Use influence and support the unrestricted rights of black businesses to locate 
in the urban areas of the nation. 
- Influence other companies in south Africa to follow the · standards of equal 
rights principles. 
- Support the freedom of Mobility of black workers to seek employment 
opportunities where ever they exist, and make possible provisions for adequate 
housing for families of employees within the proximity of workers' employment. 
- Support the ending of all apartheid laws. 
Source: Alison Cooper, U.S. and Canadian Business in SouthAf;ica 1987. (Washington, 
D.C.: South Africa Review Service), 1987, pp. 143-145. 
APPENDIX C 
Chronological summary of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals, 1914-1983 
PRINCIPAL TARGET ACTIVE GOALS OF 
SENDER COUNTRY YEARS SENDER 
COUNTRY 
United Kingdom Germany 1914 - 18 Military victory 
United States Japan 1917 Use shipping to 
help Allies in WWI 
United Kingdom USSR 1918 - 20 (l)Renew support 
for Allies in WWI 
(2) Destabilize 
Bolshevik regime 
United Kingdom Yugoslavia 1921 Block Yugoslav 
and League of attempts to wrest 
Nations territory from 
Albania; retain 
1913 borders 
League of Nations Greece 1925 Withdraw from 
occupation of 
Bulgarian territory 
League of Nations Paraguay, Bolivia 1932 - 35 Settle the Chaco 
War 
United Kingdom USSR 1933 Release two British 
citizens 
League of Nations Italy 1935 - 36 Withdraw Italian 
troops from 
Ethiopia 
United Kingdom Mexico 1938 - 47 Settle 
and United States expropriation 
claims 
Alliance Powers Germany, later 1939 - 45 Military victory 
Japan 
United States Japan 1940 - 41 Withdraw from 
Southeast Asia 




Arab League Israel 1946 - Create a homeland 
for Palestinians 
United States Netherlands 1948 - 49 Recognize 
Republic of 
Indonesia 
India Hyderabad 1948 Assimilate 
Hyderabad into 
India 
USSR United States, 1948 - 49 (1) Prevent 
United Kingdom, formation of a 
and France West German 
government (2) 
Assimilate West 
Berlin into East 
Germany 




United States and USSR and 1948 - (1) Deny strategic 
CO COM COMECON materials (2) 
Impair Soviet 
military potential 
West Germany USSR 1949 - 69 Concessions on 
reunification 
United States and China 1949 - 70 (1) Retaliation for 
CHIN COM Communist 
takeover and 
subsequent 
assistance to North 
Korea (2) Deny 
strategic and other 
materials 
United States North Korea 1950 - 53 Withdraw attack 
on South Korea 
United Kingdom Iran 1951 - 53 ( 1) Reverse the 
and United States nationalizat-ion of 




USSR Australia 1954 Repatriate a Soviet 
defector 
India Goa 1954 - 61 Assimilate Goa 
into India 
Spain United Kingdom 1954 - Gain sovereignty 
over Gibraltar 






United Arab United States and 1956 Prompt Israel, UK, 
Republic Europe and France to 
withdraw from 
sinai and Suez 
Canal 
United States United Kingdom 1956 Withdraw from 
and France Suez 










Indonesia Netherlands 1957 - 62 Control of West 
Irian 
USSR Finland 1958 - 59 Adopt pro-USSR 
policies 
United States North Vietnam, 1958 - (1) Impede 
later Vietnam military 
effectiveness of 
North Vietnam (2) 
Retribution for 
aggression in South 
Vietnam 
United States Dominican 1960 - 62 (l)Cease 




USSR China 1960 -1970 ( 1 )Retaliation for 












United States Ceylon 1961 - 65 Settle 
Expropriation 
claims 
USSR Albania 1961 - 1982 (l)Retaliation for 
alliance with China 
(2) Destabilize 
Hoxha government 
NATO Allies East Germany 1961 - 62 Berlin Wall 










United States United Arab 1963 - 65 (1) Cease military 
Republic activity in Yemen 
and Congo (2) 
Moderate anti-US 
rhetoric 
Indonesia Malaysia 1963 - 67 Promote "Crush 
Malaysia" 
campaign 






African States Portugal 1963 - 65 Leave Africa 
United States Chile 1965 - 66 Roll back copper 
price 
United States India 1965 - 67 Alter policy to 
favor agriculture 
United Kingdom Rhodesia 1965 - 79 Majority rule by 
and United black Africans 
Nations 
United States Arab League 1965 - Stop US firms 
from implementing 
Arab boycott of 
Israel 
USSR Romania 1965 Reduce diplomatic 
openings to the 
West 
Nigeria Biafra 1967 End independence 
movement 
United States Peru 1968 Forgo aircraft 
purchases from 
France 
United States Peru 1968 - 74 Settle 
expropriation 
claims 
United States Brazil 1968 - 69 Restore democracy 






United States India and Pakistan 1971 Cease fighting in 
East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) 
United States Countries 1972 - Overview 
Supporting Int'l 
Terrorism 
United Kingdom Uganda 1972 - 79 (l)Retaliation for 
and United States expelling Asians 
(2) Improve 
human rights (3) 
Destabilize Amin 
government 
United States Countries Violating 1973 - Overview 
Human Rights 
Arab League United States and 1973 - 74 (l)Retaliation for 
Netherlands supporting Israel in 
October War (2) 
Restore pre-1967 
Israeli borders 
United States South Korea 1973 - 77 Improve human 
rights 
United States Chile 1973 - 81 Improve human 
rights 
United States Turkey 1974 - 78 Withdraw turkish 
troops from 
Cyprus 
Canada India 1974 - 76 (l)Deter further 
nuclear explosions 
(2) Apply stricter 
nuclear safeguards 
Canada Pakistan 1974 - 76 (l)Apply stricter 
safeguards to 
nuclear power (2) 
Forgo nuclear 
power plant 
United States and South Korea 1975 -76 Forgo nuclear 
Canada reprocessing 
United States USSR 1975 - Liberalize Jewish 
emigration 
United States Easter Europe 1975 - Liberalize Jewish 
emigration 










United States Uruguay 1976 - Improve human 
rights 
United States Taiwan 1976 - 77 Forego nuclear 
reprocessing 
United States Ethiopia 1976 - (1) Settle 
expropriation 
claims (2) Improve 
human rights 
United States Paraguay 1977 - Improve human . 
rights 
United States Guatemala 1977 - 82 Improve human 
rights 
United States Argentina 1977 - 82 Improve human 
rights 
Canada Japan 1977 -78 Adhere to nuclear 
safeguards 





United States El Salvador 1977 - 81 Improve human 
rights 
China Albania 1978 - 83 Retaliation for 
anti-Chinese 
rhetoric . 
United States Brazil 1978 - 80 Adhere to nuclear 
safeguards 
United States Argentina 1978 - 80 Adhere to nuclear 
safeguards 
United States India 1978 - 80 Adhere to nuclear 
safeguards 
United States USSR 1978 - Liberalize 
treatment of 
dissidents ( e.g., 
Sharansky) 
Arab League Egypt 1978 - Withdraw from 
Camp David 
process 
China Vietnam 1978 - Withdraw troops 
from Cambodia 







United States Iran 1979 - 81 (1) Release 
hostages (2) Settle 
expropriation 
claims 
United States Pakistan 1979 - 80 Adhere to nuclear 
safeguards 
Arab League Canada 1979 - 80 Retaliation for 
planned move of 
Canadian Embassy 
in Israel from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem 
United States USSR 1980 - (1) Withdraw 




United States Iraq 1980 - 82 Terminate support 
of international 
terrorism· 
United States Nicaragua 1981 - (1) End support 





USSR Poland 1981 - 82 Maintain internal 
discipline 
United States Poland 1981 - ( 1) Lift martial law 
(2) Free dissidents 
(3) Resume talks 
with Solidarity 
United States USSR 1981 - 82 ( 1) Lift martial law 
in Poland (2) 
Cancel USSR-
Europe pipeline 




European Turkey 1981 - 82 Restore 
Community Democracy 
United Kingdom Argentina 1982 Withdraw troops 
from Falkland 
Islands 
Arab League Zaire 1982 Withdraw 
recognition of 
Israel 
Netherlands Suriname 1982 - (1) Improve 
human rights (2) 





South Africa Lesotho 1982 - Return refugees 
suspected of 
antistate activities 
Australia France 1983 - Stop nuclear 
testing in the 
South Pacific 
Source: Gary Clyde Haufbauer and Jeffrey 1 Schott, "Economic Sanctions in support of 
Foreign policy goals", Institute for International Economics: Policy Analyses, Vol. 6, 
October 1983., pp. 14 - 22. 
APPENDIX D 
Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 
Title III contains immediate sanctions against South Africa. Five of these codify the 
provisions of the President's Executive orders of September 9 and October 1, 1985. 
There are 14 other sanctions in addition to these. 
Section 301 - bans the importation of Kruggerrands other South African gold coins 
into the United States. The importation of Soviet gold coins into the United 
States is banned by title V, section 510. 
Section 302 - ban~ the import into the United States of arms, ammunition, military 
vehicles, and the manufacturing data for these weapons. 
Section 303 - bans the import into the United States of products of South African 
parastatals except for agricultural products for 12 months after enactment and 
except for strategic materials for which there are no reliable suppliers. 
Section 304 - bans the export of computer, computer software, and goods and 
technology to the South African military, policy and other apartheid enforcing 
agencies. Computers may be exported only if there is an end use verification 
that they will not be diverted to prohibited agencies. 
Section 305 - bans loans to the South African government or government-owned 
entities unless the loans are for educational, housing, and humanitarian 
purposed. Loans to the private sector are banned under section 310, which 
prohibits new investments in South Africa. 
Section 306 - bans air transportation between the United States and South Africa via 
U.S. and South African aircraft 10 days after enactment and terminates a 1947 
air travel agreement between the two countries. Emergency landings are 
allowed. 
Section 307 - bans the export to South Africa of nuclear material, component parts, 
items, substances, or technical data. The exception is health and safety-related 
items such as pacemakers which contain small amounts of plutonium. This 
section provides for the ban to be lifted if South Africa becomes a party to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty or maintains International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards on all nuclear activities. 
Section 308 - prohibits U.S. banks from holding deposits of the South African 
government or parastatals expect for diplomatic or consular purposes. This 
provision is effective 45 days after enactment. 
Section 309 - bans the import of South African uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, and 
textiles, effective 90 days after enactment. 
Section 310 - prohibits new investment in South Africa, effective 45 days after 
enactment, but this does not apply to firms owned by black South Africans. 
Section 313 - terminates the 1946 U.S. - South African treaty that prevents businesses 
from paying taxes on the same income to both countries. 
Section 314 - prohibits U.S. Government agencies from contracting with South African 
parastatals for goods or services except for diplomatic and consular purposes. 
Sections 315 & 316 - ban the use of U.S. Government funds to promote tourism in or 
to subsidize trade with South Africa. 
Sections 317 & 318 - ban the export to South Africa of items on the U.S. munitions 
list except for items the President determines are being exported only for 
commercial purposes and will not be used by the South African military and 
police. The President is required to notify Congress of any sales allowed and 
Congress has 30 days to disapprove by joint resolution. 
Section 319 - bans the importation into the United States of South African agricultural 
products, but title II, section, 212 allows the export of U.S. agricultural goods. 
Section 320 - bans the importation of South African iron and steel into the United 
States. 
Section 321 ~ bans the export of oil and petroleum products to South Africa. 
Section 322 - prohibits U.S. agencies from cooperating, directly or indirectly, with the 
South Africa armed forces except activities for the purpose of collecting 
intelligence are allowed. 
Section 323 - bans the importation of South African sugar and sugar-related products 
and transfers South Africa's part of the U.S. sugar import quota to the 
Philippines. 
Future Sanctions 
Title V provides for possible future sanctions. Title V. section 501 requires the 
President report to Congress one year after enactment and every year thereafter on 
the progress of the South African government in ending apartheid and establishing a 
nonracial democracy. If significant progress has not been made, he may recommend 
one or more of the following sanctions: a ban on the importation of diamonds from 
South Africa; a ban on the importation of strategic minerals; and a prohibition on U.S. 
military assistance to countries violating the international arms embargo against South 
Africa. 
Provision for Termination of Sanctions 
Section 311 provides for the termination of the immediate sanctions (under title III) 
or future sanction ( under title V) if: 
(1) Nelson Mandela and other political prisoner.s are released, 
(2) the state of emergency is lifted and all detainees under the emergency are released 
(3) democratic political parties are unbanned, 
( 4) the Group Areas, and Population Registration Acts are repealed, and 
(5) the South African government publicly commits itself to good faith negotiations 
with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions. 
The President may suspend or modify any of the sanctions if Nelson Mandela and 
other political prisoners are released and any three of the four remaining conditions 
are met. Congress ~ay disapprove of any Presidential modification by joint resolution. 
Reports To Congress 
Title V, sections 502 - 509 requires the following reports to Congress on: 
Health conditions in the "homelands" of South Africa, 
Strategic minerals imported from South Africa, 
U.S. assistance in southern Africa and what steps can be taken 
to expand the trade, private investment and transport network 
of landlocked countries in that area, other industrialized 
democracies, 
Deposit accounts in U.S. banks held by South African nationals, 
Violations of the international arms embargo on South Africa 
imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 418, 
Commu.nist activities in South Africa, and 
U.S. investigation of allegations that the ANC or other African 
opposition groups may have violated the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. 
Multilateral Negotiations 
Title IV, section 401 gives the President authority to negotiate international agreements 
imposing sanctions on South Africa with other countries,a nd he is required to report 
to Congress on the negotiations. The President is also given the power to modify U.S. 
sanctions to conform with such international agreements. Section 402 provides the 
President with the power to retaliate against foreign government if their policies allow 
their firms to take commercial advantage of prohibitions against U.S. firms selling their 
products in South Africa. Section 403 provides that any foreign company taking 
advantage of U.S. sanctions to supplant U.S. businesses in South Africa would be liable 
for damages in U.S. courts. 
U.S. Policy on Apartheid 
Title I sets forth U.S. policy on apartheid. Title III, section 312 explains U.S. policy 
toward violence or terrorism, including congressional views of the practice of 
"necklacing," a method by which some township blacks execute blacks to ave 
cooperated with South African authorities. the victim's hands and feet are bound; then 
a gasoline-filled tire is placed around his neck and set afire. 
Assistance to Black South Africans 
Title II provides assistance to victims of apartheid. 
Section 201 earmarks $4 million annually for FY87, FY88, and FY89 for scholarships 
for black South Africans. 
Section 202 provides $1.5 million of the Human Rights Fund in FY86 and each year 
thereafter for nongovernmental organizations in South Africa promoting an end 
to apartheid. 0 that amount $500,000 is to be used for direct legal assistance 
and other activities which help political detainees, political prisoners and their 
families. 
Section 203 provides that U.S. government agencies assist black-owned businesses in 
South Africa. 
Section 204 requires the Export-Import Bank to encourage the use of its facilities by 
black South African businesses. 
Section 205 requires U.S. Government agencies employing South Africans to follow the 
Sullivan Principles. 
Section 206 provides that the U.S. Government lease or buy housing for its black 
South African employees and provides $10 million for FY87 for the program. 
Section 207 requires all U.S. companies with 25 or more employees in South Africa to 
implement the Sullivan Principles and provides that no U.S. assistance in export 
marketing be given to companies who do not implement the principles. Section 
208 lists the seven Sullivan Principles which U.S. companies and the U.S. 
Government must follow and provides that the President may contract with 
private groups to assist him in monitoring the compliance with the principles. 
Section 209 prohibits assistance to groups which have members who have violated 
human rights. 
Section 210 authorizes the use of the African Emergency Reserve to meet food 
shortages in southern Africa. 
Title V, section 511 earmarks $40 million for FY87 and fiscal year thereafter for 
economic aid to disadvantaged South Africans. Of that amount $3 million each 
year would be used for training of trade unionists. These funds cannot be used 
by organizations financed or controlled by the South African government. 
State and Local Anti-Apartheid Laws 
Title VI, section 606 gives state and local governments 90 days to bring their anti-
apartheid laws into conformity with whatever the Federal Government does, or face 
the possible loss of Federal funds. 
Source: Brenda M Branaman, Analyst in Afri.can Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense Division. Sanctions Against South Africa: Activities or the 99th Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, February 13, 1987, pp. 14-20. 
APPENDIX E 
The following four tables represent sanctions against South Africa as of May 1989. 
TABLE 1: . 
Sanctions against exports to South Africa 
COUNTRIES OIL ARMA- NUC- COMP- EXPORT CREDIT 
MENTS LEAR UTE RS 
TECH. GU ARANT NON-
EEO GU ARAN 
TEED 
Argentina PB 
Australia NTB TB NTB PB TB 
Austria PB TB PB PB TB 
Belgium NTB TB PB PB PB 
Brazil NTB TB TB 
Canada VOL TB TB TB TB PB 
Denmark TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Finland NTB TB TB TB TB TB 
France NTB TB TB PB 
Greece NTB TB TB TB 
India TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Ireland PB TB TB PB PB 
Israel NTB PB 
Italy NTB TB TB PB 
Japan TB TB PB TB 
Netherlands PB TB TB PB TB 
New Zealand VOL TB TB PB TB 
Norway NTB TB TB NTB TB TB 
Portugal PB TB PB PB 
Singapore PB TB 
Spain PB TB PB PB 
Sweden TB TB TB TB TB TB 
UK PB NTB PB PB 
USA NTB TB TB PB TB 
West Germany VOL TB TB PB PB 
'Ji: lotal Ban NTH: Near 'lotal Han 
' 











TABLE 2: Sanctions against Imports from South Africa 
COUNTRY ARMS Ag. COAL IRON K.rands & Uraniu Prod.o Govt 
Prod & Gold Coins m Parastatals 
STEEL 
Aust-ralia TB TB TB NTB TB TB PB NTB 
Austria TB NTB NTB 
Belgium TB NTB NTB 
Brazil TB 
Canada TB TB TB TB V/NTB TB PB TB 
Denmark TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Finland TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
France TB PB NTB TB 
Greece TB NTB TB 
H/Kong NTB TB 
India TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Ireland TB PB PB NTB TB TB 
Israel PB PB PB 
Italy TB NTB NTB 
Japan TB PB NTB V/NTB PB 
Holland TB V/PB NTB NTB TB 
New TB TB TB NTB NTB TB PB TB 
Zealand 
Norway TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Port-ugal TB NTB NTB 
Sing-a pore TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Spain TB NTB NTB 
Sweden TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
UK TB PB NTB NTB 
USA TB TB TB NTB TB NTB NTB PB 
Germany TB NTB NTB 
]S: 1 otal Han NTH: .l\ ear lotal Han PH: .Partial Han 
V: Voluntary. 
TABLE 3: Financial Sanctions 
COUNrn.Y BAN ON BAN BAN TERMI- BAN BAN ON BAN ON 
INVFSf ON ON NATION ONSAn LEASING TRANS-
MENT GOVT. COMMER OF INVFST OF EQUIP- FER OF 
LOANS CIAL DOUBLE MENT MENrTO PATENr 
LOANS TAX- SUBSID- &MANU-
ATION IARIES & FACI'UR 
AGREE- UCEN-
MENT SEES 
Austrailia vrrn NTB V/NTB TB NTB 
Austria PB 
Belgium V/PB PROP 
Canada vrrn NTB V/NTB TB 
Denmark NTB NTB NTB TB TB 
Finland NTB NTB NTB TB TB 
France PB 
Greece PB 
Hong V/PB V/PB 
Kong 
India TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Ireland PB V/NTB 
Israel PB NTB 
Italy PB NTB V/PB TB 
Japan TB NTB V/NTB 
Nether-lands PB VINT V/NTB 
B 
New V/PB NTB V/NTB TB 
Zealand 
Norway NTB NTB NTB TB TB 
Port-ugal PB 
Spain PB TB 
Sweden NTB NTB NTB TB NTB 
Switzerland TB PB 
UK V/PB PB 
USA PB NTB NTB TB NTB 
West Germany V/PB 
B: 'lotal .Han, NTB: Near 'lotal .Han, PB: Partial Ban, V: Volunta ry, P1<UP: Le JS!atJon g 
proposed. 
TABLE 4: Diplomatic and other non-trade sanctions 
"' c 
.!2 
"' ~ g< c .; c i:' E c "' 0 .; .g "' "' ,g 0 "O rJ) c ::: g ·.:: . c c 0 "' .... u :::, c "' "' "' 0 ·- "[i c u ·s ·a-~ .... c c 0 ~u 0 ·.:: B o "iu 0 "' - 0 "' ·e ·: cc "' c ... c ·: -~ -~ "' ·- c -~ E i:2 c .... u ~~ 0 8. 0 0 0 ·.:: - :::, ·- 0 0 !::: 0 
"' c O c E - ... ~ = c~ "O "' - c c'.l 8. '8 ti e ~ :a "' "' . "' 0 "' :::, "' "' c: COUNTRIES > c:o 8 c:o a. c:o 0:: "' u ~ al :.:: u ..... E-< 
Argentina NTB TB 
Australia PB NTB TB VIB TB TB NTB VIB 
Austria PB PB PB PB 
Belgium TB NTB TB NTB NTB VIB 
Brazil PB TB TB 
Canada PB NTB TB VIB TB TB NTB VIB TB 
Denmark TB NTB TB PB TB TB TB 
Finland NTB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
France PB TB NTB NTB VIB 
Greece PB TB PB NTB 
Hong Kong PB VPB 
India TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB 
Ireland NTB PB TB VPB TB TB NTB TB 
Israel PB PB PB 
Italy PB TB PB PB VIB 
Japan NTB NTB TB VPB TB VPB VPB VIB 
Holland PB PB TB PB PB PROP 
New TB TB TB VIB TB TB NTB TB 
Zealand 
NoIWay NTB NTB TB TB TB TB TB PB 
Portugal PB TB PB PB 
Singapore TB TB NTB NTB 
S. Korea TB TB TB TB TB 
Spain PB PB TB PB TB NTB NTB VIB 
Sweeden NTB TB TB VNTB TB NTB NTB VIB TB 
UK PB TB VNTB PB PB VIB PB 
USA PB NTB PB TB NTB NTB 
W. Germany PB TB PB PB 
-mcludes cultural, academic and sc1enht1c !mks 
TB: Total Ban, NTB: Near Total Ban, PB: Partial Ban, V: Voluntary, PROB: Legislation 
proposed. 
Source: Sandra Ferguson and Peter Sluiter, "Existing Sanctions: Sanctions Directo,y", in Joseph 
Hanlon, ed., South Africa: The Sanctions Report, (London: Commonwealth Secreta,iat), pp. 
5-9. 
APPENDIX F 
IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
I. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 









5. Other citrus 
6. Apples 
7. Grapes 
8. Rais ens 
9. Pears, avocadoes, mangoes etc. 
10. Fruit & juices, tinned, frozen & preserved 
11. Sugar & honey 
12. Coffee & tea 
13. · Groundnuts & groundnut oil 
C. Agricultural products related to clothing 
1. Leather & cattle hides 
2. Wool, wooltop, wool yarn, sheepskin 
3. Furskins 
4. Cotton & cotton yarn 
5. Vegetable tanning extracts 
D. Wood, pulp & paper 
1. Pulp & pulpwood 
2. Paper & paperboard 
3. Swan wood, plywood etc. 
E. Misc. agricultural products 
1. Animal feed 
2. Wine 
3. Tobacco 
4. Cut flowers 
II. IRON, STEEL & RELATED GOODS 
A. Iron ore & powder 
B. Ferro-alloys & ores for ferro-alloys 
1. Ferro-alloys ( mainly ferrochrome) 
2. Manganese ore 
3. Chromium ore 
4. Molybdenum, tantalum, tungsten etc. 
C. Iron & steel 
1. Scrap 
2. Pig iron & ingots 
3. Bars, rods, angles, shapes 
4. Universald, plates, sheets 
5. Wire, not insulated 
6. Tubes & pipes 
7. Simple manufactures 
III. PRECIOUS METALS & DIAMONDS 
A. Gold 
B. Diamonds & precious stones 
C. Platinum group metals 
D. Silver & precious metal ores, jewellery 
IV. MINERAL FUELS 
A. Coal 
B. Petroleum 
V. OTHER MINERALS 







B. Radioactive materials & uranium 




4. Quartz, mica, feldspar 
VI. MISCELLANEOUS 
A. Chemicals 
1. Organic chemicals 
2. Inorganic chemicals 
3. Resins & plastics 
B. Manufactured goods 
1. Synthetic yarn 
2. Cloth 
3. Glass & glassware 
4. Machinery 
5. Electrical & electronic goods 
6. Cars, trucks & parts 
7. Furniture 
8. Clothing & shoes 
C. Misc. & Unspecified 
Source: Richard Moorsom, "Technical notes on trade Stateistics'~ in Joseph Hanlon, ed., 
South Africa: The Sanctions Report, Documents & Statistics, ( London: The 
Mommonwealth Secretariat), 1990, pp. 83 -85. 
APPENDIX G 
IMPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA 
I. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
A. Agricultural products 
1. Meat & fish 
2. Cereals 
3. Fruit & vegetables 
4. Vegetables oils & animal fats 
5. Coffee, tea, other non-alcoholic beverages 
6. Alcoholic beverages 
7. Tobacco & cigarettes 
8. Paper & paperboard 
II. MINERALS 
A. Coal, petroleum & gas 
B. Iron & Steel 
1. Bars, rods, shapes, plates, sheets 
2. Tubes & pipes 
C. Other minerals 
1. Fertilizer 
2. Sulphur 
3. Clay construction materials 
4. Non-ferrous metals 
5. Diamonds 
6. Non-monetary gold 
D. Chemicals 
1. Organic chemicals 
2. Inorganic chemicals 
3. Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 
4. Soap, cosmetics, perfumes 
5. Resins & plastics 
6. Synthetic rubber 
III. MANUFACTURED GOODS 
A. Clothing, textiles & related goods 
1. Synthetic fibers & yarn 
2. Fabrics 
3. Clothing & Shoes 
B. Machinery & tools 
1. Hand & interchangeable tools 
2. Steam engines & boilers 
3. Electric motors & generators 
4. Textile & leather machinery 
5. Pulp & paper machinery 
6. Printing machinery 
7. Machine tools 
8. Metal-working machinery 
9. Heating & cooling equipment 
10. Pumps & compressors 
11. Mechanical handling equipment 
C. Vehicles & transport equipment 
1. Parts & accessories 
2. Internal combustion engines 
3. Tractors & moving farm machinery 
4. Construction vehicles & mining machinery 
5. Passenger cars 
6. Goods vehicles 
7. Aircraft 
D. Electrical & electronic goods 
1. Computers 
2. · Computer parts 
3. Consumer electronics (TVs, radios, home appliances) 
4. Telephone equipment 
5. Electronic parts & components 
6. Electricity transmission equipment 
7. Medical electronics 
8. Electrical & electronic measuring equipment 
E: Other manufactured goods 
1. Glass & glassware 
2. Scientific & control instruments 
3. Photographic & cinematographic equipment 
4. Optical goods & watches 
5. Books & printed matter 
IV. UNSPECIFIED 
A. Misc. & Unspecified 
Source: Richard Moorsom, "Technical notes on trade Statistics" in Joseph Hanlon, ed., 
South Anica: The Sanctions Report, Documents and Statistics, (London: The 
Commonwealth Secretariat), 1990, pp. 85 - 87. 
APPENDIX H 
SOUTH AFRICA'S MAIN TRADING PARTNERS, 1985 - 88. 
(US$M) 
1985 1986 1987 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO: 
United States 1,374 1,965 1,272 
Japan 1,279 1,826 2,214 
United Kingdom 969 1,056 976 
France 275 343 530 
Germany 567 1,059 1,135 
SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM: 
United States 1,429 1,229 1,281 
Japan 1,028 1,270 1,882 
United Kingdom 1,256 1,279 1,556 
France 428 412 467 












Source: Financial Times, February 8, 1990 (based on IMF data), in Merle Lipton, "The 
Challenge of Sanctions'~ Discussion Paper No.I, Centre for the Study of the South African 
Economy and International Finance, London School of Economics, Spring 1991, p. 15. 
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Mr. C. Ackerman, 14 May 1990, Bellville. 
Mr. Willem (Billy) Nel, 14 May 1990, East London City. 
Mr. R.J. Radue, 14 May 1990, King William's Town. 
Mr. MvS. Hamman, 14 May 1990, Ceres. 
Dr. H.M.J. Van Rensburg, 15 May 1990, Mossel Bay. 
Dr. F. Jacobsz, 15 May 1990, Helderberg. 
Mr. A.J. De Jager, 17 May 1990, Oudtshoorn. 
Mr. P.L. Mare', 17 May 1990, Nelspruit. 
Mr. S.J. Schoeman, 21 May 1990, Sunnyside. 
Mr. S.J. De Beer, 21 May 1990, Geduld. 
Dr. P.J. Steenkamp, 29 May 1990, Umhlatuzana. 
Mr. L. Le Grange, 29 May 1990, Potchefstroom. 
Dr. A.J.G. Oosthuizen, 30 May 1990, Alberton. 
Mr. D. Christophers, 4 June 1990, Germiston. 
Mr. P.T. Steyn, 5 June 1990, Winburg. 
Dr. B.L. Geldenhuys, 5 June 1990, Brentwood. 
Mr. C.J.W. Badenhorst, 5 June 1990, East London North. 
Dr. T.J. King, 5 June 1990, Kempton Park. 
Mr. A.L. Jordaan, 8 June 1990, False Bay. 
Mr. I. Lauw, 8 June 1990, Newton Park. 
Mr. A.G. Thompson, 11 June 1990, South Coast. 
Comdt. A. Blaas, 13 June 1990, Newcastle. 
Mr. G.C. Oosthuizen, 13 June 1990, Pretoria Central. 
Mr. J.A. Marais, 13 June ~990, Port Natal. 
Mr. A.T. (Tobie) Meyer, 13 June 1990, Cradock. 
Mr. J.A. Jooste, 14 June 1990, DeAar. 
Mr. P.G. Marais, 14 June 1990, Stellenbosch. 
Mr. N.J.JvR. Koornhof, 14 June 1990, Swellendam. 
Mr. W.D. Meyer, 15 June 1990, Humansdorp. 
Mr. C.L. Fismer, 15 June 1990, Rissik. 
Dr. F.J. Van Heerden, 19 June 1990, Durban Point. 
Mr. J.C. Matthee, 19 June 1990, Durban Point. 
Mrs. S.M. Camerer, 19 June 1990, Rosettenville. 
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Those who participated in structured research interviews from the South African 
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